The European Union has spent the better part of two decades building a foreign-policy identity around a simple promise: power should be constrained by law, and crises should be resolved through principled multilateralism. That promise is not an abstract slogan. It is embedded in the everyday doctrine of the EU External Action Service (EEAS): conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue “as a tool of first response.” This is an integrated approach across the conflict cycle, and a steadfast commitment to a rules-based international order with the UN Charter at its core.
Venezuela now presents a moment of truth for that doctrine.
In the wake of the US operation that removed Nicolás Maduro, Europe’s public posture has been understandably cautious. It welcomes an opportunity for democratic transition while underscoring that restoring democracy must respect the Venezuelan people’s will and remain anchored in international law and the UN Charter. That framing is not diplomatic fence-sitting; it is the EU’s most valuable asset: legitimacy.
But legitimacy is only leverage when it is organised into policy. It must happen quickly, coherently, and visibly.
The EU already has a Council mandate that it must use.
Recent Council positions on Venezuela are not ambiguous. The Council has repeatedly renewed restrictive measures and listings in response to democratic backsliding and human-rights concerns, and it has underlined the EU’s commitment to support democracy and a peaceful and inclusive transition. This is not merely sanctions policy; it is a political line: the EU seeks democratic restoration, but through lawful and inclusive means.
The question is whether Europe will now pair that line with a diplomatic initiative commensurate with the stakes.
EEAS doctrine points to the answer: mediation, preventive diplomacy, and “principled pragmatism.” The EEAS is not starting from scratch. Its mediation doctrine recognises that conflict resolution demands principled pragmatism: defending human rights and the rule of law while engaging the messy realities that make negotiated outcomes possible.
In practical terms, that should translate into five immediate moves:
1.Activate an EEAS-led mediation track
The High Representative/VP should mandate the EEAS Mediation Support capacity to convene a structured dialogue framework focused on political freedoms, prisoner releases, electoral guarantees, and transitional governance arrangements. This should be done quietly at first, but with a clear roadmap.
2.Anchor the process in the UN Charter and regional ownership
Europe should explicitly root its engagement in UN Charter principles, including sovereignty, political independence, self-determination. It should then push for a process that is Venezuelan-led, with meaningful roles for Latin American stakeholders (including Brazil) rather than a purely Washington–Beijing tug-of-war. This aligns with the European Council’s repeated insistence that effective multilateralism and the UN Charter remain the EU’s compass.
3.Coordinate “contact group” diplomacy with enforceable sequencing
The EU should help organise a renewed international contact mechanism that couples incentives and constraints in a sequenced way: concrete reforms trigger calibrated relief; reversals trigger targeted re-tightening. The Council’s existing sanctions architecture provides the technical toolset; what is missing is the political choreography.
4.Separate accountability from revenge
If Maduro’s detention becomes a geopolitical flashpoint, Europe should insist that accountability for crimes must be pursued through lawful processes, not triumphalism. This is irrespective of whether the crime is corruption, repression, or transnational organised crime. That distinction matters for EU unity and for persuading hesitant partners that this is about norms, not dominance. Europe’s own statements appear to already point in this direction.
5.Protect EU unity by staying anchored to Council language
Divergences inside Europe are inevitable under pressure. The stabiliser is to keep returning to agreed Council/European Council phrasing: peaceful transition, human rights, verifiable democratic outcomes, and the UN Charter. The more Europe speaks with one legal voice, the harder it becomes for external actors to split the Union into “hawks” and “handwringers.”
Why this matters beyond Venezuela
This matters because the precedent being set is larger than Caracas. If the world normalises political change through unilateral force, then the guardrails that protect smaller states weaken. This must be without prejudice to how satisfying it may feel in the short term. Europe understands this better than most. It was built to ensure that law restrains power, not the other way around.
That is why Venezuela is not only a Latin American drama. Venezuela is a test of whether the EU still believes in the doctrine it teaches. That doctrine is a gospel according to mediation first, multilateralism always, the UN Charter as the floor, not the ceiling. The doctrine has many converts including the United States and should not require much preaching now.
Europe should not choose between democracy and legality. The EU’s calling is to insist that democracy pursued unlawfully is fragile, and legality pursued without democracy is hollow. The EU has no better comparative advantage than this. The only sustainable outcome is a negotiated transition that is Venezuelan-led, internationally verified, and regionally owned. That is what EU doctrine demands. It is time to operationalise it.
Nigeria’s tax overhaul is less a revenue exercise than a credibility test. It is one that will shape investor confidence, citizen buy-in, and the country’s reform reputation in the face of the world for years to come.
by Collins Nweke
Today, 1 January 2026, marks more than the start of a new year for Nigeria. It is the dawn of a new fiscal era, as the country’s ambitious tax law comes into force. The timing of this piece is deliberate: it coincides with a moment of profound national significance and symbolism. In the months since the law was announced, Nigeria has witnessed spirited debates, rigorous analyses including my op-ed on Proshare titled: Tax Ombud for Nigeria: Navigating a Promising Reform in a Distrustful Context on the role of the tax ombudsman, and passionate protests, all underscoring the gravity of the changes at hand. Yet, despite the turbulence, the government has pressed ahead, undeterred and unwavering in its resolve. Against this backdrop, my purpose is not to add to the noise, but to offer a sober reflection and an objective assessment of what will ultimately determine whether this reform succeeds or falters. For Nigeria, the true test is not simply about raising revenue, but about building credibility, at home and abroad, through the choices made from this day forward.
Operating in the intersection of international trade consultancy and Diaspora thoughts leadership for a couple of decades now, feels like a long-standing bridge between Nigeria and global capital. In such vantage position, I have learnt one enduring lesson: investors do not fear reform, they fear uncertainty. Nigeria’s new tax framework should therefore not be viewed as a risk by default, instead of the test that it is. A test of credibility, sequencing, and Nigeria’s capacity to translate reform intent into institutional reliability.
The Federal Government of Nigeria has framed the overhaul as a decisive pivot. It is a route away from oil dependency and toward domestic resource mobilisation; away from over-taxing a narrow formal sector and toward a broader, fairer base. For international investors, this narrative is familiar. What will distinguish Nigeria is not ambition, but execution.
What Investors Should Watch Most Closely
Speaking daily with investors who want to engage Nigeria but remain cautious, I can say this plainly: capital wants Nigeria to succeed. The market size, entrepreneurial energy, and strategic relevance are undeniable. But goodwill is not infinite. Nigeria has a duty, indeed an obligation, to make this reform work. Not only for revenue, but for reputation. If successful, it will reposition Nigeria as a serious reform economy, one that converts policy ambition into institutional trust. Not allowing it falter means paying attention to a few key factors:
Predictability over perfection: Tax rates can be modelled; volatility cannot. The clearest signal Nigeria can send to markets is that rules will not shift abruptly, retroactively, or selectively. Consistency in application matters more than marginal adjustments in rates. Credible reform is reform that businesses can plan around.
Balanced enforcement: A sound tax system expands compliance without penalising those already compliant. Investors will watch closely whether enforcement finally tackles elite non-compliance, leakages, and rent-seeking, rather than defaulting—yet again—to squeezing formal businesses because they are easiest to reach. Reform that punishes compliance undermines confidence.
Transparency in the use of revenues: Taxation is not merely a fiscal instrument; it is the backbone of the social contract. Investors, like citizens, want evidence that revenues translate into infrastructure, healthcare, education, and logistics that reduce the cost of doing business. Transparent reporting, independent audits, and visible outcomes are not political luxuries. These are investment fundamentals.
Sub-national readiness: Nigeria’s federal structure means national reform is only as strong as State level and local government implementation. Fragmented administration, multiple levies, and uneven capacity remain among the greatest deterrents to investment. Harmonisation, digital integration, and clarity across jurisdictions will therefore be critical tests of seriousness.
Sequencing and sensitivity: Reform during economic strain may be unavoidable, but its success depends on timing and tone. Phased implementation, clear thresholds, and protection for small enterprises would signal that Nigeria understands the difference between taxing productivity and suffocating survival.
Opposition, Dissent, and Democratic Legitimacy
It is important to recognise, and commend, the voices of trade unions, opposition parties, and civil society organisations that have raised concerns about the reform. They are not obstacles to progress, but essential actors in a functioning democracy, exercising a legitimate right to scrutinise state power and defend vulnerable groups. History shows that reforms imposed without consultation rarely endure. Government has a responsibility to engage dissent with respect, transparency, and good faith. From my position as an independent assessor, supporting investors to make informed decisions rather than defending any administration, robust opposition is not a weakness. Properly engaged, it strengthens legitimacy and improves policy outcomes.
Why This Reform Must Be a Win-Win
Engaging daily with investors eager to enter Nigeria yet wary of policy risk, one reality that shouts loud is that most investors want Nigeria to succeed. They realise that this, in the first instance is good for them. But it is also good for Nigeria. The reverse will reinforce a damaging narrative: that reform in Nigeria remains episodic rather than systemic. This moment therefore demands more than legislation. It calls for leadership that listens, institutions that deliver, and a country that treats citizens and investors not as extraction targets, but as partners in national renewal.
Tax reform is not the destination. Credibility is. And credibility, once earned, delivers the highest return of all.
I was resolutely opposed to Brexit. I remain convinced that it diminished both the United Kingdom and the European Union. It did so economically, politically, and symbolically. Yet democracy does not end where disappointment begins. The British people voted, the decision was implemented, and history moved on. What remains is not whether Brexit should have happened, but how responsibly its consequences are managed. That is why the UK’s decision to rejoin Erasmus+ from 2027 matters far beyond the confines of student exchanges. It is a quiet, deliberate, and consequential signal that the long work of repair has begun.
Erasmus+ is not a concession extracted from a defeated party. It is also not a stealth reversal of the referendum. It is a confidence-building measure between two partners that have learned, painfully, that rupture carries costs for both sides. In an era of performative politics, this return to functional cooperation is refreshingly untheatrical. It says that after years of posturing, London and Brussels are rediscovering the value of pragmatism, of doing what works, even when grand reconciliations remain politically out of reach.
The choice of Erasmus+ is telling. Few programmes embody European soft power as clearly. It builds skills, broadens horizons, and weaves human networks that outlast election cycles. For young people in particular, Erasmus+ has been a rite of passage into a wider world. The UK’s withdrawal from it was one of the most tangible, everyday losses of Brexit. It was not felt in abstract trade statistics but in classrooms, campuses, and communities. Its restoration does not erase the past five years, but it acknowledges a simple truth: cooperation in education and skills strengthens competitiveness, social cohesion, and trust.
This is what a credible Brexit reset looks like. Not denial. Not revisionism. Not a rush to reopen the settlement. A reset that works with political realities while quietly improving outcomes. Rejoining Erasmus+ respects the UK’s red lines while advancing mutual interests. Today, no free movement, no single market, no customs union are still in place. Rejoining Erasmus+ demonstrates that selective cooperation can coexist with institutional separation. In doing so, it offers a template for rebuilding ties incrementally, sector by sector, without relitigating the referendum.
Such humility is not weakness. Call it maturity. The most durable political arrangements are rarely rebuilt in a straight line. They are reconstructed through patient confidence-building, through policies that deliver visible benefits and rebuild habits of cooperation. On the question of the UK ultimately rejoining the EU, realism must prevail: it is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But politics is rarely static. If history teaches anything, it is that relationships heal when incentives align and trust is restored, often sooner than cynics expect. Fingers crossed, yes, but grounded in the hard work of repair.
Yet the significance of Erasmus+ extend beyond Europe’s internal architecture. Brexit did not only fracture UK–EU relations at home. It exported European disunity abroad, most visibly to Africa. In the years since the referendum, London and Brussels have too often pursued parallel strategies on the continent: duplicating instruments, competing narratives, and fragmenting impact. What should have been complementarity became rivalry. What should have been coordination became clutter.
Africa matters profoundly to both the UK and the EU, economically, demographically, geopolitically. Europe’s future growth, security, and climate resilience are entwined with Africa’s. And yet, post-Brexit, African partners have frequently encountered two Europes where one would have sufficed: overlapping trade initiatives, competing development finance, and unaligned regulatory approaches. The result has been inefficiency at best, confusion at worst, and missed opportunities for African agency to set the terms of engagement.
This is where the lesson of Erasmus+ becomes instructive. Cooperation does not require political reintegration. It requires political intelligence. Erasmus+ shows that shared programmes can be rebuilt on mutually agreed terms, delivering public value without reopening old wounds. Applied to Africa, this logic points to a necessary reframing: the UK and the EU do not need to compete for African trade; they need to cooperate for African transformation.
Such cooperation would not erase differences. Nor should it. The UK’s bilateral agility can complement the EU’s scale, regulatory depth, and convening power. Its ability to move quickly, tailor partnerships, and mobilise finance was instructive. Together, they can support African priorities more coherently: skills and vocational training, digital connectivity, climate adaptation, and industrial value chains aligned with the African Continental Free Trade Area. Done well, this would replace zero-sum rivalry with outcome-driven alignment.
Diaspora networks are the connective tissue in this story. Across Europe and the UK, African diasporas possess market knowledge, cultural fluency, and investment capital that remain underutilised. They are bridges, not battlegrounds. A cooperative UK–EU posture in Africa would empower these communities as partners in development and trade, rather than forcing them to navigate competing bureaucracies. Trade is not a trophy to be won from Africa; it is a partnership to be built with Africans.
Critically, African agency must remain central. Cooperation between the UK and the EU should not recreate old hierarchies or proxy competitions. It should support African strategies, institutions, and ambitions, on terms defined by African governments, businesses, and civil society. The aim is not alignment for alignment’s sake, but coherence where it adds value and restraint where it does not.
Erasmus+ therefore deserves to be read as a template, not an exception. If Britain and Europe can relearn how to cooperate on students and skills, they can do the same on research, climate, health security, and Africa’s economic transformation. The recent re-association with research programmes, the resumption of structured dialogues, and now Erasmus+ together suggest a pattern: a mosaic of practical agreements that rebuild trust piece by piece.
For those of us who opposed Brexit but accept its democratic legitimacy, this approach is both principled and pragmatic. It neither denies the past nor surrenders the future. It recognises that politics is the art of the possible. And that what is possible expands when cooperation delivers results. A reset worthy of the name does not seek to relive the arguments of 2016. It seeks to govern responsibly in the world of 2026.
Brexit was a rupture. Erasmus+ is repair. And repair, when done patiently, often lasts longer than what was broken in haste. Europe’s future will not be shaped by who won Brexit, but by who learned from it within Europe and beyond.
Belgium has decided. And in a democracy, decisions once debated, voted, and translated into policy, do not remain theoretical. They become lived reality. From 1 January 2026, a first group of jobseekers will begin to lose unemployment benefits, with a phased rollout that continues until 1 July 2027. The first wave affects roughly 21,500 people, many of them in Wallonia. And by summer 2027, the reform is expected to impact nearly 103,000 residents.
I opposed this direction when it was still a plan. In my earlier piece, I warned against a welfare debate that risks shifting from fighting poverty to fighting the poor. I still believe that warning was valid. But the point of democratic politics is not to continue campaigning after the ballots are counted. It is to help society govern itself wisely, cautiously, and humanely, especially when reform touches the lives of those with the least margin for error. My colleagues on the political Left who are still in active service might read this and say to me: how convenient! They may be right because, since retiring from active party politics, I no longer must be part of that hard decision of cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens. When it is the law, you are duty bound to comply, irrespective of political persuasion.
So I write now not to relitigate yesterday, but to prevent tomorrow’s avoidable harm.
Activation is not crueltyunless we make it so
Even as critics think otherwise, most liberals understand that Belgium’s welfare state was not built to romanticise dependency. We simply argue that it was built to protect dignity while enabling participation. Support and responsibility were always meant to travel in tandem.
In principle, governments are right to ask: how do we encourage labour-market participation, reduce long-term joblessness, and protect public finances? Those are legitimate policy aims. But legitimacy of intent does not guarantee legitimacy of outcome.
A hard truth sits at the centre of this reform: if you withdraw income support without simultaneously removing the barriers that keep people unemployed, you don’t “activate” people. You destabilise them. You push them from unemployment insurance into deeper poverty, precarious housing, debt traps, family stress, and sometimes untreated mental health conditions. The social cost does not disappear. It merely relocates often to OCMW/CPAS, to charities, to food aid networks, and to already overstretched local services.
Brussels authorities have already publicly prepared for that pressure, warning that thousands may turn to social welfare services as benefit limits bite. This is the pivot Belgium must get right: reform must be paired with protection.
A humane implementation: six guardrails Belgium should adopt now
If the reform is to proceed, and the sad reality is that it is proceeding, then federal and regional governments should adopt a do no avoidable harm framework. Concretely:
1. No one should fall off a cliff: build a guaranteed “bridge” to support
The moment unemployment benefits stop, the transition to alternative support must be automatic, guided, and time-bound; not an obstacle course of appointments, paperwork, missed letters, and administrative confusion.
A person losing benefits should receive one coordinated pathway: employment guidance + social support + income stabilisation where eligible. If activation is the goal, then administrative chaos is policy sabotage.
2.Fund the shock where it lands: municipalities need real money, not moral lectures
If the policy shifts people from federal unemployment protection toward local welfare assistance, then the federal level must co-finance the increased load. Otherwise, the reform becomes a fiscal shell game: savings for one level of government, pressure and political backlash for another.
Belgium should create a transparent mechanism that tracks how many people transfer to CPAS/OCMW support and funds municipalities accordingly: predictably, not through ad hoc crisis measures.
3. Replace “one-size-fits-all” with case-based activation
Some jobseekers are unemployed because they lack skills. Others because they are older, sick, caring for relatives, facing language barriers, or living with invisible disabilities. A uniform time cap treats these realities as excuses. They are not excuses; they are contexts.
Belgium must implement individualised, case-based activation that distinguishes:
those who need skills and placement,
those who need health and psychosocial support,
those who need care infrastructure (childcare, eldercare),
those who are effectively unemployable under current labour-market conditions and need protected pathways.
A mature welfare state doesn’t pretend all unemployment is identical.
4. Expand training exceptions into a real ladder, not a loophole
The current framework includes an exception for people enrolled by 31 December 2025 in training for shortage occupations, allowing benefits to be extended until training ends (under conditions).
That is sensible—but too narrow if Belgium wants genuine activation.
Training must be:
accessible (cost, transport, childcare),
realistic (matching labour-market demand),
and supportive (coaching, internships, employer linkages).
If training is truly the “on-ramp” to work, then government should widen, simplify, and properly resource it, especially for those closest to the labour-market margins.
5. Protect dignity in assessment and communication
When people receive letters informing them that their benefits end, the message must not be punitive. The tone matters because it signals whether society still recognises the recipient as a citizen or treats them as a burden.
Public discourse should also be policed for scapegoating. Belgium must reject narratives that imply poverty is a character flaw or that long-term unemployment is best solved through humiliation. Policy can be firm without being dehumanising.
6. Monitor outcomes like lives depend on it, because they do
Belgium should publish a quarterly Reform Impact Dashboard that tracks:
transitions to work (quality, not just any job),
transitions to CPAS/OCMW,
poverty and housing insecurity indicators,
debt and arrears,
health and mental health service demand.
And there must be a willingness to adjust. If evidence shows rising hardship without commensurate employment gains, democratic responsibility requires correction, not stubbornness.
A word to Europe: do not misread Belgium
Across Europe, many governments have long looked to Belgium as proof that a generous, humane social protection system can coexist with fiscal responsibility and labour-market participation. That reputation now places a burden not only on Belgium, but on Europe itself. This reform will be read, rightly or wrongly, as a signal. If Belgium; the careful compromiser, the laboratory of social dialogue; normalises time-limited protection without equally visible investment in activation, care, and dignity, others will feel licensed to go further and cut deeper. Europe must therefore resist the temptation to treat this moment as validation of a harsher continental turn. The lesson to draw is not that social protection has failed, but that reform divorced from social investment corrodes trust, cohesion, and legitimacy. If Europe still claims a distinct social model, one that tempers markets with solidarity, then Belgium’s experience should be a warning light, not a green one. The benchmark must not slide from humane protection to managed abandonment.
The moral test of governance
There is a phrase I used before that I repeat now with even greater urgency: we are cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens—fellow humans.
It is precisely when the political system has “decided” that the responsibility of leadership becomes most demanding. Because implementation is where policy stops being ideology and starts being ethics.
Belgium can still make this reform worthy of its social model, if it treats activation as a supported pathway, not a punishment clock; if it funds the consequences honestly; and if it refuses to confuse fiscal discipline with moral superiority.
In the coming weeks, the first wave will feel the reform not as a concept but as an empty line in a bank account. The question is whether Belgium will meet that moment with bureaucratic indifference or with the quiet competence and compassion that once made its welfare model a benchmark.
Democracy brought us here. Now decency must guide what we do next.
The author, Collins Nweke is a Senior Consultant on international trade and economic diplomacy. A three-term councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium till December 2024, his portfolio included social welfare and economy. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
In the dynamic arena of global geopolitics, Nigerians must shed the illusion that their country has to pick sides between BRICS and the G7. Rather than viewing these blocs as mutually exclusive, Nigeria should boldly pursue a dual-engagement strategy that taps into the opportunities offered by both. It is not a matter of ‘either-or’ but ‘both-and’. This is a strategic move that reflects Nigeria’s aspirations as a global player.
BRICS vs G7 is a false dichotomy
It is true that China, a key BRICS member, has invested heavily in Nigeria’s industrial sector. This is particularly visible in the Ogun, Ota, Lagos, and Badagry axis, among other locations. These visible investments often overshadow Western contributions, which tend to be more subtle and regulatory-focused. But raw investment volumes do not tell the whole story. Many Chinese investments come with challenges. Take debt sustainability as example. Limited local job creation remains an issue. We cannot ignore environmental concerns either. Meanwhile, G7-linked initiatives often support democratic institutions, capacity building, and regulatory reforms that are less visible but equally essential for long-term development.
Currency Policy and the Sovereignty Debate
Yes, Bretton Woods institutions influenced by G7 powers often push currency devaluation policies in emerging economies, including Nigeria. But it would be simplistic to attribute Nigeria’s economic struggles solely to G7 influence. Macroeconomic mismanagement at home plays a major role. It is also worth noting that BRICS institutions like the New Development Bank have not exactly rushed to fill Nigeria’s financing gaps. Neither bloc is altruistic. Both run based on interest. Those rooting for Nigeria should assume the responsibility of strategically aligning their interests with those of Nigeria.
Non-Alignment 2.0: Nigeria’s Diplomatic Playbook
Nigeria must take a cue from fellow emerging powers like India and South Africa who engage both BRICS and G7 with calculated pragmatism. This is not fence-sitting. It is strategic positioning in a multipolar world. Nigeria’s influence must be exercised in multiple fora. The country must use BRICS to assert African agency while using G7 platforms to strengthen ties with traditional powers and access advanced technology, finance, and markets. And this brings me to the issue of strategic engagement as opposed to selective alignment.
Frustration with the G7 is understandable. However, disengagement is not a strategy. Nor is blind faith in BRICS a silver bullet. Nigeria must evolve from being a passive recipient of foreign policy to becoming a confident global actor. The future lies not in choosing sides, but in choosing strategy.
That is why I stand by my position: Nigeria needs BRICS and G7. This is not naivety; it is geopolitical maturity. Let us play the global game with clarity, courage, and conviction.
An Open Letter to the Honourable Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and Belgium (On the Occasion of the 3rd EU-AU Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers) by Collins Nweke | Brussels, Belgium 21 May 2025
Your Excellencies
The 3rd European Union–African Union Ministerial Meeting convenes today in Brussels. It has the commendable goal of advancing a 25-year-old partnership. I write to you not only as a Nigerian Diaspora leader and a Belgian of Nigerian roots. I also write as a bridge between two continents that share more than history, but a destiny.
The themes of today’s deliberations: peace, security, multilateralism, prosperity, and migration, are not merely policy points. They are lived realities for the millions of Africans in Europe and Europeans engaged in Africa. They speak to our aspirations. They equally touch on our anxieties.
A Personal and Collective Stake
I have lived the confluence of African resilience and European opportunity. I see the immense potential in the collaboration between Nigeria and Belgium. This potential exists both bilaterally and through the broader EU-AU frameworks. Yet, it is equally important to speak candidly about missed opportunities. This is particularly true in the realm of Economic Diplomacy. Much of the rhetoric has not translated into meaningful and inclusive outcomes.
Missed Opportunities
There has been goodwill on both sides. A leap forward occurred in the past three years. However, economic engagement between Nigeria and Belgium has still been far below its potential. Trade volumes fluctuate without a long-term strategic framework. Investment flows are lopsided. Dialogues around innovation, technology transfer, and capacity building often stall at pilot phases. Diaspora capital and expertise are underutilized assets in bilateral cooperation. They remain on the margins of structured economic diplomacy.
Belgium, with its expertise in green technologies, port logistics, and smart infrastructure, has much to offer a transitioning Nigerian economy. Nigeria, with its youthful population, creative industries, and vast market, is a gateway to Africa’s future. Yet our nations have not unlocked this constructive collaboration.
A Call for Bold, Pragmatic Collaboration
As Foreign Ministers, you hold the keys to fostering a new diplomatic architecture, one where trade and talent move together. An architecture where diaspora communities are institutional partners, and where prosperity is co-created, not simply negotiated.
A Two-Point Recommendation
1. Establish a Nigeria–Belgium Bilateral Economic Diplomacy Council This should be a structured, high-level platform. It should involve governments, the private sector, and diaspora stakeholders. It would move beyond trade fairs. This initiative would focus on sustained joint ventures and policy alignment. It would strategically target sectors like clean energy, agri-tech, and the digital economy.
2.Create a Diaspora Innovation and Investment Window Through embassies and missions, Nigeria and Belgium should jointly design programmes. These programmes should incentivize diaspora-led startups, skills transfer, and remittances. These remittances should be channeled into productive sectors. This is not charity. It is smart economics.
Conclusion
Excellencies, this is a moment to lead not from tradition, but from transformation. The EU-AU partnership must not only show a shared past. It must project a shared future. Nigerians in Belgium and Europe and Belgians in Africa are part of this future. Our governments should be partners in progress, not prisoners of protocol. As you deliberate on policies that will shape continents, I urge you to also listen to the diaspora. They are the voices of those who straddle both. We live the consequences of your decisions and embody the potential of your vision.
Respectfully yours
Collins Nweke Advocate for Fair EU-Africa Economic Relations | Senior Consultant Nigeria Belgium Luxembourg Business Forum
During my tenure in a Green political office, I faced a daunting energy policy delimma concerning transition economies. It was about taking a firm position on an aggressive push for transition to renewable energy by emerging economies. Seen as a pathway to a sustainable and resilient future, my party is non compromising on making fossil fuels a thing of the past. I recall a challenging debate at the African Carebbean and Pacific (ACP) secretariat during my bid for a seat in the European Parliament. A co-debater representing the business-leaning Belgian Liberals made an impassionate case for nuclear power as the new godsend for global energy security. When he was done, the skilful moderator turned to me and in a well calculated tone, she went: Honourable Nweke, you want no nuclear power stations, you are reported to hold the private view that attempts to get Africa to join the clean energy transition is harassment. What exactly do you want?
For a split second, I was frozen. However, I quickly gathered my thoughts. I then made a start “As Greens, we…” to which the lady promptly interjected “Not the Greens Honourable Nweke. The question is What Do YOU Want?” I then made a second attempt. Very well then. Let me correct one misconception: I see the transition to renewable energy as both necessary and urgent in addressing the global climate crisis. However, I also recognize that an abrupt shift away from fossil fuels, without a just and inclusive strategy, risks causing economic dislocation for many African nations whose economies remain heavily dependent on oil revenues. We need a pragmatic approach. A strategy rooted in accelerating clean energy adoption while investing in economic diversification, workforce retraining, and equitable development to ensure no one is left behind in the transition.
I stood by that position. When I argue that oil is not a dead commodity for Africa, I do not mince words. However, we are at an interregnum where emerging economies like my native Nigeria need to equally be told the inconvenient truth about the politics and economics of renewable energy. This involves a complex interplay of domestic policy, foreign relations, market forces, and structural challenges. This is more so especially when viewed through the lens of international trade and bilateralism. Overreliance on Oil export is a major issue. Nigeria’s economy remains heavily dependent on crude oil. Now is the ideal time to argue that investing in renewable energy will diversify energy sources and reduce vulnerability to global oil price shocks. Linked to that is import dependence as the country imports most of its refined petroleum products. Renewables will urgently help reduce this dependency culture.
Nigeria is facing one of its worst power shortages, with the national grid collapsing and leaving many homes and businesses without power. This makes Nigeria one of the world’s most vulnerable countries in terms of energy. There are a number of alternate energy sources that Nigeria can begin immediately to adopt from Europe, even from little brave Belgium. The problem with energy security in Nigeria is well known and well documented and therefore needs no further analysis. So, focusing on the solutions should be the reasonable thing to do. Talking of solutions, the first thing that comes to mind is the abundant sunlight year-round, that Nigeria is blessed with. Nigeria has an average solar radiation of 5.5 kWh/m²/day, which is significantly higher than Belgium’s 2.8 kWh/m²/day. This makes solar power a highly viable option for Nigeria. The fact that Rural Electrification Agency (REA) solar mini grids exist in Nigeria tells us that there is at least a sense that Nigeria knows what to do. REA as initiative needs scaling up.
Wind Energy potential is moderate in most regions, but areas like Sokoto, Kano, and Jos have significant wind resources. I guess the combination of onshore and offshore installations in Belgian wind energy infrastructure offers valuable lessons for Nigeria. Small to medium wind farms and hybrid energy systems could help Nigeria in combining solar and wind.
I am tempted not to overlook the potentials in hydropower for Nigeria with its vast water resources. There’s abundance of large and small rivers. While large hydropower projects are operational for instance the Kainji Dam, I have not stopped dreaming of small-scale hydropower in my Igbuzo hometown, in the Okpuzu and Atakpo rivers where I went swimming as a child. Numerous such rural river resources are scattered across the length and breadth of the country and can boost off-grid energy access. In other words, mini- and micro-hydropower plants for remote areas harbour unexplored energy potentials for Nigeria.
Biomass and Biogas is an option too. Nigeria generates a significant amount of agricultural and local waste that can be converted into energy. Farm residues, animal waste, and urban waste could be used for power generation and cooking gas. This is one viable way to address energy needs in rural areas and reduce environmental pollution. Of course I’m not losing sight of the strategic investments, supportive policies, and commitment to sustainable practices that is required here. Out here in Belgium, we have done so much since 2009 in integrating biomass and biogas in our energy mix, but it is not yet uhuru because of the challenges involved. It won’t be different for Nigeria.
On energy mix, would not play down any potential for achieving an energy mix for Nigeria no matter how small it is. With the few volcanic and hot spring regions in Nigeria, I will not exclude the potential for Geothermal Energy. In this regard, I think of Jos, Biu, and Mambilla Plateaux. Just as I believe that some hot springs from the Southwest to the far North, have great potentials. I recall with melancholy, geography lessons even in Umejei Primary School and later in St. Thomas’s College where we got acquainted with Ikogosi Warm Spring, Ruwan Zafi Hot Spring, Wikki Warm Spring in Yankari National Park, and Akiti Warm Spring, I believe in present day Nasarawa State. With enough will, Nigeria can easily surpass Belgium in small-scale geothermal systems for localized heating and electricity. I’m sure Belgium will readily transfer skills and knowledge and technology in this area if Nigeria asks nicely because there are also business potentials in it. Belgium is open for business.
Renewable energy as a clean energy source that is climate friendly is quite sustainable. Many countries are dependent on it but in Nigeria it is a different ball game on account of several limitations that impede on its development. When Nigeria becomes the subject of harassment, if I may borrow from the merciless debate moderator, less questions are being asked about how these challenges could be addressed. What international trade opportunities exist?
First and foremost, we must look at Nigerian Government Policy and Investment. The secured private sector participation must be encouraged through intentional public policies and legislative frameworks. Public-private partnership (PPPs) arrangements could be sealed to bridge finance gaps for renewable energy projects. Government must show openness in inviting international partners to the space as part of Nigeria’s intentional foreign policy. The 5D Renewed Foreign Policy mantra of current administration made provisions for this in the pillar around Development & Diaspora. The Diaspora has a role cut out here for them as a number of them are in the renewable energy space. Global Green Investment trends offer good lessons on how international investors are shifting toward green energy projects. Nigeria could attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into its renewable sector if it ensures policy stability and attractive returns. Collaborations with countries like Belgium, Germany, or Denmark, and even China, could bring in advanced renewable technology, especially solar and wind, if the table is organised through sound public policies.
Nigeria–Belgium Collaboration Opportunities in Renewable Energy
Belgium and Nigeria have complementary strengths that position them for mutually beneficial cooperation in renewable energy. There are strategic areas for business-to-business (B2B), government-to-government (G2G), and business to government (B2G) collaboration in infrastructure development as well as research and development.
Infrastructure Development
Ample Business-to-Business (B2B) opportunities exist in Solar Mini-Grids & Off-Grid Electrification where there can be collaboration between Belgian firms like 3E, GreenPulse and Nigerian developers to scale off-grid solar power for rural communities. There is also the Waste-to-Energy Solutions. In Belgian technology providers, VYNCKE, Nigeria does have a partner. There are indications that Nigerian agro-industrial firms could partner here to convert biomass into renewable energy. Nigeria needs not reinvent the wheels in Smart Port & Logistics Infrastructure when in more ways than one, Belgium’s Port of Antwerp-Bruges have shown readiness to provide the expertise needed to help green Nigerian ports. The Lagos Port could take advantage of this opportunity should they be serious about reducing carbon emissions in maritime logistics.
There is also Government-to-Government (G2G) opportunities to explore. There can be cooperation through EU–Nigeria Green Deal initiatives for infrastructure financing and technical support under Bilateral Green Transition Framework. This is independent of development and cooperation through Enabel, Belgium’s development agency. Again their willingness and ability to fund renewable energy infrastructure in public health and education institutions in Nigeria is no hidden agenda.
Research & Development (Education & Awareness)
Just like in infrastructure development, Business-to-Business (B2B) opportunities are there to exploit for instance in Green Skills Training. Private training providers can play a role in this space. Belgian vocational institutions like Syntra Vlaanderen can co-develop technical certification programmes with Nigerian polytechnics for solar and wind technicians, to leave it at just one example. Belgian and Nigerian media firms could initiate joint public awareness campaigns to co-produce for instance educational content on renewable energy and climate literacy.
Under Government-to-Government (G2G), public universities could seal University Research Partnerships. Joint academic programs between Katholiek Universiteit Leuven, Ghent University, and Universities of Lagos and Port Harcourt, comes to mind in the domain of clean energy innovation. There can also be curriculum development support with Belgium, given its databank of knowledge acquired over the years. This could provide support in the integration of renewable energy and sustainability into Nigeria’s national curriculum.
Nigeria and the rest of the renewable energy world
There is the dimension of geopolitics of energy that Nigeria needs to watch in terms of the evolving oil diplomacy versus Green diplomacy. As the world shifts toward renewables, Nigeria’s oil-based diplomatic leverage will wane. Here it is not a matter of if, but that of when it will wane. Embracing renewables could open new partnerships in climate finance from the EU, US, or UN. As signatory to the Paris Agreement, Nigeria will be under global pressure to honour its climate commitments. It is hard to admit but Nigeria’s renewable energy policies are influenced by international expectations and access to climate funding like the Green Climate Fund. Only time will tell if these are in Nigeria’s National and security interests.
As many international investors are shifting toward green energy projects, Nigeria could attract FDI into its renewable sector if it ensures policy stability and attractive returns. Nigeria needs smart tariff policies to support local industry without discouraging investment realising that import duties on solar panels or wind turbines can either stimulate or stifle renewable adoption. With the right policies in place and given the current appetite for inter-Africa trade, Nigeria could become a regional hub for solar panel assembly or biomass fuel if it builds capacity and leverages trade agreements like AfCFTA.
END
The author, Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium, where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and the Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves on its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
The Trump-Zelenskyy Oval Office debacle has led to many unsolicited advice to a desperate Ukrainian President on how he ought to have handled an erratic American President. I laughed at some, got offended, if not angry, at others. Yet some got me thinking. They got me thinking of a few incidents during my time as municipal legislator at Ostend City Council, Belgium. Let me single out two particular incidents.
One was during the first of my three terms. I had just been sworn in. While learning the legislative rope, all buried in piles of briefing notes, books, and handouts, I relied for guidance in the interim, on my sense of right and wrong, my ideological persuasion if you like, and my Green Party political lines, especially the issues on which we were elected. One of the items slated for a vote in one of my early sittings was approval of procedure for employment of ‘Student Vacation Jobbers’ at the department for social welfare in whose board I served at the time.
Asking around, I discovered that the vacant positions were never published by the department. The order of allocation of student job positions was for Councillors to bring in their children. If, as Councillor, we had no school-age children of 16 years or older, we could bring in anyone of our choosing. Next in rank were the staff of the department in order of seniority. If there are any places left after filling these anointed priority places, the Council Chairman will then handpick party royals to favour with the positions.
My immediate reaction was that this must be wrong and that it must stop. I quickly put together a brief interpellation in which I pointed out that I do not feel comfortable giving my teenage son priority over other kids just because I, his dad, happened to be Councillor. Equality of chance presupposes that we should open up the space for all kids irrespective of background. Let the best candidates get the jobs.
If we must favour any group, I argued, then let us prioritise kids from families in poverty or that are facing threats of poverty. We know who they are because their parents are our clients on income support. They lack the network to facilitate getting vacation job for their kids, which we all have in abundance. If we are serious about breaking generational poverty, let us consider spreading our tentacles to directions that will effectively break the poverty circle. I then acknowledged that this procedure has been in place for a very long time and that I do not intend to cause avoidable disruption and administrative bottleneck. I therefore will not vote against but will request that in the course of the year, we must revisit the procedure and abandon the old order.
A couple of days later, a journalist contacted me to say that he had picked the story up from somewhere. The Council Chairman had denied my side of the story, stating that during the entire Council sitting in question, I uttered no word. “As a matter of fact, Councillor Collins Nweke was one of the first to vote in support of the motion”, he declared to the journalist. He detested this cowardly attitude of keeping quiet during proceedings only to open the mouth wide with journalist to tell lies. He went comically further to say that if elections were close by, he would have suggested that I was suffering from early symptoms of election fever.
My teenage son who had applied for a place, became a casualty of the entire episode. He got punished because his dad spoke up. As applicant, rather than posting him to a work post as close to his home as possible, as is the standard practice, he was allocated a student job place as far away from home as possible with basically an impossible public transport connection. But the young man understood and made the best out of that first experience as student worker. On the benefit of hindsight, I would have applied the doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity by abstaining rather than voting for or against. Useful lesson learnt.
Second incident was during my second term. The Mayor pushed for a Bill to reform parts of our policy on the local economy. I felt that a part of the unintended consequences of the proposed Bill will be bankruptcy for businesses owned by a large segment of ethnic minority entrepreneurs. In specific terms, a few business cum residential districts were adjudged to be attracting higher number of corner shops offering ethnic products and night shops. And with that, a perception of insecurity was felt by some local residents who felt that ‘their City’ was being overtaken by migrants. They feel like ‘strangers’ in their homes and all of those social stereotypical sentiments. Others who owned homes in the districts were worried that their properties were being devalued as a consequence of the population shift and mix.
Though I had the economy portfolio as well as equality rights within my caucus and the policy was mine to drive, we have a culture of consensus, preferably or majority carries the vote. To cut long story short, I was more or less alone within my caucus in my opposition against the reform. That is not to say that my party colleagues supported the reform full force, though one of us silently wished for it to pass because he had a property there. The general feeling is more of not ignoring the concerns of voters who may not be racist but feel insecure or vulnerable with the changing demography of our cherished city.
The big question is what do we do? Politically, it will be murderous for us to vote in support of the Bill because we can’t defend it with our core support base. Voting against it, which was my first inclination, was feared to be counterproductive with some of our voters that favoured the Bill. My sense was that most of my colleagues, maybe all, would vote yes if we allowed the notion of voting only your heart. In the end we agreed on kicking in the doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity. The compromise was that we will abstain from voting and will offer no clear explanation for or against. We will do all we can to empower the affected group of the proposed reform with information and administrative support where needed.
These two incidents pulled out of my personal experience in politics are meant to provide a preface to the unsolicited thoughts I equally want to join in proffering on Nigeria’s approach towards the Russia-Ukraine war. I believe that it is the same doctrine of diplomatic ambiguity which I have had reasons to either apply or support a number of times in my political career that I believe Nigeria is deploying in dealing with the Russia-Ukraine war.
The doctrine is a strategic foreign policy approach where a country deliberately avoids taking a clear or definitive stance on a contentious international issue. This doctrine allows states to maintain flexibility, avoid alienating key partners, and retain room for diplomatic maneuvering. By refusing to openly align with any side in a conflict or dispute, a country can maximize its options, protect its interests, and reduce the risk of becoming entangled in the rivalries of larger powers.
Like in basically all things, applying the doctrine comes with some consequences. I can therefore safely imagine that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and his team, must have weighed the pros and cons before stepping in to brief Mr President and recommend Nigeria’s position.
As the largest economy and most populous nation in Africa, Nigeria plays a pivotal role in shaping African responses to global crises. Its foreign policy traditionally balances non-alignment, economic pragmatism, and regional leadership. Historically, Nigeria has positioned itself as part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), avoiding entanglement in distant geopolitical conflicts and great power struggles. Maintaining ambiguity aligns with this tradition and reinforces sovereignty in decision-making, prioritizing domestic economic development, regional stability in West Africa, and preserving ties with all major powers. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Nigeria has leaned slightly toward the Western stance, condemning Russian aggression in UN votes but avoiding strident rhetoric or severing ties with Moscow. This in practical terms reflects textbook application of the doctrine of ambiguity.
In the choices that Nigeria makes, it must think of the preservation of its strategic relationships. The country maintains strong economic ties with the West, including investment, aid, trade, and military cooperation, particularly through partnerships with the EU, UK, and US. But in the same vein, it has growing military and energy ties with Russia, including cooperation in areas like oil exploration, arms procurement, and nuclear technology. Being diplomatic ambiguous ensures it does not alienate either side.
There are also gains in economic diversification that Nigeria needs to consider. Its reliance on Western capital markets and development finance institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Bank is crucial for the country’s economic recovery and infrastructure investment. The counterbalance here is that Russia’s role in the global oil and gas markets aligns with Nigeria’s interests as an energy exporter. Nigeria benefits when high oil prices, driven by geopolitical uncertainty, bolster government revenues.
The Minister must have also considered the need for flexibility for future alliances in his memo to Mr President. I summise that by not fully committing to either bloc, Nigeria can adapt its position based on how the war evolves and how global power shifts play out, ensuring diplomatic maneuverability.
Timing they say can be everything. With pressing domestic challenges like high youth unemployment and restiveness, security crises up North, spate of kidnappings, and efforts at economic diversification away from oil, of which the Nigerian Export Promotion Council reports over 20% growth in 2024, the Minister may have reasoned that Nigeria benefits from focusing inward rather than spending diplomatic capital on a distant European conflict.
There is also the regional leadership dimension and African consensus to consider. A diplomatic ambiguous position allows Nigeria to play a consensus-building role within the African Union (AU), where member states have differing views on the crisis. The Minister may have felt that Nigeria is better off projecting itself as a unifying force, keeping Africa’s voice independent and cohesive in global forums.
Decisions around positioning a consequential country like Nigeria in an issue of global dimension like the Russia-Ukraine war do not come easy. There are a few risks to consider in applying the Doctrine of Ambiguity. For a start, there is the Western pressure and perception issues to contend with. Nigeria’s relatively soft stance on Russia could be viewed negatively by the EU, UK, and US who expect clearer alignment in defense of international law and territorial sovereignty. Who knows how this could affect Nigeria’s access to Western investment, security partnerships, and climate finance, which are critical for its long-term development agenda? Early indications for instance are that some African countries like Kenya that took a clear pro-West stance have seen increased trade and investment benefits from Western governments looking to reward loyalty. Nigeria faces potential risks of being seen as fence-sitting, forfeiting opportunities to negotiate preferential trade or security deals from either side.
There is the moral and ethical concerns to contend with. Nigeria aspires to moral leadership in Africa, rooted in its history of anti-apartheid activism and peacekeeping leadership. Avoiding a clear stance risks eroding Nigeria’s moral authority on global governance issues.
Not trading carefully can lead to internal political divisions giving Nigeria’s internal political divisions. The country has a complex domestic political environment, with historical ties to both the West and Russia through Cold War-era military cooperation. Internal pro-Russia, pro-Ukraine, and pro-West factions within the government, academia, Diaspora, and media could exploit ambiguity, framing it as indecision, lack of vision, or maybe even ‘stomach infrastructure’ where some Nigerians in the Russian Diaspora are being accused without evidence of acting as paid agents of the Russian Federation to spread propaganda.
One of the most vexing risks that Nigeria faces in taking the route of diplomatic ambiguity is reduced influence in global governance. Its ambition to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council or take leadership on major global issues such as development financing or advocacy for Africa on climate adaptation could be undermined if it is seen as unwilling to take clear, principled positions on defining issues like Ukraine.
In the final analysis, there is a balancing act for Nigeria to undertake. Its application of the doctrine of ambiguity in the Russia-Ukraine crisis is pragmatic. It allows the country to preserve vital economic and security relationships while staying true to its non-aligned heritage. However, as a continental leader, Nigeria faces higher expectations to articulate an African perspective on global crises, particularly in light of its aspirations for global leadership. Nigeria could fine-tune its diplomatic ambiguity into a constructive diplomatic neutrality, where it condemns violations of international law such as territorial aggression while also advocating for African interests, including ensuring food security, energy price stability, and non-punitive responses toward African economies impacted by sanctions spillover. This may be a good strategy for Africa’s dominant economy to position itself as a mediator capable of facilitating dialogue between Russia, Ukraine, and global powers, leveraging its status as a respected African power.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves in its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
When Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso abruptly withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forming the Alliance of Sahel States (also known by its French acronym AES) some did not take them seriously. The olive branch extended by some critical stakeholders keen to see a de-escalation in the crisis began to lower in January 2024 when the trio formally withdrew from the bloc. Anger, resentment, and other emotions may be inevitable. However every prudent leader must realise that a comprehensive and inclusive approach is essential to prevent the AES formation from leading to further regional instability. By fostering dialogue, enhancing security cooperation, and promoting sustainable development, ECOWAS, the AU, and the international community must play a role in building a more united and prosperous West Africa.
Before delving into the specific roles of the core regional, continental, and global stakeholders, it is essential to provide an overview of how we arrived at this point. As of February 2025, the government of Niger Republic has implemented several significant changes to its border regulations, particularly affecting its relationship with Nigeria. There have been border closures and reopenings following the military coup in July 2023. The introduction of new travel documents followed swiftly. In line with AES initiatives, Niger introduced a joint biometric passport for its citizens, to facilitate movement within the alliance. However, this new passport has faced recognition challenges from non-AES countries, like Senegal. This led to trade restrictions, when in October 2024, Niger imposed a comprehensive ban on food exports to countries outside the AES, including Nigeria. This measure was officially positioned as a means to boost agricultural self-reliance within the alliance but it has (unintentionally?) disrupted traditional trade flows between Niger and Nigeria.
Without doubts, these developments reflect Niger’s shift towards strengthening ties with its immediate neighbours within the AES framework, while asserting its sovereignty and redefining its relationships and border policies with countries like Nigeria. The core question remains whether or not Niger has focused only on the gains of its moves and has overlooked the potential losses
Gains and Losses from Niger-Nigeria Border War
The border closures created short-term economic and social hardships, particularly for vulnerable populations and businesses. However, they also presented opportunities for improving national security, promoting local economic development, and asserting political independence. Long-term gains will depend on the success of Niger’s domestic policies and its cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States. We must remember that the first attempt at a Sahel alliance fell apart. Could it be that it will succeed this time around because they are dancing to the tunes of more determined foreign drummers focused on redrawing the World Order? That remains to be seen. But as far as our mortal eyes can carry us, we can’t lose sight of some obvious gains.
The Gains
The gain that springs most obviously to the eyes is security enhancement. The border closures aimed to curb the movement of armed groups, smuggling, and other illicit activities, contributing to national security, particularly in Niger, which faces threats from extremist groups. The border closures led to a temporary reduction in cross-border crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, and arms trafficking. A boost to domestic production is another important gain in the stride to agricultural self-sufficiency. By reducing dependency on imports, Niger sought to encourage local agricultural production, supporting its intentional national food security goals and local industry sufficiency. The restrictions provided opportunities for local industries to meet domestic demand, fostering industrial growth.
There is also political leverage that we may not discontenance. For Niger, the border closures were part of a broader strategy to assert its sovereignty and negotiate better terms in regional alliances, particularly after its exit from ECOWAS and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The Losses
Analysts for Niger of the costs-benefits of their border strategy have a number of losses to contend with. For a start, economic disruption by way of trade decline is a critical factor. The border closures severely impacted cross-border trade. Both formal and informal trade, including agricultural products, livestock, and manufactured goods, experienced significant reductions. The attendant revenue loss has had significant impact on the fragile economy. Governments of both Niger and Nigeria lost customs duties and taxes collected from cross-border trade, impacting national and local economies. The humanitarian impact manifesting in food insecurity was pretty visible. Niger, which relies on food imports from Nigeria, faced increased food insecurity. Rising food prices worsened conditions for vulnerable populations. Many small-scale traders, transporters, and border communities that depend on cross-border trade for their livelihoods faced economic hardship.
The social and cultural disruptions is another critical loss. It is said that in the border area between Niger and Nigeria, some homes have their living rooms in one country and their bedrooms in the other country. In other words, limited movement and restrictions on free movement of people disrupted daily life. Families and communities with cross-border ties are separated, affecting social cohesion, employment, and education opportunities, especially for those who frequently crossed borders, not to mention the strained diplomatic relations between Niger and Nigeria.
The Strategic Approach
To address the potential crisis resulting from the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, a coordinated and pragmatic approach is essential. ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), and the broader international community should prioritize diplomatic engagement, security cooperation, and socioeconomic development to foster regional stability.
ECOWAS as key actor
The ECOWAS has the prime responsibility of demonstrating good faith by efforts at rebuilding trust for regional unity. The bloc is formally on records to have started off well. In its 29 January 2025 Declaration formally acknowledging the withdrawal of the trio of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS, it placed a four-point instruction before member states as follows:
1. recognize National passports and identity cards bearing ECOWAS logo held by the citizens of Burkina Faso, the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Niger, until further notice.
2. continue to treat goods and services coming from the three countries in accordance with the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) and investment policy.
3. allow citizens of the three affected countries to continue to enjoy the right of visa free movement, residence and establishment in accordance with the ECOWAS protocols until further notice.
4. provide full support and cooperation to ECOWAS officials from the three countries in the course of their assignments for the Community.
Determined to avoid confusion and disruption in the lives and businesses of the ECOWAS population during what it described as a transition period, the instruction to member states added that the arrangements will be in place until the full determination of the modalities of our future engagement with the three countries by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Governments. The Commission has set up a structure to facilitate discussions on these modalities with each of the three countries.
It could be gleaned from the ECOWAS statement that it pays or intends to pay premium to Inclusive Dialogue when it indicated the establishment of requisite structure to facilitate discussions on modalities with each of the three Sahel economies. Without delay and despite the new border regulations announced recently by Niger, ECOWAS should initiate high-level diplomatic dialogues with the AES states, ensuring that their security and governance concerns are addressed within the framework of regional integration. The dialogue should aim to rebuild trust and explore pathways for their re-entry into ECOWAS.
Talking of framework, ECOWAS can be served better by a flexible governance framework. It should consider revising its governance protocols to accommodate the specific political and security challenges faced by Sahel states, promoting inclusivity and understanding. There must be Security Collaboration with the establishment of joint security initiatives with AES to combat terrorism, insurgency, and cross-border crime, reinforcing collective security while respecting the sovereignty of member states.
Some may find this misplaced but from an economic standpoint, providing incentives to AES states is a strategic investment that can restore regional economic integration, stabilise food supply chains, reduce the costs of conflict, and strengthen ECOWAS’s long-term influence. By promoting inclusive economic growth and enhancing trade and infrastructure, ECOWAS can foster a more prosperous and interconnected West Africa, benefiting all member states in the long run.
Of all the arguments in support of a strategic approach to managing the Sahel States crisis, the most compelling perhaps is the need to maintain strategic geopolitical and economic influence. Providing economic incentives reinforces ECOWAS’s role as the primary regional organization, strengthening its influence and maintaining regional cohesion. There is probably no smarter way of countering external influence. This is because supporting the Sahel States economically can reduce their reliance on external actors, such as non-African powers, ensuring that regional development aligns with ECOWAS’s long-term interests. Other factors circle around restoration of regional economic integration, strengthening supply chain and food security, and promoting long-term economic growth and stability.
It is not unimportant to consider the Cost-Benefit Perspective where we look at the short-term costs versus long-term gains. While providing incentives may involve short-term financial costs, the long-term benefits, such as increased trade, economic growth, and political stability, far outweigh these initial critical investments. Numerous studies have proven that infrastructure investments and trade facilitation measures generate a multipliereffect by stimulating private sector growth, increasing government revenues, and improving living standards.
African Union (AU) as key Pan-African Mediator
A role naturally cut out for the African Union is that of Neutral Mediation, facilitating dialogue between ECOWAS, AES, and other stakeholders to prevent further fragmentation of the region. A Continental Security Strategy is an imperative of our time. This should aim to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It should also address the root causes of insecurity in the Sahel, ensuring a coordinated response to terrorism and political instability. The newly elected President of the African Union Commission, Ambassador Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, whose mantra is “Silencing the Guns” has an obligation to ensuring that all nations of Africa, especially his native Djibouti return to constitutional order. Another critical role for the AU is the mobilisation of humanitarian assistance to mitigate the impact of border closures and economic disruptions on vulnerable populations, promoting regional stability and goodwill.
The broader International Community as Enablers of Sustainable Development and Governance
An essential component of sustainable peace and development is Diplomatic Engagement. The United Nations, European Union, and other international partners should support AU and ECOWAS-led mediation efforts, emphasizing dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. The region must be provided with targeted security assistance to help both ECOWAS and AES states combat terrorism, while ensuring that such support aligns with international human rights standards. They should increase investments in sustainable development, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure, to address the root causes of conflict and foster long-term stability. Related to this is capacity building. The AU should support governance reforms, anti-corruption measures, and inclusive political processes to strengthen state institutions and improve governance in both ECOWAS and AES countries.
No strategic approach to negotiated settlement of the crises with the Alliance of Sahel States can be said to be cast in stones but a well- considered implementation roadmap can certainly be put in place. A three-phase roadmap of short, medium, and long term is recommended.
The short term is a six-month duration in whichdiplomatic dialogue between ECOWAS, AES, and the AU is initiated. The focus will be on confidence-building measures and reducing tensions. In a subsequent eighteen-month medium term phase, joint security initiatives should be recommended to implement economic incentives to encourage regional cooperation. This then ushers in a five-year long term phase of consolidation, promotion of sustainable development, and good governance, ensuring that the root causes of conflict and insecurity are addressed.
In conclusion, the pressing issue remains the military coups and the return to constitutional order. In hindsight, the immediate use of threats and sanctions by ECOWAS has proven ineffective in addressing the series of military takeovers. However, recent actions indicate that ECOWAS has learned valuable lessons and is now striving to balance its commitment to democratic governance with the need for peace and stability in the Sahel. By prioritizing dialogue, supporting socioeconomic development, and addressing the root causes of political instability, ECOWAS can facilitate a peaceful return to constitutional order in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. This approach not only aims to maintain regional unity and long-term stability but also demonstrates strength and resilience, not weakness.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Collins Nweke is a former Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium where he served three consecutive terms until December 2024. He is a Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and Institute of Management Consultants. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars and Administrators, where he serves in its Governing Council. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
This week the good people of Ghana will continue adjusting to last weekend news of the return of John, not The Baptist, but Dramani Mahama, to the presidential villa. While this is understandably good news for his supporters, those that lined up behind incumbent Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia, his opponent, are left to nurse their wounds. But did this come entirely as a surprise to them? It probably didn’t. I will tell you why in a moment. It certainly didn’t matter to objective watchers like me with no horse in this race except a desire to see the consolidation of democracy in a prominent West African nation. This is at a time when things are falling apart in the region and dominant regional players like Nigeria are struggling to hold the centre together.
Call it the day after. We can then begin to ask how this victory came about given that the same issues that led Ghanaians to sack Mahama in 2016 are same for renewing their faiths in him eight years later. So, where was Ghana then economically and politically? Where are they now; what has changed?
Let us begin with the present. As of election day in 2024, Ghana’s consumer inflation rose to 23.0% year-on-year, up from 22.1% in October. This marks the third consecutive monthly increase, primarily driven by higher food prices. The market women of Makola, central Accra felt this especially in the prices of vegetables, yam, cassava, and plantains. However, the second quarter of 2024 saw Ghana’s economy grow by 6.9% year-on-year, the fastest rate since the Nana Akufo-Addo presidency. This growth was propelled by strong performances in the mining and quarrying sectors, with the gold sector expanding by 23.6%. The country equally restructured $13 billion in U.S. dollar bonds, effectively exiting a nearly two-year debt default. This restructuring reduced the nation’s debt by over $4 billion. This brings with it the prospect of positioning Ghana for a return to global capital markets.
While the nation’s debt was reduced, it could safely be said that the elections were held amid significant economic challenges. The high inflation linked to debt defaults were skilfully made electioneering issues. This leads one to ask if Ghanaians are quick to forget that in 2015, Mahama’s government equally sought a $918 million bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stabilize the economy and address high debt levels.
Ghanaians may not be quick to forget. It might simply be that Mahama was a better political communicator with better packaged messaging than Bawumia and his New Patriotic Party. He may have been better at bringing on issues that influenced voter sentiment at a time when many are seeking change due to rising living costs. Mahama dipped into his accomplishments as President from 2012 to 2017. He successfully emphasized his infrastructure development that focused on roads, schools, hospitals, and energy projects. He reminded voters of initiatives like the Atuabo Gas Processing Plant and expansion of ports and airports which modernised Ghana’s economy.
Tried as he could, Bawumia was unable to successfully shine the light on the energy crisis that enveloped Ghana under Mahama’s watch. Ghana faced a severe power crisis, the so-called Dumsor with frequent outages crippling businesses and causing pains to households.
On his part Mahama got the focus to rest on the efforts his administration invested in to achieve energy mix. This includes thermal and renewable energy plants, to address the power crisis. His campaign was good at deploying contrastcommunication strategy. For instance while admitting that the economy was hard hit with declining prices of gold, cocoa, and oil, his team was quick to point to the fact that the fault lay with decline in global commodity prices and had nothing to do with government policy or lack of it. To rub it in, they then end the messaging with a pointer to the early years of his administration when oil production boosted GDP.
Mahama drew attention to how he oversaw a relatively peaceful political environment and upheld Ghana’s democratic tradition. Despite mostly unfair criticisms, he told voters that he ensured free and fair elections in 2016, where he conceded defeat to Nana Akufo-Addo, solidifying Ghana’s reputation for political stability. He could not be blamed for exercising his bragging rights around investments in education including the Community Day Senior High School project, which improved access to secondary education; expansion of the National Health Insurance Scheme; and increased access to healthcare facilities.
While he can’t match the records of incumbent President in shuttle diplomacy, Mahama did not shy away from highlighting his key role in regional diplomacy, including efforts to mediate political crises in neighboring countries like Burkina Faso.
As the dust settles, the Bawumia team will be assessing their communication failure in not leveraging on some of the major scandals that docked Mahama. How on earth were they unable to convince voters that they can’t trust a guy involved in a contract to brand public buses with photos of Ghanaian presidents with a whopping $3.6 million. What about the GYEEDA Affair? The Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA) was implicated in the misappropriation of funds meant for youth employment programs. Yet the youths of Ghana were allowed by Bawumia to trust their faiths in the man’s hands! Again? How on earth did the Bawumia campaign miss the opportunity to paint all of the country black with the ghost of the SADA Controversy? The Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA), established to develop Ghana’s northern regions, faced allegations of mismanagement and corruption involving millions of cedis. And then comes the Ford Expedition GiftImbroglio! Mahama was accused of accepting a Ford Expedition vehicle from a Burkinabe contractor who had won lucrative government contracts, raising concerns about conflict of interest and ethical breaches.
From all indications, it appears the people of Ghana are fine to forgive economic mismanagement and persistent allegations of corruption preferring instead to settle for a legacy of focus on infrastructure development and commitment to democracy. His manifesto, Mahama’s First 120 Days Social Contract with the People of Ghana, was a fine read. The next four years will prove whether the people’s gamble with Mahama will pay off.
For the renewed presidency of John Dramani Mahama, which by the way, reminds us of the return of Donald Trump of the United States, the challenges facing him are humongous. But he has the parliamentary majority needed to push through his agenda. His legacy will be anchored on a number of policy areas of which analysts are now on the look out to asses his soon to be appointed cabinet. His appointments will give a window to his succes or failure in areas crucial in addressing Ghana’s current challenges while building on lessons from his previous tenure.
On debt management, who will be his point person in building on Ghana’s recent debt restructuring success by adopting prudent fiscal policies to prevent further accumulation of unsustainable debt? Mahama needs to improve revenue collection through tax reforms and combating tax evasion. Are there lessons that he’d pick from the tax reforms components of Tinubunomics? In controlling inflation, Africa will be on the look out for Mahama to deliver a template on successful measures to address rising inflation, particularly in food prices, by supporting local production and reducing dependency on imports.
If his Minister for Employment has no track records of expertise in youth employment through aggressive skills development programmes and projects and incentivizing private sector growth, particularly in industries like technology and manufacturing, he has beautifully set himself up to fail. Of course Mahama must do everything he can to rid himself of the ghosts of GYEEDA by not bringing close to him, anybody that resembles the crooks that misappropriated funds meant to give young people career prospects a decade ago
If you are no proponent of Economic Diversification, Mahama should not have you on the shortlist for consideration either as trade or economic portfolio. Ghana should have reduced yesterday its undue reliance on commodities like gold, cocoa, and oil. But if by tomorrow, Mahama pays more attention to investing in agriculture, renewable energy, and digital technology, Ghana will not easily forget his second coming.
It is expected that the President-elect will defend his credentials for infrastructure through his policy around sustainable energy solutions. Under him Ghana must expand its renewable energy capacity, through solar and wind to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and prevent future power crises and by so doing wave a final goodbye to the ghosts of Dumsor. While on it, he must strengthen public-private partnerships for energy infrastructure investments. In choosing his international partners for energy, he must keep away from Western leaders who’d preach to him the gospel according to jettisoning oil to embrace exclusively clean energy despite oil still supporting a significant chunk of the economy of Ghana. Amongst the friends he made while serving as a member of European and Pan African Parliaments’ Ad hoc Committee on Cooperation, he must know who to run away from and who to embrace as international partners willing and able to respects Ghana’s sovereignty and facilitate the provision of targeted subsidies to ensure affordable electricity for low-income households while promoting efficient energy use.
If his job description for Minister for Transport does not include proveable experience and expertise in managing investment in road and rail networks, he must withdraw and edit it. It is the imperative of Ghana’s time in history to enhance connectivity between rural and urban areas, promoting trade and economic activity. He must expand and modernize ports and airports to make Ghana a regional logistics hub. He did it before. He must do it again in his second coming.
A President Mahama must prioritise building on existing healthcare infrastructure by improving access to quality care, particularly in underserved rural areas. He must strengthen public health initiatives to address ongoing issues like malaria and rising non-communicable diseases. Strengthening of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) to ensure universal coverage and address challenges like delays in claims payments should be a priority..
Building on his efforts up to 2016 and whatever accomplishments of his predecessor, President Mahama must accelerate efforts to make senior high school universally accessible and improve technical and vocational training to align with market needs.
The promise of constituting the leanest and most efficient government in the fourth Republic of Ghana is easy to say because lean government is the new trend. So, this President can’t listen to anyone who tells him to create more ministerial portfolios. He however must give consideration to refocusing existing portfolios and perhaps rename or merge some ministeries. For instance it might serve Ghana well to have a ministry for institutional reforms and digitisation into which ministeries with overlapping portfolios could be collapsed. Such a ministry could be tasked with strengthening anti-corruption institutions like the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Auditor-General’s office. It must facilitate policies around transparent procurement processes and punish financial mismanagement to rebuild public trust. His Year One accomplishment must include Public Sector Efficiency. This is as urgent as it is. Ghana should urgently show other African countries how to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and streamline service delivery to make government programmes and projects more effective. While at it, it must foster greater civic engagement with the civil society to ensure inclusivity in decision-making and policy implementation.
As of today Ghana ranks 133 out of 191 countries and maintains the same human development index (HDI) value for 2020 and 2021 with 0.632. This puts the country in the medium human development category, according to UNDP report. Between 1990 and 2021, Ghana’s Human Development Index (HDI) value grew from 0.460 to 0.632, reflecting an increase of 37.4%. However, though Ghana falls in the medium human development category, when considered for unequal distribution of human development, the country records a loss of 27.5 per cent in its HDI. For instance, Ghana’s level of gender inequality remains high over the years and ranked 130 out of 170 countries in 2021 in terms of gender inequality between female and male achievements. President Mahama has every reason to take Social Protection and Welfare seriously. He must make work out of poverty alleviation, expand social protection programmes to cushion the impact of rising living costs on vulnerable populations. Genuine focus should go to food security by supporting smallholder farmers with subsidies, access to credit, and modern farming techniques. Affordable housing in urban centres has remained a challenge. There can’t be a better time than now to partner with private developers to create affordable housing units to address the housing deficit.
Not unimportant is how President John Mahama will perform in the international stage with special reference to Regional Leadership and Foreign Policy. The principles enshrined in Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, particularly Article 40, which underscores the promotion and protection of the nation’s interests, respect for international law, and adherence to the principles of organisations such as the United Nations and the African Union, have continued to guide the country at the international stage. Over the years, the foreign policy has evolved to adapt to changing international dynamics. It is the hope that Mahama will remain consistent in the area of economic diplomacy and will leverage Ghana’s strategic position in West Africa to attract foreign direct investment and promote trade through agreements like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Doing this will not preclude him from continuing to play a mediating role in regional conflicts to ensure peace and stability in the sub-region.
In conclusion, the 2024 elections that returned John Dramani Mahama as President underscores Ghana’s resolve to give him a shot at navigating the country’s economic recovery while upholding its democratic traditions. That he received as high as 56.55% mandate by Ghanaians indicates the readiness of the people to give him another chance. He can’t take this for granted by assuming that he has completely been forgiven his sins of old. He needs to rebuild trust amongs Ghanaians. As independent onlooker but one with a vested interest in the Pan-African agenda, I urge Mr President to place accountability and legacy building high on his agenda. It is not enough to state in his contract with the people of Ghana that he’d establish a robust code of conduct and standards for all government officials. The people of Ghana ade more interested in his clear mechanisms to address scandals and allegations of corruption from the past to rebuild credibility. Resting on this, he has no option but to focus on completing unfinished projects from his previous tenure, particularly in infrastructure and energy, to strengthen his governance legacy. By focusing on these recommended imperatives of the time, Mahama can address Ghana’s current challenges while leveraging his experience in rebuilding trust among Ghanaians and Africans.
The author, Collins Nweke is opinion-maker writer with The Brussels Times. A Fellow of both the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and the Institute of Management Consultants, he serves on the Governing Board of the International Association of Research Scholars & Administrators, where he is also a Fellow. He features on several Afrocentric media as Global Affairs Analyst. A Green Party Municipal Legislator in the legislature 2006 – 2025, he writes from Brussels, Belgium.
