policy – Page 2 – Thoughts on EU-Africa Global Affairs

From Rupture to Repair: Why Erasmus+ Signals a Smarter Brexit Reset

I was resolutely opposed to Brexit. I remain convinced that it diminished both the United Kingdom and the European Union. It did so economically, politically, and symbolically. Yet democracy does not end where disappointment begins. The British people voted, the decision was implemented, and history moved on. What remains is not whether Brexit should have happened, but how responsibly its consequences are managed. That is why the UK’s decision to rejoin Erasmus+ from 2027 matters far beyond the confines of student exchanges. It is a quiet, deliberate, and consequential signal that the long work of repair has begun.

Erasmus+ is not a concession extracted from a defeated party. It is also not a stealth reversal of the referendum. It is a confidence-building measure between two partners that have learned, painfully, that rupture carries costs for both sides. In an era of performative politics, this return to functional cooperation is refreshingly untheatrical. It says that after years of posturing, London and Brussels are rediscovering the value of pragmatism, of doing what works, even when grand reconciliations remain politically out of reach.

The choice of Erasmus+ is telling. Few programmes embody European soft power as clearly. It builds skills, broadens horizons, and weaves human networks that outlast election cycles. For young people in particular, Erasmus+ has been a rite of passage into a wider world. The UK’s withdrawal from it was one of the most tangible, everyday losses of Brexit. It was not felt in abstract trade statistics but in classrooms, campuses, and communities. Its restoration does not erase the past five years, but it acknowledges a simple truth: cooperation in education and skills strengthens competitiveness, social cohesion, and trust.

This is what a credible Brexit reset looks like. Not denial. Not revisionism. Not a rush to reopen the settlement. A reset that works with political realities while quietly improving outcomes. Rejoining Erasmus+ respects the UK’s red lines while advancing mutual interests. Today, no free movement, no single market, no customs union are still in place. Rejoining Erasmus+ demonstrates that selective cooperation can coexist with institutional separation. In doing so, it offers a template for rebuilding ties incrementally, sector by sector, without relitigating the referendum.

Such humility is not weakness. Call it maturity. The most durable political arrangements are rarely rebuilt in a straight line. They are reconstructed through patient confidence-building, through policies that deliver visible benefits and rebuild habits of cooperation. On the question of the UK ultimately rejoining the EU, realism must prevail: it is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But politics is rarely static. If history teaches anything, it is that relationships heal when incentives align and trust is restored, often sooner than cynics expect. Fingers crossed, yes, but grounded in the hard work of repair.

Yet the significance of Erasmus+ extend beyond Europe’s internal architecture. Brexit did not only fracture UK–EU relations at home. It exported European disunity abroad, most visibly to Africa. In the years since the referendum, London and Brussels have too often pursued parallel strategies on the continent: duplicating instruments, competing narratives, and fragmenting impact. What should have been complementarity became rivalry. What should have been coordination became clutter.

Africa matters profoundly to both the UK and the EU, economically, demographically, geopolitically. Europe’s future growth, security, and climate resilience are entwined with Africa’s. And yet, post-Brexit, African partners have frequently encountered two Europes where one would have sufficed: overlapping trade initiatives, competing development finance, and unaligned regulatory approaches. The result has been inefficiency at best, confusion at worst, and missed opportunities for African agency to set the terms of engagement.

This is where the lesson of Erasmus+ becomes instructive. Cooperation does not require political reintegration. It requires political intelligence. Erasmus+ shows that shared programmes can be rebuilt on mutually agreed terms, delivering public value without reopening old wounds. Applied to Africa, this logic points to a necessary reframing: the UK and the EU do not need to compete for African trade; they need to cooperate for African transformation.

Such cooperation would not erase differences. Nor should it. The UK’s bilateral agility can complement the EU’s scale, regulatory depth, and convening power. Its ability to move quickly, tailor partnerships, and mobilise finance was instructive. Together, they can support African priorities more coherently: skills and vocational training, digital connectivity, climate adaptation, and industrial value chains aligned with the African Continental Free Trade Area. Done well, this would replace zero-sum rivalry with outcome-driven alignment.

Diaspora networks are the connective tissue in this story. Across Europe and the UK, African diasporas possess market knowledge, cultural fluency, and investment capital that remain underutilised. They are bridges, not battlegrounds. A cooperative UK–EU posture in Africa would empower these communities as partners in development and trade, rather than forcing them to navigate competing bureaucracies. Trade is not a trophy to be won from Africa; it is a partnership to be built with Africans.

Critically, African agency must remain central. Cooperation between the UK and the EU should not recreate old hierarchies or proxy competitions. It should support African strategies, institutions, and ambitions, on terms defined by African governments, businesses, and civil society. The aim is not alignment for alignment’s sake, but coherence where it adds value and restraint where it does not.

Erasmus+ therefore deserves to be read as a template, not an exception. If Britain and Europe can relearn how to cooperate on students and skills, they can do the same on research, climate, health security, and Africa’s economic transformation. The recent re-association with research programmes, the resumption of structured dialogues, and now Erasmus+ together suggest a pattern: a mosaic of practical agreements that rebuild trust piece by piece.

For those of us who opposed Brexit but accept its democratic legitimacy, this approach is both principled and pragmatic. It neither denies the past nor surrenders the future. It recognises that politics is the art of the possible. And that what is possible expands when cooperation delivers results. A reset worthy of the name does not seek to relive the arguments of 2016. It seeks to govern responsibly in the world of 2026.

Brexit was a rupture. Erasmus+ is repair. And repair, when done patiently, often lasts longer than what was broken in haste. Europe’s future will not be shaped by who won Brexit, but by who learned from it within Europe and beyond.

Reforming Unemployment Without Cutting Too Close to the Bones

Belgium has decided. And in a democracy, decisions once debated, voted, and translated into policy, do not remain theoretical. They become lived reality. From 1 January 2026, a first group of jobseekers will begin to lose unemployment benefits, with a phased rollout that continues until 1 July 2027. The first wave affects roughly 21,500 people, many of them in Wallonia. And by summer 2027, the reform is expected to impact nearly 103,000 residents.

I opposed this direction when it was still a plan. In my earlier piece, I warned against a welfare debate that risks shifting from fighting poverty to fighting the poor. I still believe that warning was valid. But the point of democratic politics is not to continue campaigning after the ballots are counted. It is to help society govern itself wisely, cautiously, and humanely, especially when reform touches the lives of those with the least margin for error. My colleagues on the political Left who are still in active service might read this and say to me: how convenient! They may be right because, since retiring from active party politics, I no longer must be part of that hard decision of cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens. When it is the law, you are duty bound to comply, irrespective of political persuasion.

So I write now not to relitigate yesterday, but to prevent tomorrow’s avoidable harm.

Activation is not cruelty unless we make it so

Even as critics think otherwise, most liberals understand that Belgium’s welfare state was not built to romanticise dependency. We simply argue that it was built to protect dignity while enabling participation. Support and responsibility were always meant to travel in tandem.

In principle, governments are right to ask: how do we encourage labour-market participation, reduce long-term joblessness, and protect public finances? Those are legitimate policy aims. But legitimacy of intent does not guarantee legitimacy of outcome.

A hard truth sits at the centre of this reform: if you withdraw income support without simultaneously removing the barriers that keep people unemployed, you don’t “activate” people. You destabilise them. You push them from unemployment insurance into deeper poverty, precarious housing, debt traps, family stress, and sometimes untreated mental health conditions. The social cost does not disappear. It merely relocates often to OCMW/CPAS, to charities, to food aid networks, and to already overstretched local services.

Brussels authorities have already publicly prepared for that pressure, warning that thousands may turn to social welfare services as benefit limits bite. This is the pivot Belgium must get right: reform must be paired with protection.

A humane implementation: six guardrails Belgium should adopt now

If the reform is to proceed, and the sad reality is that it is proceeding, then federal and regional governments should adopt a do no avoidable harm framework. Concretely:

1. No one should fall off a cliff: build a guaranteed “bridge” to support

The moment unemployment benefits stop, the transition to alternative support must be automatic, guided, and time-bound; not an obstacle course of appointments, paperwork, missed letters, and administrative confusion.

A person losing benefits should receive one coordinated pathway: employment guidance + social support + income stabilisation where eligible. If activation is the goal, then administrative chaos is policy sabotage.

2. Fund the shock where it lands: municipalities need real money, not moral lectures

If the policy shifts people from federal unemployment protection toward local welfare assistance, then the federal level must co-finance the increased load. Otherwise, the reform becomes a fiscal shell game: savings for one level of government, pressure and political backlash for another.

Belgium should create a transparent mechanism that tracks how many people transfer to CPAS/OCMW support and funds municipalities accordingly: predictably, not through ad hoc crisis measures.

3. Replace “one-size-fits-all” with case-based activation

Some jobseekers are unemployed because they lack skills. Others because they are older, sick, caring for relatives, facing language barriers, or living with invisible disabilities. A uniform time cap treats these realities as excuses. They are not excuses; they are contexts.

Belgium must implement individualised, case-based activation that distinguishes:

those who need skills and placement,
those who need health and psychosocial support,
those who need care infrastructure (childcare, eldercare),
those who are effectively unemployable under current labour-market conditions and need protected pathways.

A mature welfare state doesn’t pretend all unemployment is identical.

4. Expand training exceptions into a real ladder, not a loophole

The current framework includes an exception for people enrolled by 31 December 2025 in training for shortage occupations, allowing benefits to be extended until training ends (under conditions).

That is sensible—but too narrow if Belgium wants genuine activation.

Training must be:

accessible (cost, transport, childcare),
realistic (matching labour-market demand),
and supportive (coaching, internships, employer linkages).

If training is truly the “on-ramp” to work, then government should widen, simplify, and properly resource it, especially for those closest to the labour-market margins.

5. Protect dignity in assessment and communication

When people receive letters informing them that their benefits end, the message must not be punitive. The tone matters because it signals whether society still recognises the recipient as a citizen or treats them as a burden.

Public discourse should also be policed for scapegoating. Belgium must reject narratives that imply poverty is a character flaw or that long-term unemployment is best solved through humiliation. Policy can be firm without being dehumanising.

6. Monitor outcomes like lives depend on it, because they do

Belgium should publish a quarterly Reform Impact Dashboard that tracks:

transitions to work (quality, not just any job),
transitions to CPAS/OCMW,
poverty and housing insecurity indicators,
debt and arrears,
health and mental health service demand.

And there must be a willingness to adjust. If evidence shows rising hardship without commensurate employment gains, democratic responsibility requires correction, not stubbornness.

A word to Europe: do not misread Belgium

Across Europe, many governments have long looked to Belgium as proof that a generous, humane social protection system can coexist with fiscal responsibility and labour-market participation. That reputation now places a burden not only on Belgium, but on Europe itself. This reform will be read, rightly or wrongly, as a signal. If Belgium; the careful compromiser, the laboratory of social dialogue; normalises time-limited protection without equally visible investment in activation, care, and dignity, others will feel licensed to go further and cut deeper. Europe must therefore resist the temptation to treat this moment as validation of a harsher continental turn. The lesson to draw is not that social protection has failed, but that reform divorced from social investment corrodes trust, cohesion, and legitimacy. If Europe still claims a distinct social model, one that tempers markets with solidarity, then Belgium’s experience should be a warning light, not a green one. The benchmark must not slide from humane protection to managed abandonment.

The moral test of governance

There is a phrase I used before that I repeat now with even greater urgency: we are cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens—fellow humans.

It is precisely when the political system has “decided” that the responsibility of leadership becomes most demanding. Because implementation is where policy stops being ideology and starts being ethics.

Belgium can still make this reform worthy of its social model, if it treats activation as a supported pathway, not a punishment clock; if it funds the consequences honestly; and if it refuses to confuse fiscal discipline with moral superiority.

In the coming weeks, the first wave will feel the reform not as a concept but as an empty line in a bank account. The question is whether Belgium will meet that moment with bureaucratic indifference or with the quiet competence and compassion that once made its welfare model a benchmark.

Democracy brought us here. Now decency must guide what we do next.

The author, Collins Nweke is a Senior Consultant on international trade and economic diplomacy. A three-term councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium till December 2024, his portfolio included social welfare and economy. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.

Deploying the Belgian Art of Consensus in the European Debacle over Frozen Russian Asset

by Collins Nweke

At moments of historic pressure, nations are judged not only by the positions they take, but by the solutions they propose. The current European debate over frozen Russian assets, crystallised at a crucial EU summit, is one such moment. Belgium now finds itself at the intersection of legality and leadership, national prudence and European purpose.

The question confronting Europe is deceptively simple: should frozen Russian state assets be mobilised to support Ukraine? The answer, morally and politically, is already clear across much of the continent. Ukraine’s survival is inseparable from Europe’s security. What is contested is how Europe should act. More than that is who bears the risk.

Belgium’s caution has been widely interpreted, in some quarters, as hesitation. That reading is incomplete. My reading is that Belgium is not resisting European solidarity. It is warning against a model of solidarity that concentrates systemic risk in one member state simply because history and infrastructure placed the assets there. This is not obstructionism as some would like to simplistically label it. It is institutional realism.

As home to Euroclear, Belgium is custodian to a significant share of the frozen Russian assets. That custodianship carries legal exposure, financial vulnerability, and geopolitical risk. Any unilateral move that leaves Belgium or Euroclear bearing the brunt of litigation, retaliation, or reputational damage would be neither fair nor European. In a Union built on shared sovereignty, shared risk must follow shared ambition.

This is where Belgium’s political tradition offers Europe a way forward. Consensus-building is not weakness; it is statecraft. Belgian politics has long thrived on crafting outcomes that allow divergent interests to converge without humiliation or coercion. Europe would do well to draw from that tradition now. But Belgium would have to create the enabling environment for that to happen.

A credible European solution must rest on one foundational principle: Europeanise the risk, not merely the decision. If Europe chooses to act collectively, then the legal and financial consequences must also be collectively borne. A binding EU-level indemnity mechanism would ensure that no single member state becomes the fall guy for a European geopolitical choice. This must be anchored in a Council decision or regulation. It should not be seen as special pleading by Belgium. It is a test of European maturity.

Second, Europe must separate urgency from recklessness. There is already a lawful pathway that commands broad support: the use of windfall profits generated by frozen assets. Expanding this channel allows Europe to continue supporting Ukraine decisively while the more complex legal architecture around principal assets is clarified. Acting responsibly need not mean acting slowly.

Third, this debate exposes a structural weakness the EU can no longer ignore. Ad-hoc improvisation is no substitute for institutional readiness. Europe should seize this moment to establish a permanent EU-level sovereign assets mechanism. This is a framework that governs frozen state assets under strict political and legal thresholds. Such an instrument would remove hostage risk from individual member states and ensure that future crises are met with preparation, not panic.

For Belgium’s Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, the path forward lies not in retreat, but in reframing. Belgium should say, clearly and publicly, that it supports the objective of mobilising Russian-linked resources for Ukraine, provided Europe acts as Europe. That means unity not only in rhetoric, but in liability, governance, and protection of strategic infrastructure.

This is the win-win Europe needs. Belgium retains its legal and financial integrity. Europe gains a sustainable, credible mechanism to back its geopolitical commitments. Ukraine receives continued support without undermining the legal order Europe claims to defend.

In the end, the choice is not between Belgian national interest and European common interest. Properly understood, they converge. A Europe that asks one member state to carry disproportionate risk is not a stronger Europe; it is a fragile one. Conversely, a Europe that mutualises responsibility is a Europe capable of leadership.

Consensus, after all, is not the art of delaying decisions. It is the discipline of ensuring that when decisions are taken, they endure. Belgium should help Europe rise to that standard. It should rise to this occasion not by saying no, but by showing how to say yes, together.

Understanding the U.S. Visa Restrictions on Nigerians Linked to Anti-Christian Violence

Collins Nweke commends the US shift from “Christian genocide” to “anti-Christian violence” framing, calls visa restrictions a targeted accountability tool addressing Nigeria’s impunity culture, not a national sanction.

In his Proshare Op-Ed, Nweke argues language correction reflects diplomatic maturity, recognising Nigeria’s complex security reality, communal clashes, banditry, and extremism affecting all groups. He urges Nigeria to prosecute perpetrators of violence, strengthen security accountability, build a conflict-prevention architecture, protect witnesses, and communicate transparently to avoid future sanctions.

Nweke also spoke to the topic on RadioNow FM, providing some nuanced arguments.

Upgrading Nigeria’s Economic Reforms for Shared Gains

When President Bola Tinubu announced Nigeria’s ambitious economic reforms in 2023, he framed them as bold steps to rescue the nation from fiscal collapse and stagnation. Two years later, his administration points to some verifiable gains: revenue mobilisation is up, FX market turbulence has eased, inflation is moderating, and GDP growth is stabilising.

It is only fair to admit that these are not trivial developments. Meeting the 2025 revenue target ahead of schedule signals improved fiscal mobilisation. Clearing a long-standing foreign exchange backlog has restored some investor confidence and narrowed currency spreads. Oil output is recovering towards 1.5 million barrels per day. Services are also driving GDP growth as bank recapitalisation is strengthening financial stability.

And yet, for millions of Nigerians, these numbers tell a story their wallets do not recognise.

The Reform–Reality Gap

Despite these “gains,” everyday Nigerians face the harshest cost-of-living pressures in a generation. Inflation, though easing statistically, still sits above 21%. Prices of food and essentials remain painfully high. The removal of the petrol subsidy, electricity tariff hikes, and a weaker naira have combined to squeeze household incomes and overwhelm small businesses.

This isn’t just about economic indicators. It is about lived experiences of everyday Nigerians. For them the bread and butter issues they faced under President Buhari have gotten worse, not better, under President Tinubu. What some of us tell our colleagues in government or those that politically lean towards the ruling party is: save your saliva; Nigerians feel prices, not your percentages.

Reforms are often front-loaded with pain while benefits arrive on a lag. I’m not one, but my economist friends call it “J-curve” in their trade. Let us tell ourselves the truth about Nigeria: weak social safety nets mean there’s little cushion to soften the knock-out blows citizen receive daily. I’m not sure government genuinely agrees with this but without targeted, transparent interventions, reform fatigue risks eroding public trust and stalling the entire recovery agenda.

The Right Direction Maybe, But…

This isn’t a call for a U-turn. Nigeria’s policy shifts on FX unification, revenue reforms, and financial sector recapitalisation are directionally correct. The problem lies in sequencing, communication, and cushioning.

Take fuel subsidy removal: economically rational, but socially destabilising without simultaneous investments in mass transit, targeted and honest cash transfers, and energy alternatives. Or electricity tariffs: cost-reflective pricing is unavoidable for investor confidence, but Nigerians should never pay more for darkness.

Reforms succeed when policy discipline meets citizen empathy. Nigeria must not pursue stability at the expense of social cohesion.

Lessons From Abroad — A Wider Lens

Nigeria is not alone in navigating the pain-versus-gain cycle of ambitious economic reforms. Around the world, other economies have grappled with similar dilemmas, some successfully, others less so.

1. Ghana (2022–2025) — The Discipline Dividend

Implemented an IMF-backed stabilisation plan, cutting subsidies and increasing taxes.
Faced severe short-term hardship: food and fuel prices soared, public sector strikes intensified.
Outcome: By 2025, inflation has fallen, FX has stabilised, and investor confidence has begun returning.
Lesson for Nigeria: Pain upfront can deliver gains later. But only if reforms are sustained and supported by credible institutions.

2. Kenya (2024) — Reform Without Buy-In

Rolled out aggressive tax reforms to boost revenue but underestimated citizen fatigue.
Lack of social dialogue and safeguards triggered mass protests (“#RejectFinanceBill2024”), forcing partial reversals.
Lesson for Nigeria: Sequencing and fairness matter; reforms fail when citizens don’t trust the process or feel excluded.

3. Indonesia (1998–2025) — Gradual, Inclusive Transformation

After the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia faced soaring inflation, mass layoffs, and currency collapse.
Leaders adopted a sequenced reform path:
- Fiscal discipline paired with targeted subsidies
- Massive investments in infrastructure and SMEs
- Progressive liberalisation of FX and trade regimes
Outcome: Today, Indonesia is an emerging powerhouse, combining macroeconomic stability with inclusive growth.
Lesson for Nigeria: Reforms succeed when sequencing is matched with social buffers and long-term investment.

4. Vietnam (1986–Present) — The Power of Export-Led Strategy

Through the Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam shifted from a closed economy to one of the world’s fastest-growing export-driven economies.
Prioritised:
- Investment in manufacturing clusters
- Integration into global value chains
- Gradual FX liberalisation backed by trade surpluses
Outcome: Sustained GDP growth above 6% for decades, drastic poverty reduction, and rising FDI inflows.
Lesson for Nigeria: Nigeria must pair fiscal reforms with an export strategy to truly stabilise the naira and diversify earnings.

5. India (1991–Present) — Reform + Communication = Buy-In

Faced with a balance-of-payments crisis, India liberalised FX markets, cut subsidies, and opened up to global trade.
Key to success was political storytelling: reforms were communicated clearly, framed as national revival, and backed by bipartisan consensus.
Outcome: From a fragile, closed economy to a top-five global economy, driven by services exports, tech, and manufacturing.
Lesson for Nigeria: Economic reforms thrive when communication, credibility, and consistency align.

Nigeria can learn from these transition economies: reforms succeed only when people believe the sacrifices will pay off. And please do not start bullying Nigerians when they do not understand the right things that you are trying to do. Or call citizens daft moaners when it is your responsibility to calmly and proactively make them get the gist.

Upgrading the Reform Agenda: a five-point recommendation

These recommendations are not about abandoning reforms. It is about upgrading them:

1. Make Revenue Fair and Transparent

Widen the tax net instead of overburdening compliant taxpayers.
Publish verifiable quarterly revenue and expenditure dashboards to build trust.

2. Protect the Most Vulnerable

Expand and digitise targeted cash transfers to shield low-income households.
Reduce “one-size-fits-all” tariffs and create relief bands for SMEs and rural consumers.

3. Fix the Power Sector, Predictably

Tie tariff hikes to enforceable service benchmarks: if tariffs rise, service must rise too. Remember that Nigerians have adapted to darkness. But please do not make them pay for the same darkness that you created.
Invest in decentralised renewables to reduce dependency on the national grid. Belgium offers huge opportunities on renewables and entrepreneurs there and in Nigeria are ready to engage. Organise the table for them with business forum, trade mission, et cetera.

4. Unlock Food Security

Secure agricultural belts and provide affordable storage and logistics.
Support mechanisation and smallholder financing to bend food inflation downward.

5. Communicate With Candour

Nigerians are resilient, but not if kept in the dark. Citizens deserve clear, frequent, and honest communication about the economic roadmap and trade-offs.

Turning Stability Into Shared Prosperity

Nigeria stands at an economic crossroads. The stabilisation drive is working in parts. But citizenship legitimacy, which is the sense that reforms serve people, not just numbers, remains fragile.

As I often remind policymakers both in Europe and in Africa:

“Stability isn’t the destination. Prosperity is. Reforms must move from policy papers to people’s pockets.”

This requires patience, yes, but also precision. Nigeria doesn’t need to turn back. It needs to upgrade. It must upgrade with empathy, sequencing, and execution. If we get that right, this moment of pain can become the platform for shared prosperity.

The author, Collins Nweke is senior consultant international trade and researcher on economic diplomacy. A former three-term Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium, Collins is a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and the Institute of Management Consultant. He is also a distinguished fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars & Administrators, where he serves on its Governing Council. Collins writes from Brussels, Belgium.

The Use of Strategic Maturity to Contain Trump Without Confrontation

At the just-concluded 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, The Netherlands, history did not just unfold. History was carefully steered. At a time when the Western alliance faces internal fractures, there is transatlantic fatigue. There are also mounting global threats. Yet, the European Union did not emerge as a disjointed bloc of bureaucracies. The EU came out as a strategic actor with resolve, restraint, and refined diplomatic dexterity. The summit revealed so much that need not be repeated here. Nonetheless, the most notable revelation is the laying bare of the EU’s quiet containment of President Donald Trump’s destabilising impulses. This was done through the characteristic European purposeful politics and calibrated diplomacy.

The summit’s defining headline may be the unprecedented agreement to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. This is a leap that silences years of criticism from Washington, especially from Trump, about European freeloading. But buried beneath the numbers lies a more compelling story. It is about how Europe managed to uphold NATO’s cohesion and project unity. At the same time, Europe subtly neutralised the toxic unpredictability of the Trump doctrine.

Unlike previous NATO gatherings marked by President Trump’s incendiary outbursts, this year’s summit was different. There were no threats to abandon Article 5. It was notable for what didn’t happen. There was no explosive press conference, no ridicule of allies, and no disruption of summit communiqués. Instead, EU leaders adopted a mature, layered response strategy. First, they embraced a pragmatic posture, meeting Trump’s demands halfway by bolstering military expenditure. But in tandem, the EU was shaping the narrative to suit European realities. Second, they invested in soft containment. They reaffirmed NATO’s core values and buttressed Ukraine. They also advanced strategic autonomy in case America once again wavers.

At the centre of this diplomatic choreography was NATO’s new Secretary-General, Mark Rutte. The former Prime Minister of The Netherlands is seen as a steady hand whose transatlantic credibility proved invaluable. His presence, familiar to Trump yet anchored in European consensus-building, was key to managing the optics of loyalty without subservience. In many ways, Rutte symbolised Europe’s pivot from a reactive to a proactive actor in global affairs.

Nowhere was this clearer than in the calibrated support for Ukraine. While the summit formally limited Ukraine’s presence, it deepened military and financial backing. It also includes air-defense systems and fast-tracked integration. Rather than provoke Trump with overt expansionist rhetoric, Europe delivered substance over symbolism. In that symbolism lies another hallmark of seasoned European diplomacy.

The EU smartly redefined what defense means in the contemporary world. They embedded the 5% defense commitment within a framework that includes infrastructure. This framework also covers cyber-resilience and civil protection. This framing not only broadened the coalition of contributors but also softened the brute militarism Trump typically champions. It is, in effect, a Europeanisation of deterrence: multidimensional, layered, and sustainable.

Critics may argue that Europe still operates in America’s shadow. Yet, what transpired in The Hague shows that shadow is now cast by two actors, not one. Europe’s investments in strategic autonomy, through joint procurement, shared stockpiles, and integrated infrastructure, signal that the U.S. remains indispensable. It is at the same time, no longer irreplaceable.

For Africa and the Global South, Europe’s diplomatic balancing act offers lessons. It is possible to engage powerful partners without capitulating. It is possible to play the long game even in an era of transactional geopolitics. And it is certainly possible to lead without bombast.

As the dust settles on the summit, the EU must now match diplomatic gains with delivery. Defense spending must be realised, not just promised. Ukraine must see results, not just reassurance. And Europe must internalise this moment. It is not a victory lap, but a turning point toward becoming a geopolitical actor in its own right.

In The Hague, NATO’s future was safeguarded. There was no shouting across the table. There was instead strategic whispering across aisles. If that’s not purposeful politics, I do not know what is.

The BRICS and G7 Politics for Nigeria: Not One or the Other

youtube.com/watch

by Collins Nweke

In the dynamic arena of global geopolitics, Nigerians must shed the illusion that their country has to pick sides between BRICS and the G7. Rather than viewing these blocs as mutually exclusive, Nigeria should boldly pursue a dual-engagement strategy that taps into the opportunities offered by both. It is not a matter of ‘either-or’ but ‘both-and’. This is a strategic move that reflects Nigeria’s aspirations as a global player.

BRICS vs G7 is a false dichotomy

It is true that China, a key BRICS member, has invested heavily in Nigeria’s industrial sector. This is particularly visible in the Ogun, Ota, Lagos, and Badagry axis, among other locations. These visible investments often overshadow Western contributions, which tend to be more subtle and regulatory-focused. But raw investment volumes do not tell the whole story. Many Chinese investments come with challenges. Take debt sustainability as example. Limited local job creation remains an issue. We cannot ignore environmental concerns either. Meanwhile, G7-linked initiatives often support democratic institutions, capacity building, and regulatory reforms that are less visible but equally essential for long-term development.

Currency Policy and the Sovereignty Debate

Yes, Bretton Woods institutions influenced by G7 powers often push currency devaluation policies in emerging economies, including Nigeria. But it would be simplistic to attribute Nigeria’s economic struggles solely to G7 influence. Macroeconomic mismanagement at home plays a major role. It is also worth noting that BRICS institutions like the New Development Bank have not exactly rushed to fill Nigeria’s financing gaps. Neither bloc is altruistic. Both run based on interest. Those rooting for Nigeria should assume the responsibility of strategically aligning their interests with those of Nigeria.

Non-Alignment 2.0: Nigeria’s Diplomatic Playbook

Nigeria must take a cue from fellow emerging powers like India and South Africa who engage both BRICS and G7 with calculated pragmatism. This is not fence-sitting. It is strategic positioning in a multipolar world. Nigeria’s influence must be exercised in multiple fora. The country must use BRICS to assert African agency while using G7 platforms to strengthen ties with traditional powers and access advanced technology, finance, and markets. And this brings me to the issue of strategic engagement as opposed to selective alignment.

Frustration with the G7 is understandable. However, disengagement is not a strategy. Nor is blind faith in BRICS a silver bullet. Nigeria must evolve from being a passive recipient of foreign policy to becoming a confident global actor. The future lies not in choosing sides, but in choosing strategy.

That is why I stand by my position: Nigeria needs BRICS and G7. This is not naivety; it is geopolitical maturity. Let us play the global game with clarity, courage, and conviction.

Watch my related interview with Amarachi Ubani of Channels TV: https://youtu.be/Esp8JpRHCV8?feature=shared

Prisoners of Protocol

An Open Letter to the Honourable Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and Belgium (On the Occasion of the 3rd EU-AU Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers) by Collins Nweke | Brussels, Belgium 21 May 2025

Your Excellencies

The 3rd European Union–African Union Ministerial Meeting convenes today in Brussels. It has the commendable goal of advancing a 25-year-old partnership. I write to you not only as a Nigerian Diaspora leader and a Belgian of Nigerian roots. I also write as a bridge between two continents that share more than history, but a destiny.

The themes of today’s deliberations: peace, security, multilateralism, prosperity, and migration, are not merely policy points. They are lived realities for the millions of Africans in Europe and Europeans engaged in Africa. They speak to our aspirations. They equally touch on our anxieties.

A Personal and Collective Stake

I have lived the confluence of African resilience and European opportunity. I see the immense potential in the collaboration between Nigeria and Belgium. This potential exists both bilaterally and through the broader EU-AU frameworks. Yet, it is equally important to speak candidly about missed opportunities. This is particularly true in the realm of Economic Diplomacy. Much of the rhetoric has not translated into meaningful and inclusive outcomes.

Missed Opportunities

There has been goodwill on both sides. A leap forward occurred in the past three years. However, economic engagement between Nigeria and Belgium has still been far below its potential. Trade volumes fluctuate without a long-term strategic framework. Investment flows are lopsided. Dialogues around innovation, technology transfer, and capacity building often stall at pilot phases. Diaspora capital and expertise are underutilized assets in bilateral cooperation. They remain on the margins of structured economic diplomacy.

Belgium, with its expertise in green technologies, port logistics, and smart infrastructure, has much to offer a transitioning Nigerian economy. Nigeria, with its youthful population, creative industries, and vast market, is a gateway to Africa’s future. Yet our nations have not unlocked this constructive collaboration.

A Call for Bold, Pragmatic Collaboration

As Foreign Ministers, you hold the keys to fostering a new diplomatic architecture, one where trade and talent move together. An architecture where diaspora communities are institutional partners, and where prosperity is co-created, not simply negotiated.

A Two-Point Recommendation

1. Establish a Nigeria–Belgium Bilateral Economic Diplomacy Council
This should be a structured, high-level platform. It should involve governments, the private sector, and diaspora stakeholders. It would move beyond trade fairs. This initiative would focus on sustained joint ventures and policy alignment. It would strategically target sectors like clean energy, agri-tech, and the digital economy.

2. Create a Diaspora Innovation and Investment Window
Through embassies and missions, Nigeria and Belgium should jointly design programmes. These programmes should incentivize diaspora-led startups, skills transfer, and remittances. These remittances should be channeled into productive sectors. This is not charity. It is smart economics.

Conclusion

Excellencies, this is a moment to lead not from tradition, but from transformation. The EU-AU partnership must not only show a shared past. It must project a shared future. Nigerians in Belgium and Europe and Belgians in Africa are part of this future. Our governments should be partners in progress, not prisoners of protocol. As you deliberate on policies that will shape continents, I urge you to also listen to the diaspora. They are the voices of those who straddle both. We live the consequences of your decisions and embody the potential of your vision.

Respectfully yours

Collins Nweke
Advocate for Fair EU-Africa Economic Relations | Senior Consultant Nigeria Belgium Luxembourg Business Forum

The State of Diaspora Voting in Africa and Other Jurisdictions: A Comparative Analysis with Nigeria

Executive Summary
Diaspora voting has gained considerable momentum worldwide. It is the right of citizens living outside their home country to take part in national elections. In Africa, while several countries have embraced diaspora enfranchisement, many, including Nigeria, stay either hesitant or stagnant. This background policy brief examines global and African trends in diaspora voting. It finds lessons Nigeria can learn. It also recommends a pathway for institutionalizing diaspora voting rights in Nigeria.

Introduction

The phenomenon of migration has expanded the footprint of national populations beyond territorial boundaries. It creates dynamic diasporas that influence politics, economics, and culture in their countries of origin. Recognizing their growing relevance, many nations have adopted diaspora voting to strengthen democratic participation and harness diaspora engagement. In Nigeria, constitutional and logistical barriers have hindered diaspora voting despite persistent advocacy. As the world moves toward more inclusive political systems, Nigeria risks marginalizing an important segment of its citizenry. An estimated 17 million Nigerians in the diaspora will be affected if reforms are not urgently prioritized.

Global Trends: Beyond Africa

Diaspora voting is more advanced globally than in Africa.

France: French citizens abroad have 11 dedicated seats in the National Assembly.
Italy: Italians abroad elect members of Parliament directly from overseas constituencies.
India: While India allows expatriates to vote, actual implementation is restrictive; physical presence at Indian polling stations is needed.
Mexico: Mexican citizens abroad can vote in presidential elections via mail and, recently, online.
United States: Americans living abroad can vote via absentee ballots for federal elections.

Key Insights Globally:

§ Most advanced democracies allow remote voting: absentee ballots, postal voting, online platforms.

§ Recognizing the diaspora’s economic power (e.g., remittances), many countries actively promote political inclusion as a bridge to investment and soft diplomacy.

The African Experience: Diaspora Voting Trends

Country	Status of Diaspora Voting	Notes
South Africa	Permitted	Diaspora votes in presidential elections at embassies.
Ghana	Permitted (since 2006)	Implementation is partial; technical barriers remain.
Kenya	Permitted (since 2013)	Limited to presidential elections; logistical issues persist.
Senegal	Fully Permitted	Diaspora elects legislators dedicated to overseas constituencies.
Mali	Fully Permitted	Diaspora voting well-integrated; dedicated diaspora seats in parliament.
Tunisia	Fully Permitted	Tunisians abroad elect their own representatives.
Nigeria	Not Permitted	Constitutional constraints; no enabling law.

“Key Insights from Africa:

§ Countries like Senegal and Mali not only allow diaspora voting but grant diaspora citizens dedicated legislative representation.

§ In most African nations that permit diaspora voting, it is often restricted to presidential elections due to logistical simplicity.

§ Implementation challenges remain (e.g., voter registration abroad, verification, cost management), but political will has consistently driven reforms.

Nigeria’s Position and Challenges

Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy and the continent’s biggest recipient of remittances, receiving $20 billion annually. Still, Nigeria lags behind peers in diaspora enfranchisement.

Key challenges include

§ Constitutional Restrictions: Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution does not offer for external voting.

§ Lack of Political Will: Successive governments have expressed support but have neglected to push legislation or constitutional amendments.

§ Institutional Readiness: INEC’s ability to conduct credible elections domestically raises concerns about expansion abroad.

§ Logistical Concerns: Cost implications, voter verification abroad, security, and diplomatic coordination are cited as barriers.

Recommendations for Nigeria

1. Constitutional Amendment: Urgently focus on an amendment to allow external voting for presidential elections initially.

2. Legislative Framework: Enact enabling laws specifying the scope, procedures, and institutions responsible for diaspora voting.

3. Pilot Programs: Test diaspora voting in select countries with significant Nigerian populations (e.g., USA, UK, South Africa, Canada) during the next general election cycle.

4. Capacity Building for INEC: Invest in training and digital tools. Collaborate with embassies to ease diaspora voter registration and balloting.

5. Public Awareness Campaigns: Build trust and demand through education targeting both diaspora citizens and domestic stakeholders.

Conclusion

Diaspora voting is no longer a luxury but a democratic imperative in a globalized world. Nigeria’s failure to enfranchise its diaspora community contradicts its aspirations for inclusive governance and development. Comparative experiences from Africa and beyond show that the political, logistical, and constitutional hurdles Nigeria faces are surmountable. Overcoming them requires political will and strategic planning. Now is the time to act!

The author, Collins Nweke, was Chairperson Emeritus of Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) Europe from 2011 to 2013. He is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars & Administrators. He holds a PhD (honoris causa) in Governance.

The Politics and Economics of Renewable Energy for Nigeria

During my tenure in a Green political office, I faced a daunting energy policy delimma concerning transition economies. It was about taking a firm position on an aggressive push for transition to renewable energy by emerging economies. Seen as a pathway to a sustainable and resilient future, my party is non compromising on making fossil fuels a thing of the past. I recall a challenging debate at the African Carebbean and Pacific (ACP) secretariat during my bid for a seat in the European Parliament. A co-debater representing the business-leaning Belgian Liberals made an impassionate case for nuclear power as the new godsend for global energy security. When he was done, the skilful moderator turned to me and in a well calculated tone, she went: Honourable Nweke, you want no nuclear power stations, you are reported to hold the private view that attempts to get Africa to join the clean energy transition is harassment. What exactly do you want?

For a split second, I was frozen. However, I quickly gathered my thoughts. I then made a start “As Greens, we…” to which the lady promptly interjected “Not the Greens Honourable Nweke. The question is What Do YOU Want?” I then made a second attempt. Very well then. Let me correct one misconception: I see the transition to renewable energy as both necessary and urgent in addressing the global climate crisis. However, I also recognize that an abrupt shift away from fossil fuels, without a just and inclusive strategy, risks causing economic dislocation for many African nations whose economies remain heavily dependent on oil revenues. We need a pragmatic approach. A strategy rooted in accelerating clean energy adoption while investing in economic diversification, workforce retraining, and equitable development to ensure no one is left behind in the transition.

I stood by that position. When I argue that oil is not a dead commodity for Africa, I do not mince words. However, we are at an interregnum where emerging economies like my native Nigeria need to equally be told the inconvenient truth about the politics and economics of renewable energy. This involves a complex interplay of domestic policy, foreign relations, market forces, and structural challenges. This is more so especially when viewed through the lens of international trade and bilateralism. Overreliance on Oil export is a major issue. Nigeria’s economy remains heavily dependent on crude oil. Now is the ideal time to argue that investing in renewable energy will diversify energy sources and reduce vulnerability to global oil price shocks. Linked to that is import dependence as the country imports most of its refined petroleum products. Renewables will urgently help reduce this dependency culture.

Nigeria is facing one of its worst power shortages, with the national grid collapsing and leaving many homes and businesses without power. This makes Nigeria one of the world’s most vulnerable countries in terms of energy. There are a number of alternate energy sources that Nigeria can begin immediately to adopt from Europe, even from little brave Belgium. The problem with energy security in Nigeria is well known and well documented and therefore needs no further analysis. So, focusing on the solutions should be the reasonable thing to do. Talking of solutions, the first thing that comes to mind is the abundant sunlight year-round, that Nigeria is blessed with. Nigeria has an average solar radiation of 5.5 kWh/m²/day, which is significantly higher than Belgium’s 2.8 kWh/m²/day. This makes solar power a highly viable option for Nigeria. The fact that Rural Electrification Agency (REA) solar mini grids exist in Nigeria tells us that there is at least a sense that Nigeria knows what to do. REA as initiative needs scaling up.

Wind Energy potential is moderate in most regions, but areas like Sokoto, Kano, and Jos have significant wind resources. I guess the combination of onshore and offshore installations in Belgian wind energy infrastructure offers valuable lessons for Nigeria. Small to medium wind farms and hybrid energy systems could help Nigeria in combining solar and wind.

I am tempted not to overlook the potentials in hydropower for Nigeria with its vast water resources. There’s abundance of large and small rivers. While large hydropower projects are operational for instance the Kainji Dam, I have not stopped dreaming of small-scale hydropower in my Igbuzo hometown, in the Okpuzu and Atakpo rivers where I went swimming as a child. Numerous such rural river resources are scattered across the length and breadth of the country and can boost off-grid energy access. In other words, mini- and micro-hydropower plants for remote areas harbour unexplored energy potentials for Nigeria.

Biomass and Biogas is an option too. Nigeria generates a significant amount of agricultural and local waste that can be converted into energy. Farm residues, animal waste, and urban waste could be used for power generation and cooking gas. This is one viable way to address energy needs in rural areas and reduce environmental pollution. Of course I’m not losing sight of the strategic investments, supportive policies, and commitment to sustainable practices that is required here. Out here in Belgium, we have done so much since 2009 in integrating biomass and biogas in our energy mix, but it is not yet uhuru because of the challenges involved. It won’t be different for Nigeria.

On energy mix, would not play down any potential for achieving an energy mix for Nigeria no matter how small it is. With the few volcanic and hot spring regions in Nigeria, I will not exclude the potential for Geothermal Energy. In this regard, I think of Jos, Biu, and Mambilla Plateaux. Just as I believe that some hot springs from the Southwest to the far North, have great potentials. I recall with melancholy, geography lessons even in Umejei Primary School and later in St. Thomas’s College where we got acquainted with Ikogosi Warm Spring, Ruwan Zafi Hot Spring, Wikki Warm Spring in Yankari National Park, and Akiti Warm Spring, I believe in present day Nasarawa State. With enough will, Nigeria can easily surpass Belgium in small-scale geothermal systems for localized heating and electricity. I’m sure Belgium will readily transfer skills and knowledge and technology in this area if Nigeria asks nicely because there are also business potentials in it. Belgium is open for business.

Renewable energy as a clean energy source that is climate friendly is quite sustainable. Many countries are dependent on it but in Nigeria it is a different ball game on account of several limitations that impede on its development. When Nigeria becomes the subject of harassment, if I may borrow from the merciless debate moderator, less questions are being asked about how these challenges could be addressed. What international trade opportunities exist?

First and foremost, we must look at Nigerian Government Policy and Investment. The secured private sector participation must be encouraged through intentional public policies and legislative frameworks. Public-private partnership (PPPs) arrangements could be sealed to bridge finance gaps for renewable energy projects. Government must show openness in inviting international partners to the space as part of Nigeria’s intentional foreign policy. The 5D Renewed Foreign Policy mantra of current administration made provisions for this in the pillar around Development & Diaspora. The Diaspora has a role cut out here for them as a number of them are in the renewable energy space. Global Green Investment trends offer good lessons on how international investors are shifting toward green energy projects. Nigeria could attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into its renewable sector if it ensures policy stability and attractive returns. Collaborations with countries like Belgium, Germany, or Denmark, and even China, could bring in advanced renewable technology, especially solar and wind, if the table is organised through sound public policies.

Nigeria–Belgium Collaboration Opportunities in Renewable Energy

Belgium and Nigeria have complementary strengths that position them for mutually beneficial cooperation in renewable energy. There are strategic areas for business-to-business (B2B), government-to-government (G2G), and business to government (B2G) collaboration in infrastructure development as well as research and development.

Infrastructure Development

Ample Business-to-Business (B2B) opportunities exist in Solar Mini-Grids & Off-Grid Electrification where there can be collaboration between Belgian firms like 3E, GreenPulse and Nigerian developers to scale off-grid solar power for rural communities. There is also the Waste-to-Energy Solutions. In Belgian technology providers, VYNCKE, Nigeria does have a partner. There are indications that Nigerian agro-industrial firms could partner here to convert biomass into renewable energy. Nigeria needs not reinvent the wheels in Smart Port & Logistics Infrastructure when in more ways than one, Belgium’s Port of Antwerp-Bruges have shown readiness to provide the expertise needed to help green Nigerian ports. The Lagos Port could take advantage of this opportunity should they be serious about reducing carbon emissions in maritime logistics.

There is also Government-to-Government (G2G) opportunities to explore. There can be cooperation through EU–Nigeria Green Deal initiatives for infrastructure financing and technical support under Bilateral Green Transition Framework. This is independent of development and cooperation through Enabel, Belgium’s development agency. Again their willingness and ability to fund renewable energy infrastructure in public health and education institutions in Nigeria is no hidden agenda.

Research & Development (Education & Awareness)

Just like in infrastructure development, Business-to-Business (B2B) opportunities are there to exploit for instance in Green Skills Training. Private training providers can play a role in this space. Belgian vocational institutions like Syntra Vlaanderen can co-develop technical certification programmes with Nigerian polytechnics for solar and wind technicians, to leave it at just one example. Belgian and Nigerian media firms could initiate joint public awareness campaigns to co-produce for instance educational content on renewable energy and climate literacy.

Under Government-to-Government (G2G), public universities could seal University Research Partnerships. Joint academic programs between Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Ghent University, and Universities of Lagos and Port Harcourt, comes to mind in the domain of clean energy innovation. There can also be curriculum development support with Belgium, given its databank of knowledge acquired over the years. This could provide support in the integration of renewable energy and sustainability into Nigeria’s national curriculum.

Nigeria and the rest of the renewable energy world

There is the dimension of geopolitics of energy that Nigeria needs to watch in terms of the evolving oil diplomacy versus Green diplomacy. As the world shifts toward renewables, Nigeria’s oil-based diplomatic leverage will wane. Here it is not a matter of if, but that of when it will wane. Embracing renewables could open new partnerships in climate finance from the EU, US, or UN. As signatory to the Paris Agreement, Nigeria will be under global pressure to honour its climate commitments. It is hard to admit but Nigeria’s renewable energy policies are influenced by international expectations and access to climate funding like the Green Climate Fund. Only time will tell if these are in Nigeria’s National and security interests.

As many international investors are shifting toward green energy projects, Nigeria could attract FDI into its renewable sector if it ensures policy stability and attractive returns. Nigeria needs smart tariff policies to support local industry without discouraging investment realising that import duties on solar panels or wind turbines can either stimulate or stifle renewable adoption. With the right policies in place and given the current appetite for inter-Africa trade, Nigeria could become a regional hub for solar panel assembly or biomass fuel if it builds capacity and leverages trade agreements like AfCFTA.

END

The author, Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium, where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and the Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves on its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.

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