At moments of historic pressure, nations are judged not only by the positions they take, but by the solutions they propose. The current European debate over frozen Russian assets, crystallised at a crucial EU summit, is one such moment. Belgium now finds itself at the intersection of legality and leadership, national prudence and European purpose.
The question confronting Europe is deceptively simple: should frozen Russian state assets be mobilised to support Ukraine? The answer, morally and politically, is already clear across much of the continent. Ukraine’s survival is inseparable from Europe’s security. What is contested is how Europe should act. More than that is who bears the risk.
Belgium’s caution has been widely interpreted, in some quarters, as hesitation. That reading is incomplete. My reading is that Belgium is not resisting European solidarity. It is warning against a model of solidarity that concentrates systemic risk in one member state simply because history and infrastructure placed the assets there. This is not obstructionism as some would like to simplistically label it. It is institutional realism.
As home to Euroclear, Belgium is custodian to a significant share of the frozen Russian assets. That custodianship carries legal exposure, financial vulnerability, and geopolitical risk. Any unilateral move that leaves Belgium or Euroclear bearing the brunt of litigation, retaliation, or reputational damage would be neither fair nor European. In a Union built on shared sovereignty, shared risk must follow shared ambition.
This is where Belgium’s political tradition offers Europe a way forward. Consensus-building is not weakness; it is statecraft. Belgian politics has long thrived on crafting outcomes that allow divergent interests to converge without humiliation or coercion. Europe would do well to draw from that tradition now. But Belgium would have to create the enabling environment for that to happen.
A credible European solution must rest on one foundational principle: Europeanise the risk, not merely the decision. If Europe chooses to act collectively, then the legal and financial consequences must also be collectively borne. A binding EU-level indemnity mechanism would ensure that no single member state becomes the fall guy for a European geopolitical choice. This must be anchored in a Council decision or regulation. It should not be seen as special pleading by Belgium. It is a test of European maturity.
Second, Europe must separate urgency from recklessness. There is already a lawful pathway that commands broad support: the use of windfall profits generated by frozen assets. Expanding this channel allows Europe to continue supporting Ukraine decisively while the more complex legal architecture around principal assets is clarified. Acting responsibly need not mean acting slowly.
Third, this debate exposes a structural weakness the EU can no longer ignore. Ad-hoc improvisation is no substitute for institutional readiness. Europe should seize this moment to establish a permanent EU-level sovereign assets mechanism. This is a framework that governs frozen state assets under strict political and legal thresholds. Such an instrument would remove hostage risk from individual member states and ensure that future crises are met with preparation, not panic.
For Belgium’s Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, the path forward lies not in retreat, but in reframing. Belgium should say, clearly and publicly, that it supports the objective of mobilising Russian-linked resources for Ukraine, provided Europe acts as Europe. That means unity not only in rhetoric, but in liability, governance, and protection of strategic infrastructure.
This is the win-win Europe needs. Belgium retains its legal and financial integrity. Europe gains a sustainable, credible mechanism to back its geopolitical commitments. Ukraine receives continued support without undermining the legal order Europe claims to defend.
In the end, the choice is not between Belgian national interest and European common interest. Properly understood, they converge. A Europe that asks one member state to carry disproportionate risk is not a stronger Europe; it is a fragile one. Conversely, a Europe that mutualises responsibility is a Europe capable of leadership.
Consensus, after all, is not the art of delaying decisions. It is the discipline of ensuring that when decisions are taken, they endure. Belgium should help Europe rise to that standard. It should rise to this occasion not by saying no, but by showing how to say yes, together.
Collins Nweke commends the US shift from “Christian genocide” to “anti-Christian violence” framing, calls visa restrictions a targeted accountability tool addressing Nigeria’s impunity culture, not a national sanction.
In his Proshare Op-Ed, Nweke argues language correction reflects diplomatic maturity, recognising Nigeria’s complex security reality, communal clashes, banditry, and extremism affecting all groups. He urges Nigeria to prosecute perpetrators of violence, strengthen security accountability, build a conflict-prevention architecture, protect witnesses, and communicate transparently to avoid future sanctions.
Nweke also spoke to the topic on RadioNow FM, providing some nuanced arguments.
Nigeria is leading Africa in oil exports to the United States (US), supplying $2.57 billion worth of crude between January and August 2025.
According to reports, the West African nation accounted for more than half of all African crude imported by the US during the eight months, shipping 33.23 million barrels out of a total 60.75 million barrels, or 55% of all African crude imports into the US this year.
Thami Ngubeni spoke to Senior International Trade Consultant and Author of Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora, Collins Nweke.
At the just-concluded 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, The Netherlands, history did not just unfold. History was carefully steered. At a time when the Western alliance faces internal fractures, there is transatlantic fatigue. There are also mounting global threats. Yet, the European Union did not emerge as a disjointed bloc of bureaucracies. The EU came out as a strategic actor with resolve, restraint, and refined diplomatic dexterity. The summit revealed so much that need not be repeated here. Nonetheless, the most notable revelation is the laying bare of the EU’s quiet containment of President Donald Trump’s destabilising impulses. This was done through the characteristic European purposeful politics and calibrated diplomacy.
The summit’s defining headline may be the unprecedented agreement to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. This is a leap that silences years of criticism from Washington, especially from Trump, about European freeloading. But buried beneath the numbers lies a more compelling story. It is about how Europe managed to uphold NATO’s cohesion and project unity. At the same time, Europe subtly neutralised the toxic unpredictability of the Trump doctrine.
Unlike previous NATO gatherings marked by President Trump’s incendiary outbursts, this year’s summit was different. There were no threats to abandon Article 5. It was notable for what didn’t happen. There was no explosive press conference, no ridicule of allies, and no disruption of summit communiqués. Instead, EU leaders adopted a mature, layered response strategy. First, they embraced a pragmatic posture, meeting Trump’s demands halfway by bolstering military expenditure. But in tandem, the EU was shaping the narrative to suit European realities. Second, they invested in soft containment. They reaffirmed NATO’s core values and buttressed Ukraine. They also advanced strategic autonomy in case America once again wavers.
At the centre of this diplomatic choreography was NATO’s new Secretary-General, Mark Rutte. The former Prime Minister of The Netherlands is seen as a steady hand whose transatlantic credibility proved invaluable. His presence, familiar to Trump yet anchored in European consensus-building, was key to managing the optics of loyalty without subservience. In many ways, Rutte symbolised Europe’s pivot from a reactive to a proactive actor in global affairs.
Nowhere was this clearer than in the calibrated support for Ukraine. While the summit formally limited Ukraine’s presence, it deepened military and financial backing. It also includes air-defense systems and fast-tracked integration. Rather than provoke Trump with overt expansionist rhetoric, Europe delivered substance over symbolism. In that symbolism lies another hallmark of seasoned European diplomacy.
The EU smartly redefined what defense means in the contemporary world. They embedded the 5% defense commitment within a framework that includes infrastructure. This framework also covers cyber-resilience and civil protection. This framing not only broadened the coalition of contributors but also softened the brute militarism Trump typically champions. It is, in effect, a Europeanisation of deterrence: multidimensional, layered, and sustainable.
Critics may argue that Europe still operates in America’s shadow. Yet, what transpired in The Hague shows that shadow is now cast by two actors, not one. Europe’s investments in strategic autonomy, through joint procurement, shared stockpiles, and integrated infrastructure, signal that the U.S. remains indispensable. It is at the same time, no longer irreplaceable.
For Africa and the Global South, Europe’s diplomatic balancing act offers lessons. It is possible to engage powerful partners without capitulating. It is possible to play the long game even in an era of transactional geopolitics. And it is certainly possible to lead without bombast.
As the dust settles on the summit, the EU must now match diplomatic gains with delivery. Defense spending must be realised, not just promised. Ukraine must see results, not just reassurance. And Europe must internalise this moment. It is not a victory lap, but a turning point toward becoming a geopolitical actor in its own right.
In The Hague, NATO’s future was safeguarded. There was no shouting across the table. There was instead strategic whispering across aisles. If that’s not purposeful politics, I do not know what is.
In recent conversations, a deeply pessimistic narrative has been making the rounds. A friend lamented, “Wars, or is it world wars, tend to start small.” “First, it was Ukraine, then Sudan, oh! I forgot Cameroon is at war with itself, then came Gaza and now we are in Israel and Iran. If we combine the populations of these nations, we might conclude that World War III is looming. Nations backing them increase this possibility.”
It’s a tempting theory. This idea that the world is sliding inevitably toward a third global war. The imagery is dramatic, the fear visceral. But it is not exact. And it is certainly not helpful. Yes, the world is going through a turbulent season. But no, these are not the rumblings of a third world war. Rather than scaremongering, we must turn to reason, perspective, and a sober reading of the facts.
We should not confuse local conflicts with global conflagration. Across the globe today, we see regional and context-specific conflicts. These are occurring in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and Cameroon. They are not the makings of a coordinated, worldwide military confrontation. During the early 20th century, global alliances triggered continent-wide mobilizations. In contrast, today’s conflicts are largely unlinked in cause. They differ in geography and participants.
Ukraine is about NATO-Russia tensions. Gaza is rooted in the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Sudan’s crisis is an internal power struggle. And Cameroon? That is a nation facing long-standing grievances in its Anglophone regions. These are tragic. Yes, but not interconnected in a way that could set off a world war.
The World Is More Diplomatic Than Ever
Diplomacy has not disappeared. To the contrary, it has diversified. Nations and multilateral institutions are actively working, often behind the scenes, to de-escalate these crises. Turkey is brokering grain deals in Ukraine. Egypt is mediating ceasefires in Gaza. The African Union is engaging with Sudanese factions. Diplomatic tracks are alive and well. Unlike in 1914, when diplomacy collapsed under the weight of imperial arrogance, today’s world is different. It has layers of dialogue and mediation channels. They may be formal and informal, but they work in tandem.
Globalization Has Changed the Stakes
In today’s hyper-connected world, a world war would be an economic suicide pact. No major power can afford it. Not the United States, not China, not Europe. Trade interdependence has created a strong disincentive for outright global war. Even amid tensions, the world’s leading economies continue to trade, invest, and collaborate. They work together on global challenges like climate change and pandemics. Unlike the nationalism and protectionism that fueled earlier world wars, today’s powers are bound, though reluctantly, by mutual economic interest.
Modern Warfare Is Strategic, Not Expansive
Even the most serious escalations today, like between Iran and Israel, are calibrated rather than reckless. Military doctrines have shifted from conquest to deterrence. The existence of nuclear weapons has paradoxically acted as a stabilizer. The logic of mutual assured destruction means that major powers understand the cost of letting conflict spiral out of control. Moreover, it is simple to make comparisons to the past. Yet, history is not a script we are destined to relive. The causes of the two World Wars are not mirrored in today’s world. Imperial rivalries, the collapse of global governance, and the absence of civil society differ from contemporary conditions. In fact, global institutions are stronger, more inclusive, and more vigilant than ever.
Peacebuilding is not a whisper but a chorus
Around the world, citizens and civil society organizations are actively resisting war narratives. Youth movements are pushing for climate justice, democracy, and human rights. Technological tools give ordinary people a voice and a platform. Peace is not passive; it is being actively built every day. It is not unimportant to remind ourselves in times like today
that the majority of the world is not in conflict. Much of Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Pacific remain stable. International cooperation continues, from vaccine sharing to infrastructure funding to peacekeeping missions.
In times like this, pessimism can feel like realism. But fatalism is lazy. It abdicates responsibility. It stops us from doing the work needed to build peace, strengthen institutions, and hold leaders accountable. No, World War III is not inevitable. But peace won’t happen on autopilot either. We need informed engagement, committed diplomacy, and a refusal to buy into doomsday thinking. Let us reject fear and reaffirm our faith in humanity’s capacity to learn from history, not repeat it.
The author, Collins Nweke, senior consultant international trade and economic diplomacy. He is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria. Collins was a Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars & Administrators. He serves on its Governing Council.
In the dynamic arena of global geopolitics, Nigerians must shed the illusion that their country has to pick sides between BRICS and the G7. Rather than viewing these blocs as mutually exclusive, Nigeria should boldly pursue a dual-engagement strategy that taps into the opportunities offered by both. It is not a matter of ‘either-or’ but ‘both-and’. This is a strategic move that reflects Nigeria’s aspirations as a global player.
BRICS vs G7 is a false dichotomy
It is true that China, a key BRICS member, has invested heavily in Nigeria’s industrial sector. This is particularly visible in the Ogun, Ota, Lagos, and Badagry axis, among other locations. These visible investments often overshadow Western contributions, which tend to be more subtle and regulatory-focused. But raw investment volumes do not tell the whole story. Many Chinese investments come with challenges. Take debt sustainability as example. Limited local job creation remains an issue. We cannot ignore environmental concerns either. Meanwhile, G7-linked initiatives often support democratic institutions, capacity building, and regulatory reforms that are less visible but equally essential for long-term development.
Currency Policy and the Sovereignty Debate
Yes, Bretton Woods institutions influenced by G7 powers often push currency devaluation policies in emerging economies, including Nigeria. But it would be simplistic to attribute Nigeria’s economic struggles solely to G7 influence. Macroeconomic mismanagement at home plays a major role. It is also worth noting that BRICS institutions like the New Development Bank have not exactly rushed to fill Nigeria’s financing gaps. Neither bloc is altruistic. Both run based on interest. Those rooting for Nigeria should assume the responsibility of strategically aligning their interests with those of Nigeria.
Non-Alignment 2.0: Nigeria’s Diplomatic Playbook
Nigeria must take a cue from fellow emerging powers like India and South Africa who engage both BRICS and G7 with calculated pragmatism. This is not fence-sitting. It is strategic positioning in a multipolar world. Nigeria’s influence must be exercised in multiple fora. The country must use BRICS to assert African agency while using G7 platforms to strengthen ties with traditional powers and access advanced technology, finance, and markets. And this brings me to the issue of strategic engagement as opposed to selective alignment.
Frustration with the G7 is understandable. However, disengagement is not a strategy. Nor is blind faith in BRICS a silver bullet. Nigeria must evolve from being a passive recipient of foreign policy to becoming a confident global actor. The future lies not in choosing sides, but in choosing strategy.
That is why I stand by my position: Nigeria needs BRICS and G7. This is not naivety; it is geopolitical maturity. Let us play the global game with clarity, courage, and conviction.
An Open Letter to the Honourable Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and Belgium (On the Occasion of the 3rd EU-AU Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers) by Collins Nweke | Brussels, Belgium 21 May 2025
Your Excellencies
The 3rd European Union–African Union Ministerial Meeting convenes today in Brussels. It has the commendable goal of advancing a 25-year-old partnership. I write to you not only as a Nigerian Diaspora leader and a Belgian of Nigerian roots. I also write as a bridge between two continents that share more than history, but a destiny.
The themes of today’s deliberations: peace, security, multilateralism, prosperity, and migration, are not merely policy points. They are lived realities for the millions of Africans in Europe and Europeans engaged in Africa. They speak to our aspirations. They equally touch on our anxieties.
A Personal and Collective Stake
I have lived the confluence of African resilience and European opportunity. I see the immense potential in the collaboration between Nigeria and Belgium. This potential exists both bilaterally and through the broader EU-AU frameworks. Yet, it is equally important to speak candidly about missed opportunities. This is particularly true in the realm of Economic Diplomacy. Much of the rhetoric has not translated into meaningful and inclusive outcomes.
Missed Opportunities
There has been goodwill on both sides. A leap forward occurred in the past three years. However, economic engagement between Nigeria and Belgium has still been far below its potential. Trade volumes fluctuate without a long-term strategic framework. Investment flows are lopsided. Dialogues around innovation, technology transfer, and capacity building often stall at pilot phases. Diaspora capital and expertise are underutilized assets in bilateral cooperation. They remain on the margins of structured economic diplomacy.
Belgium, with its expertise in green technologies, port logistics, and smart infrastructure, has much to offer a transitioning Nigerian economy. Nigeria, with its youthful population, creative industries, and vast market, is a gateway to Africa’s future. Yet our nations have not unlocked this constructive collaboration.
A Call for Bold, Pragmatic Collaboration
As Foreign Ministers, you hold the keys to fostering a new diplomatic architecture, one where trade and talent move together. An architecture where diaspora communities are institutional partners, and where prosperity is co-created, not simply negotiated.
A Two-Point Recommendation
1. Establish a Nigeria–Belgium Bilateral Economic Diplomacy Council This should be a structured, high-level platform. It should involve governments, the private sector, and diaspora stakeholders. It would move beyond trade fairs. This initiative would focus on sustained joint ventures and policy alignment. It would strategically target sectors like clean energy, agri-tech, and the digital economy.
2.Create a Diaspora Innovation and Investment Window Through embassies and missions, Nigeria and Belgium should jointly design programmes. These programmes should incentivize diaspora-led startups, skills transfer, and remittances. These remittances should be channeled into productive sectors. This is not charity. It is smart economics.
Conclusion
Excellencies, this is a moment to lead not from tradition, but from transformation. The EU-AU partnership must not only show a shared past. It must project a shared future. Nigerians in Belgium and Europe and Belgians in Africa are part of this future. Our governments should be partners in progress, not prisoners of protocol. As you deliberate on policies that will shape continents, I urge you to also listen to the diaspora. They are the voices of those who straddle both. We live the consequences of your decisions and embody the potential of your vision.
Respectfully yours
Collins Nweke Advocate for Fair EU-Africa Economic Relations | Senior Consultant Nigeria Belgium Luxembourg Business Forum
During my tenure in a Green political office, I faced a daunting energy policy delimma concerning transition economies. It was about taking a firm position on an aggressive push for transition to renewable energy by emerging economies. Seen as a pathway to a sustainable and resilient future, my party is non compromising on making fossil fuels a thing of the past. I recall a challenging debate at the African Carebbean and Pacific (ACP) secretariat during my bid for a seat in the European Parliament. A co-debater representing the business-leaning Belgian Liberals made an impassionate case for nuclear power as the new godsend for global energy security. When he was done, the skilful moderator turned to me and in a well calculated tone, she went: Honourable Nweke, you want no nuclear power stations, you are reported to hold the private view that attempts to get Africa to join the clean energy transition is harassment. What exactly do you want?
For a split second, I was frozen. However, I quickly gathered my thoughts. I then made a start “As Greens, we…” to which the lady promptly interjected “Not the Greens Honourable Nweke. The question is What Do YOU Want?” I then made a second attempt. Very well then. Let me correct one misconception: I see the transition to renewable energy as both necessary and urgent in addressing the global climate crisis. However, I also recognize that an abrupt shift away from fossil fuels, without a just and inclusive strategy, risks causing economic dislocation for many African nations whose economies remain heavily dependent on oil revenues. We need a pragmatic approach. A strategy rooted in accelerating clean energy adoption while investing in economic diversification, workforce retraining, and equitable development to ensure no one is left behind in the transition.
I stood by that position. When I argue that oil is not a dead commodity for Africa, I do not mince words. However, we are at an interregnum where emerging economies like my native Nigeria need to equally be told the inconvenient truth about the politics and economics of renewable energy. This involves a complex interplay of domestic policy, foreign relations, market forces, and structural challenges. This is more so especially when viewed through the lens of international trade and bilateralism. Overreliance on Oil export is a major issue. Nigeria’s economy remains heavily dependent on crude oil. Now is the ideal time to argue that investing in renewable energy will diversify energy sources and reduce vulnerability to global oil price shocks. Linked to that is import dependence as the country imports most of its refined petroleum products. Renewables will urgently help reduce this dependency culture.
Nigeria is facing one of its worst power shortages, with the national grid collapsing and leaving many homes and businesses without power. This makes Nigeria one of the world’s most vulnerable countries in terms of energy. There are a number of alternate energy sources that Nigeria can begin immediately to adopt from Europe, even from little brave Belgium. The problem with energy security in Nigeria is well known and well documented and therefore needs no further analysis. So, focusing on the solutions should be the reasonable thing to do. Talking of solutions, the first thing that comes to mind is the abundant sunlight year-round, that Nigeria is blessed with. Nigeria has an average solar radiation of 5.5 kWh/m²/day, which is significantly higher than Belgium’s 2.8 kWh/m²/day. This makes solar power a highly viable option for Nigeria. The fact that Rural Electrification Agency (REA) solar mini grids exist in Nigeria tells us that there is at least a sense that Nigeria knows what to do. REA as initiative needs scaling up.
Wind Energy potential is moderate in most regions, but areas like Sokoto, Kano, and Jos have significant wind resources. I guess the combination of onshore and offshore installations in Belgian wind energy infrastructure offers valuable lessons for Nigeria. Small to medium wind farms and hybrid energy systems could help Nigeria in combining solar and wind.
I am tempted not to overlook the potentials in hydropower for Nigeria with its vast water resources. There’s abundance of large and small rivers. While large hydropower projects are operational for instance the Kainji Dam, I have not stopped dreaming of small-scale hydropower in my Igbuzo hometown, in the Okpuzu and Atakpo rivers where I went swimming as a child. Numerous such rural river resources are scattered across the length and breadth of the country and can boost off-grid energy access. In other words, mini- and micro-hydropower plants for remote areas harbour unexplored energy potentials for Nigeria.
Biomass and Biogas is an option too. Nigeria generates a significant amount of agricultural and local waste that can be converted into energy. Farm residues, animal waste, and urban waste could be used for power generation and cooking gas. This is one viable way to address energy needs in rural areas and reduce environmental pollution. Of course I’m not losing sight of the strategic investments, supportive policies, and commitment to sustainable practices that is required here. Out here in Belgium, we have done so much since 2009 in integrating biomass and biogas in our energy mix, but it is not yet uhuru because of the challenges involved. It won’t be different for Nigeria.
On energy mix, would not play down any potential for achieving an energy mix for Nigeria no matter how small it is. With the few volcanic and hot spring regions in Nigeria, I will not exclude the potential for Geothermal Energy. In this regard, I think of Jos, Biu, and Mambilla Plateaux. Just as I believe that some hot springs from the Southwest to the far North, have great potentials. I recall with melancholy, geography lessons even in Umejei Primary School and later in St. Thomas’s College where we got acquainted with Ikogosi Warm Spring, Ruwan Zafi Hot Spring, Wikki Warm Spring in Yankari National Park, and Akiti Warm Spring, I believe in present day Nasarawa State. With enough will, Nigeria can easily surpass Belgium in small-scale geothermal systems for localized heating and electricity. I’m sure Belgium will readily transfer skills and knowledge and technology in this area if Nigeria asks nicely because there are also business potentials in it. Belgium is open for business.
Renewable energy as a clean energy source that is climate friendly is quite sustainable. Many countries are dependent on it but in Nigeria it is a different ball game on account of several limitations that impede on its development. When Nigeria becomes the subject of harassment, if I may borrow from the merciless debate moderator, less questions are being asked about how these challenges could be addressed. What international trade opportunities exist?
First and foremost, we must look at Nigerian Government Policy and Investment. The secured private sector participation must be encouraged through intentional public policies and legislative frameworks. Public-private partnership (PPPs) arrangements could be sealed to bridge finance gaps for renewable energy projects. Government must show openness in inviting international partners to the space as part of Nigeria’s intentional foreign policy. The 5D Renewed Foreign Policy mantra of current administration made provisions for this in the pillar around Development & Diaspora. The Diaspora has a role cut out here for them as a number of them are in the renewable energy space. Global Green Investment trends offer good lessons on how international investors are shifting toward green energy projects. Nigeria could attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into its renewable sector if it ensures policy stability and attractive returns. Collaborations with countries like Belgium, Germany, or Denmark, and even China, could bring in advanced renewable technology, especially solar and wind, if the table is organised through sound public policies.
Nigeria–Belgium Collaboration Opportunities in Renewable Energy
Belgium and Nigeria have complementary strengths that position them for mutually beneficial cooperation in renewable energy. There are strategic areas for business-to-business (B2B), government-to-government (G2G), and business to government (B2G) collaboration in infrastructure development as well as research and development.
Infrastructure Development
Ample Business-to-Business (B2B) opportunities exist in Solar Mini-Grids & Off-Grid Electrification where there can be collaboration between Belgian firms like 3E, GreenPulse and Nigerian developers to scale off-grid solar power for rural communities. There is also the Waste-to-Energy Solutions. In Belgian technology providers, VYNCKE, Nigeria does have a partner. There are indications that Nigerian agro-industrial firms could partner here to convert biomass into renewable energy. Nigeria needs not reinvent the wheels in Smart Port & Logistics Infrastructure when in more ways than one, Belgium’s Port of Antwerp-Bruges have shown readiness to provide the expertise needed to help green Nigerian ports. The Lagos Port could take advantage of this opportunity should they be serious about reducing carbon emissions in maritime logistics.
There is also Government-to-Government (G2G) opportunities to explore. There can be cooperation through EU–Nigeria Green Deal initiatives for infrastructure financing and technical support under Bilateral Green Transition Framework. This is independent of development and cooperation through Enabel, Belgium’s development agency. Again their willingness and ability to fund renewable energy infrastructure in public health and education institutions in Nigeria is no hidden agenda.
Research & Development (Education & Awareness)
Just like in infrastructure development, Business-to-Business (B2B) opportunities are there to exploit for instance in Green Skills Training. Private training providers can play a role in this space. Belgian vocational institutions like Syntra Vlaanderen can co-develop technical certification programmes with Nigerian polytechnics for solar and wind technicians, to leave it at just one example. Belgian and Nigerian media firms could initiate joint public awareness campaigns to co-produce for instance educational content on renewable energy and climate literacy.
Under Government-to-Government (G2G), public universities could seal University Research Partnerships. Joint academic programs between Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Ghent University, and Universities of Lagos and Port Harcourt, comes to mind in the domain of clean energy innovation. There can also be curriculum development support with Belgium, given its databank of knowledge acquired over the years. This could provide support in the integration of renewable energy and sustainability into Nigeria’s national curriculum.
Nigeria and the rest of the renewable energy world
There is the dimension of geopolitics of energy that Nigeria needs to watch in terms of the evolving oil diplomacy versus Green diplomacy. As the world shifts toward renewables, Nigeria’s oil-based diplomatic leverage will wane. Here it is not a matter of if, but that of when it will wane. Embracing renewables could open new partnerships in climate finance from the EU, US, or UN. As signatory to the Paris Agreement, Nigeria will be under global pressure to honour its climate commitments. It is hard to admit but Nigeria’s renewable energy policies are influenced by international expectations and access to climate funding like the Green Climate Fund. Only time will tell if these are in Nigeria’s National and security interests.
As many international investors are shifting toward green energy projects, Nigeria could attract FDI into its renewable sector if it ensures policy stability and attractive returns. Nigeria needs smart tariff policies to support local industry without discouraging investment realising that import duties on solar panels or wind turbines can either stimulate or stifle renewable adoption. With the right policies in place and given the current appetite for inter-Africa trade, Nigeria could become a regional hub for solar panel assembly or biomass fuel if it builds capacity and leverages trade agreements like AfCFTA.
END
The author, Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium, where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and the Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves on its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
The Trump-Zelenskyy Oval Office debacle has led to many unsolicited advice to a desperate Ukrainian President on how he ought to have handled an erratic American President. I laughed at some, got offended, if not angry, at others. Yet some got me thinking. They got me thinking of a few incidents during my time as municipal legislator at Ostend City Council, Belgium. Let me single out two particular incidents.
One was during the first of my three terms. I had just been sworn in. While learning the legislative rope, all buried in piles of briefing notes, books, and handouts, I relied for guidance in the interim, on my sense of right and wrong, my ideological persuasion if you like, and my Green Party political lines, especially the issues on which we were elected. One of the items slated for a vote in one of my early sittings was approval of procedure for employment of ‘Student Vacation Jobbers’ at the department for social welfare in whose board I served at the time.
Asking around, I discovered that the vacant positions were never published by the department. The order of allocation of student job positions was for Councillors to bring in their children. If, as Councillor, we had no school-age children of 16 years or older, we could bring in anyone of our choosing. Next in rank were the staff of the department in order of seniority. If there are any places left after filling these anointed priority places, the Council Chairman will then handpick party royals to favour with the positions.
My immediate reaction was that this must be wrong and that it must stop. I quickly put together a brief interpellation in which I pointed out that I do not feel comfortable giving my teenage son priority over other kids just because I, his dad, happened to be Councillor. Equality of chance presupposes that we should open up the space for all kids irrespective of background. Let the best candidates get the jobs.
If we must favour any group, I argued, then let us prioritise kids from families in poverty or that are facing threats of poverty. We know who they are because their parents are our clients on income support. They lack the network to facilitate getting vacation job for their kids, which we all have in abundance. If we are serious about breaking generational poverty, let us consider spreading our tentacles to directions that will effectively break the poverty circle. I then acknowledged that this procedure has been in place for a very long time and that I do not intend to cause avoidable disruption and administrative bottleneck. I therefore will not vote against but will request that in the course of the year, we must revisit the procedure and abandon the old order.
A couple of days later, a journalist contacted me to say that he had picked the story up from somewhere. The Council Chairman had denied my side of the story, stating that during the entire Council sitting in question, I uttered no word. “As a matter of fact, Councillor Collins Nweke was one of the first to vote in support of the motion”, he declared to the journalist. He detested this cowardly attitude of keeping quiet during proceedings only to open the mouth wide with journalist to tell lies. He went comically further to say that if elections were close by, he would have suggested that I was suffering from early symptoms of election fever.
My teenage son who had applied for a place, became a casualty of the entire episode. He got punished because his dad spoke up. As applicant, rather than posting him to a work post as close to his home as possible, as is the standard practice, he was allocated a student job place as far away from home as possible with basically an impossible public transport connection. But the young man understood and made the best out of that first experience as student worker. On the benefit of hindsight, I would have applied the doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity by abstaining rather than voting for or against. Useful lesson learnt.
Second incident was during my second term. The Mayor pushed for a Bill to reform parts of our policy on the local economy. I felt that a part of the unintended consequences of the proposed Bill will be bankruptcy for businesses owned by a large segment of ethnic minority entrepreneurs. In specific terms, a few business cum residential districts were adjudged to be attracting higher number of corner shops offering ethnic products and night shops. And with that, a perception of insecurity was felt by some local residents who felt that ‘their City’ was being overtaken by migrants. They feel like ‘strangers’ in their homes and all of those social stereotypical sentiments. Others who owned homes in the districts were worried that their properties were being devalued as a consequence of the population shift and mix.
Though I had the economy portfolio as well as equality rights within my caucus and the policy was mine to drive, we have a culture of consensus, preferably or majority carries the vote. To cut long story short, I was more or less alone within my caucus in my opposition against the reform. That is not to say that my party colleagues supported the reform full force, though one of us silently wished for it to pass because he had a property there. The general feeling is more of not ignoring the concerns of voters who may not be racist but feel insecure or vulnerable with the changing demography of our cherished city.
The big question is what do we do? Politically, it will be murderous for us to vote in support of the Bill because we can’t defend it with our core support base. Voting against it, which was my first inclination, was feared to be counterproductive with some of our voters that favoured the Bill. My sense was that most of my colleagues, maybe all, would vote yes if we allowed the notion of voting only your heart. In the end we agreed on kicking in the doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity. The compromise was that we will abstain from voting and will offer no clear explanation for or against. We will do all we can to empower the affected group of the proposed reform with information and administrative support where needed.
These two incidents pulled out of my personal experience in politics are meant to provide a preface to the unsolicited thoughts I equally want to join in proffering on Nigeria’s approach towards the Russia-Ukraine war. I believe that it is the same doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity which I have had reasons to either apply or support a number of times in my political career that I believe Nigeria is deploying in dealing with the Russia-Ukraine war.
The doctrine is a strategic foreign policy approach where a country deliberately avoids taking a clear or definitive stance on a contentious international issue. This doctrine allows states to maintain flexibility, avoid alienating key partners, and retain room for diplomatic maneuvering. By refusing to openly align with any side in a conflict or dispute, a country can maximize its options, protect its interests, and reduce the risk of becoming entangled in the rivalries of larger powers.
Like in basically all things, applying the doctrine comes with some consequences. I can therefore safely imagine that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and his team, must have weighed the pros and cons before stepping in to brief Mr President and recommend Nigeria’s position.
As the largest economy and most populous nation in Africa, Nigeria plays a pivotal role in shaping African responses to global crises. Its foreign policy traditionally balances non-alignment, economic pragmatism, and regional leadership. Historically, Nigeria has positioned itself as part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), avoiding entanglement in distant geopolitical conflicts and great power struggles. Maintaining ambiguity aligns with this tradition and reinforces sovereignty in decision-making, prioritizing domestic economic development, regional stability in West Africa, and preserving ties with all major powers. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Nigeria has leaned slightly toward the Western stance, condemning Russian aggression in UN votes but avoiding strident rhetoric or severing ties with Moscow. This in practical terms reflects textbook application of the doctrine of ambiguity.
In the choices that Nigeria makes, it must think of the preservation of its strategic relationships. The country maintains strong economic ties with the West, including investment, aid, trade, and military cooperation, particularly through partnerships with the EU, UK, and US. But in the same vein, it has growing military and energy ties with Russia, including cooperation in areas like oil exploration, arms procurement, and nuclear technology. Being diplomatic ambiguous ensures it does not alienate either side.
There are also gains in economic diversification that Nigeria needs to consider. Its reliance on Western capital markets and development finance institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Bank is crucial for the country’s economic recovery and infrastructure investment. The counterbalance here is that Russia’s role in the global oil and gas markets aligns with Nigeria’s interests as an energy exporter. Nigeria benefits when high oil prices, driven by geopolitical uncertainty, bolster government revenues.
The Minister must have also considered the need for flexibility for future alliances in his memo to Mr President. I summise that by not fully committing to either bloc, Nigeria can adapt its position based on how the war evolves and how global power shifts play out, ensuring diplomatic maneuverability.
Timing they say can be everything. With pressing domestic challenges like high youth unemployment and restiveness, security crises up North, spate of kidnappings, and efforts at economic diversification away from oil, of which the Nigerian Export Promotion Council reports over 20% growth in 2024, the Minister may have reasoned that Nigeria benefits from focusing inward rather than spending diplomatic capital on a distant European conflict.
There is also the regional leadership dimension and African consensus to consider. A diplomatic ambiguous position allows Nigeria to play a consensus-building role within the African Union (AU), where member states have differing views on the crisis. The Minister may have felt that Nigeria is better off projecting itself as a unifying force, keeping Africa’s voice independent and cohesive in global forums.
Decisions around positioning a consequential country like Nigeria in an issue of global dimension like the Russia-Ukraine war do not come easy. There are a few risks to consider in applying the Doctrine of Ambiguity. For a start, there is the Western pressure and perception issues to contend with. Nigeria’s relatively soft stance on Russia could be viewed negatively by the EU, UK, and US who expect clearer alignment in defense of international law and territorial sovereignty. Who knows how this could affect Nigeria’s access to Western investment, security partnerships, and climate finance, which are critical for its long-term development agenda? Early indications for instance are that some African countries like Kenya that took a clear pro-West stance have seen increased trade and investment benefits from Western governments looking to reward loyalty. Nigeria faces potential risks of being seen as fence-sitting, forfeiting opportunities to negotiate preferential trade or security deals from either side.
There is the moral and ethical concerns to contend with. Nigeria aspires to moral leadership in Africa, rooted in its history of anti-apartheid activism and peacekeeping leadership. Avoiding a clear stance risks eroding Nigeria’s moral authority on global governance issues.
Not trading carefully can lead to internal political divisions giving Nigeria’s internal political divisions. The country has a complex domestic political environment, with historical ties to both the West and Russia through Cold War-era military cooperation. Internal pro-Russia, pro-Ukraine, and pro-West factions within the government, academia, Diaspora, and media could exploit ambiguity, framing it as indecision, lack of vision, or maybe even ‘stomach infrastructure’ where some Nigerians in the Russian Diaspora are being accused without evidence of acting as paid agents of the Russian Federation to spread propaganda.
One of the most vexing risks that Nigeria faces in taking the route of diplomatic ambiguity is reduced influence in global governance. Its ambition to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council or take leadership on major global issues such as development financing or advocacy for Africa on climate adaptation could be undermined if it is seen as unwilling to take clear, principled positions on defining issues like Ukraine.
In the final analysis, there is a balancing act for Nigeria to undertake. Its application of the doctrine of ambiguity in the Russia-Ukraine crisis is pragmatic. It allows the country to preserve vital economic and security relationships while staying true to its non-aligned heritage. However, as a continental leader, Nigeria faces higher expectations to articulate an African perspective on global crises, particularly in light of its aspirations for global leadership. Nigeria could fine-tune its diplomatic ambiguity into a constructive diplomatic neutrality, where it condemns violations of international law such as territorial aggression while also advocating for African interests, including ensuring food security, energy price stability, and non-punitive responses toward African economies impacted by sanctions spillover. This may be a good strategy for Africa’s dominant economy to position itself as a mediator capable of facilitating dialogue between Russia, Ukraine, and global powers, leveraging its status as a respected African power.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves in its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
When Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso abruptly withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forming the Alliance of Sahel States (also known by its French acronym AES) some did not take them seriously. The olive branch extended by some critical stakeholders keen to see a de-escalation in the crisis began to lower in January 2024 when the trio formally withdrew from the bloc. Anger, resentment, and other emotions may be inevitable. However every prudent leader must realise that a comprehensive and inclusive approach is essential to prevent the AES formation from leading to further regional instability. By fostering dialogue, enhancing security cooperation, and promoting sustainable development, ECOWAS, the AU, and the international community must play a role in building a more united and prosperous West Africa.
Before delving into the specific roles of the core regional, continental, and global stakeholders, it is essential to provide an overview of how we arrived at this point. As of February 2025, the government of Niger Republic has implemented several significant changes to its border regulations, particularly affecting its relationship with Nigeria. There have been border closures and reopenings following the military coup in July 2023. The introduction of new travel documents followed swiftly. In line with AES initiatives, Niger introduced a joint biometric passport for its citizens, to facilitate movement within the alliance. However, this new passport has faced recognition challenges from non-AES countries, like Senegal. This led to trade restrictions, when in October 2024, Niger imposed a comprehensive ban on food exports to countries outside the AES, including Nigeria. This measure was officially positioned as a means to boost agricultural self-reliance within the alliance but it has (unintentionally?) disrupted traditional trade flows between Niger and Nigeria.
Without doubts, these developments reflect Niger’s shift towards strengthening ties with its immediate neighbours within the AES framework, while asserting its sovereignty and redefining its relationships and border policies with countries like Nigeria. The core question remains whether or not Niger has focused only on the gains of its moves and has overlooked the potential losses
Gains and Losses from Niger-Nigeria Border War
The border closures created short-term economic and social hardships, particularly for vulnerable populations and businesses. However, they also presented opportunities for improving national security, promoting local economic development, and asserting political independence. Long-term gains will depend on the success of Niger’s domestic policies and its cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States. We must remember that the first attempt at a Sahel alliance fell apart. Could it be that it will succeed this time around because they are dancing to the tunes of more determined foreign drummers focused on redrawing the World Order? That remains to be seen. But as far as our mortal eyes can carry us, we can’t lose sight of some obvious gains.
The Gains
The gain that springs most obviously to the eyes is security enhancement. The border closures aimed to curb the movement of armed groups, smuggling, and other illicit activities, contributing to national security, particularly in Niger, which faces threats from extremist groups. The border closures led to a temporary reduction in cross-border crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, and arms trafficking. A boost to domestic production is another important gain in the stride to agricultural self-sufficiency. By reducing dependency on imports, Niger sought to encourage local agricultural production, supporting its intentional national food security goals and local industry sufficiency. The restrictions provided opportunities for local industries to meet domestic demand, fostering industrial growth.
There is also political leverage that we may not discontenance. For Niger, the border closures were part of a broader strategy to assert its sovereignty and negotiate better terms in regional alliances, particularly after its exit from ECOWAS and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The Losses
Analysts for Niger of the costs-benefits of their border strategy have a number of losses to contend with. For a start, economic disruption by way of trade decline is a critical factor. The border closures severely impacted cross-border trade. Both formal and informal trade, including agricultural products, livestock, and manufactured goods, experienced significant reductions. The attendant revenue loss has had significant impact on the fragile economy. Governments of both Niger and Nigeria lost customs duties and taxes collected from cross-border trade, impacting national and local economies. The humanitarian impact manifesting in food insecurity was pretty visible. Niger, which relies on food imports from Nigeria, faced increased food insecurity. Rising food prices worsened conditions for vulnerable populations. Many small-scale traders, transporters, and border communities that depend on cross-border trade for their livelihoods faced economic hardship.
The social and cultural disruptions is another critical loss. It is said that in the border area between Niger and Nigeria, some homes have their living rooms in one country and their bedrooms in the other country. In other words, limited movement and restrictions on free movement of people disrupted daily life. Families and communities with cross-border ties are separated, affecting social cohesion, employment, and education opportunities, especially for those who frequently crossed borders, not to mention the strained diplomatic relations between Niger and Nigeria.
The Strategic Approach
To address the potential crisis resulting from the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, a coordinated and pragmatic approach is essential. ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), and the broader international community should prioritize diplomatic engagement, security cooperation, and socioeconomic development to foster regional stability.
ECOWAS as key actor
The ECOWAS has the prime responsibility of demonstrating good faith by efforts at rebuilding trust for regional unity. The bloc is formally on records to have started off well. In its 29 January 2025 Declaration formally acknowledging the withdrawal of the trio of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS, it placed a four-point instruction before member states as follows:
1. recognize National passports and identity cards bearing ECOWAS logo held by the citizens of Burkina Faso, the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Niger, until further notice.
2. continue to treat goods and services coming from the three countries in accordance with the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) and investment policy.
3. allow citizens of the three affected countries to continue to enjoy the right of visa free movement, residence and establishment in accordance with the ECOWAS protocols until further notice.
4. provide full support and cooperation to ECOWAS officials from the three countries in the course of their assignments for the Community.
Determined to avoid confusion and disruption in the lives and businesses of the ECOWAS population during what it described as a transition period, the instruction to member states added that the arrangements will be in place until the full determination of the modalities of our future engagement with the three countries by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Governments. The Commission has set up a structure to facilitate discussions on these modalities with each of the three countries.
It could be gleaned from the ECOWAS statement that it pays or intends to pay premium to Inclusive Dialogue when it indicated the establishment of requisite structure to facilitate discussions on modalities with each of the three Sahel economies. Without delay and despite the new border regulations announced recently by Niger, ECOWAS should initiate high-level diplomatic dialogues with the AES states, ensuring that their security and governance concerns are addressed within the framework of regional integration. The dialogue should aim to rebuild trust and explore pathways for their re-entry into ECOWAS.
Talking of framework, ECOWAS can be served better by a flexible governance framework. It should consider revising its governance protocols to accommodate the specific political and security challenges faced by Sahel states, promoting inclusivity and understanding. There must be Security Collaboration with the establishment of joint security initiatives with AES to combat terrorism, insurgency, and cross-border crime, reinforcing collective security while respecting the sovereignty of member states.
Some may find this misplaced but from an economic standpoint, providing incentives to AES states is a strategic investment that can restore regional economic integration, stabilise food supply chains, reduce the costs of conflict, and strengthen ECOWAS’s long-term influence. By promoting inclusive economic growth and enhancing trade and infrastructure, ECOWAS can foster a more prosperous and interconnected West Africa, benefiting all member states in the long run.
Of all the arguments in support of a strategic approach to managing the Sahel States crisis, the most compelling perhaps is the need to maintain strategic geopolitical and economic influence. Providing economic incentives reinforces ECOWAS’s role as the primary regional organization, strengthening its influence and maintaining regional cohesion. There is probably no smarter way of countering external influence. This is because supporting the Sahel States economically can reduce their reliance on external actors, such as non-African powers, ensuring that regional development aligns with ECOWAS’s long-term interests. Other factors circle around restoration of regional economic integration, strengthening supply chain and food security, and promoting long-term economic growth and stability.
It is not unimportant to consider the Cost-Benefit Perspective where we look at the short-term costs versus long-term gains. While providing incentives may involve short-term financial costs, the long-term benefits, such as increased trade, economic growth, and political stability, far outweigh these initial critical investments. Numerous studies have proven that infrastructure investments and trade facilitation measures generate a multipliereffect by stimulating private sector growth, increasing government revenues, and improving living standards.
African Union (AU) as key Pan-African Mediator
A role naturally cut out for the African Union is that of Neutral Mediation, facilitating dialogue between ECOWAS, AES, and other stakeholders to prevent further fragmentation of the region. A Continental Security Strategy is an imperative of our time. This should aim to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It should also address the root causes of insecurity in the Sahel, ensuring a coordinated response to terrorism and political instability. The newly elected President of the African Union Commission, Ambassador Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, whose mantra is “Silencing the Guns” has an obligation to ensuring that all nations of Africa, especially his native Djibouti return to constitutional order. Another critical role for the AU is the mobilisation of humanitarian assistance to mitigate the impact of border closures and economic disruptions on vulnerable populations, promoting regional stability and goodwill.
The broader International Community as Enablers of Sustainable Development and Governance
An essential component of sustainable peace and development is Diplomatic Engagement. The United Nations, European Union, and other international partners should support AU and ECOWAS-led mediation efforts, emphasizing dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. The region must be provided with targeted security assistance to help both ECOWAS and AES states combat terrorism, while ensuring that such support aligns with international human rights standards. They should increase investments in sustainable development, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure, to address the root causes of conflict and foster long-term stability. Related to this is capacity building. The AU should support governance reforms, anti-corruption measures, and inclusive political processes to strengthen state institutions and improve governance in both ECOWAS and AES countries.
No strategic approach to negotiated settlement of the crises with the Alliance of Sahel States can be said to be cast in stones but a well- considered implementation roadmap can certainly be put in place. A three-phase roadmap of short, medium, and long term is recommended.
The short term is a six-month duration in whichdiplomatic dialogue between ECOWAS, AES, and the AU is initiated. The focus will be on confidence-building measures and reducing tensions. In a subsequent eighteen-month medium term phase, joint security initiatives should be recommended to implement economic incentives to encourage regional cooperation. This then ushers in a five-year long term phase of consolidation, promotion of sustainable development, and good governance, ensuring that the root causes of conflict and insecurity are addressed.
In conclusion, the pressing issue remains the military coups and the return to constitutional order. In hindsight, the immediate use of threats and sanctions by ECOWAS has proven ineffective in addressing the series of military takeovers. However, recent actions indicate that ECOWAS has learned valuable lessons and is now striving to balance its commitment to democratic governance with the need for peace and stability in the Sahel. By prioritizing dialogue, supporting socioeconomic development, and addressing the root causes of political instability, ECOWAS can facilitate a peaceful return to constitutional order in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. This approach not only aims to maintain regional unity and long-term stability but also demonstrates strength and resilience, not weakness.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves in its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
