BOOK LAUNCH OF THE CITY HE NEVER RETURNED TO By Ibekwe Paul Chukwuemeka

Keynote address delivered by Collins Nweke,
Global Affairs Analyst & Author, Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora

Ladies and Gentlemen

Distinguished Guests
Members of the Literary Community
Friends of Nigeria
Fellow Africans
And lovers of ideas

Good evening.

It is both an honour and a profound responsibility to stand before you today to launch what I consider one of the most important Nigerian novels of recent years particularly out here in Belgium and Europe.

The City He Never Returned To is not simply a novel.

It is a mirror. It is a ledger. It is a conversation.

And perhaps most importantly, it is an invitation.

An invitation to revisit a chapter of our collective history that remains unfinished.

An invitation to imagine what healing might look like if we summoned sufficient courage to pursue it.

An invitation to move beyond remembrance toward repair.

Before I speak about this book, permit me a brief personal reflection.

I come to this conversation not merely as a reader, analyst, or keynote speaker. In more ways than one, I am a war child. When the Nigerian Civil War broke out, I was still a toddler. Like many children of that generation, my memories are not arranged as historical facts or political arguments. They survive instead as fragments: the anxiety in adult voices, the sudden silences when certain subjects arose, the cautious way people spoke about the future, and the lingering awareness that something profound had happened to our country and to the people around us.

As I grew older, I came to understand that while some people experienced the war on the battlefield, many of us experienced it in memory, in inheritance, and in its long shadows. We inherited stories. We inherited grief. We inherited caution. We inherited questions that were never fully answered.

That is why this novel resonates with me so deeply. I am not a distant observer looking back at history through the comfort of archives. I am part of a generation shaped by the afterlife of that history. A generation that grew up among survivors. A generation that learned that wars do not always end when the guns fall silent. Sometimes they continue quietly, in memory, in institutions, in relationships, and in the stories nations tell themselves about who belongs and who does not.

Perhaps that is why I find the central proposition of this book so compelling. It is not content merely to remember. It dares to ask what comes after memory. It dares to ask how a nation heals. It dares to ask how survival can become repair, and how repair can become renewal.

The author, Ibekwe Paul Chukwuemeka, tells us in his Author’s Note that this novel began not with a plot, but with a question:

“How does a nation live with a past that refuses to become past?”

That question sits at the heart of this remarkable work.

For many Nigerians, particularly those whose families carry memories of the civil war, the past has never truly become past.

It survives in silences. It survives in inherited fears. It survives in caution, in suspicion, in stories told under the mango trees, at the ogwa in the village square, around dining tables and family gatherings. It survives in memories that official history often struggles to accommodate.

What makes this novel extraordinary is that it refuses to become trapped in grievance. Instead, it dares to ask a more difficult question:

What comes after survival?

The Emeka Ibekwe’s answer is both bold and original.

He calls it “speculative repair.”

In his own words and I quote:

“What if we treated this national healing not as a mysterious affair of the heart, but as the most complex—and most worthy—engineering project of our lifetime?” Unquote

That single sentence may well become one of the defining intellectual contributions of this book.

Because throughout history, societies have often spoken about reconciliation as an emotional process.

But this novel challenges us to think differently. It suggests that healing is also institutional. That memory requires archives. That justice requires documentation. That reconciliation requires accountability. And that nation-building requires deliberate design.

As someone whose professional and intellectual life has increasingly focused on economic diplomacy, governance, and institutional development, I find this idea deeply compelling.

Nations do not become stronger because they forget. They become stronger because they learn how to remember responsibly. That is why one of the central symbols in this novel is not a weapon. Not a politician. Not even a battlefield.

It is a ledger.

The ledger carried by Okechukwu Nwankwo, whose character or persona is recognisable in the Okey be anyi  of our different families.

A simple book of records. A record of assets. A record of losses. A record of names. A record of existence itself.

At one point in the novel, Okechukwu says:

“If we lose the record of what we have, we lose the proof of who we are.”

That statement speaks not only to one family. It speaks to nations. Because nations, too, require ledgers. Ledgers of truth. Ledgers of memory. Ledgers of accountability.

Without them, history becomes vulnerable to manipulation. And societies become vulnerable to repetition.

One of the most moving passages in the book appears in the dedication where the author writes:

“The opposite of war is not just peace, but the difficult, daily work of building something worthy of the survivors.”

Allow me to repeat that:

“The opposite of war is not just peace, but the difficult, daily work of building something worthy of the survivors.”

That is a profound political statement. And perhaps an even deeper moral one. Because too often we celebrate the end of conflict while neglecting the harder work that follows. The work of rebuilding trust. The work of rebuilding institutions. The work of rebuilding relationships. The work of rebuilding shared futures.

The Emeka (the author) reminds us that survival alone is not enough.

A nation owes its survivors something more. It owes them dignity. It owes them recognition. It owes them inclusion. And it owes future generations a better inheritance.

What particularly impressed me about this novel is that it refuses easy binaries.

It does not seek to inflame. It seeks to understand. It does not seek victory. It seeks healing.

It does not seek separation. It seeks a stronger basis for coexistence.

In the Introduction, the author writes:

“You cannot repair what you will not first acknowledge.”

This is true of families. It is true of institutions. And it is true of nations.

Across the world, societies that have successfully confronted difficult histories have not done so by pretending those histories never happened.

They have done so by acknowledging them honestly. Germany did not become stronger by forgetting. South Africa did not become stronger by denying. Rwanda did not become stronger by silence.

Every society that has healed has first found the courage to look directly at its wounds.

Nigeria is no exception.

Yet the beauty of this novel is that it does not stop at diagnosis. Many books tell us what is broken. Few attempt to imagine what repair might look like.

This one does.

And that is why I believe The City He Never Returned To belongs to an emerging tradition of literature that does more than remember history.

It seeks to shape the future.

As a first-generation Nigerian migrant who has spent decades living in Europe while remaining emotionally, intellectually, and professionally connected to Nigeria, I found another aspect of this book deeply resonant.

The author writes from Brussels. He writes from distance. Yet he writes with intimacy.

He demonstrates that distance need not diminish belonging. Indeed, sometimes distance sharpens perspective. Sometimes it allows us to see patterns that proximity obscures. Sometimes it allows us to imagine possibilities that entrenched positions dismiss.

The diaspora has often been described as a source of remittances. This novel reminds us that the diaspora is also a source of ideas. A source of memory. A source of imagination. And sometimes, a source of national self-reflection.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At its core, this book is an act of hope. Not naïve hope. Not sentimental hope. But disciplined hope. The kind of hope that understands pain. The kind of hope that acknowledges loss. The kind of hope that recognises injustice. Yet still chooses to believe in the possibility of a shared future.

The author closes his introduction with these words:

“The discussion begins not in the halls of power, but in the imagination.”

How true. Every institution was once an idea. Every policy was once a conversation. Every reform was once an act of imagination. And every better future begins with someone daring to imagine it.

Tonight, Ibekwe Paul Chukwuemeka (simply Emeka to us his friends) has done precisely that.

He has given us more than a novel. He has given us a framework for conversation. A vocabulary for healing. A language of repair. And a challenge. The challenge is whether we are prepared to engage honestly with the questions he raises.

Whether we are prepared to move from memory to understanding. From understanding to empathy. From empathy to repair. And from repair to renewal.

I congratulate the author for this remarkable achievement.

I commend Akajiofo Press for bringing this important work into the public domain. And I encourage every reader not merely to read this book, but to study it, and to  wrestle with it.

Discuss it. Debate it. Question it.

Because the future it imagines ultimately belongs not to the author alone, but to all of us.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is with great pleasure that I formally present and celebrate the launch of The City He Never Returned To.

May it travel widely. May it provoke thought. May it inspire dialogue.

And may it contribute, in its own important way, to building a Nigeria, and indeed an Africa, worthy of those who survived, and worthy of those yet to come.

Thank you.

God bless Nigeria. God bless Africa.

And God bless the power of literature to help us imagine a better future.

Brussels, Saturday 20 June 2026

A Trilogy on Why Governance and Economic Statecraft Matter

For decades, governance and economic diplomacy were treated as separate disciplines. Governments governed. Diplomats attracted investment. Development agencies pursued growth.

That distinction is rapidly disappearing.

In this three-part Proshare essay series, I explore why the future of economic development, particularly in Nigeria, will increasingly be shaped not only by national governments but by states and their leaders.

Part One: From Gateway to Factory Floor argues that investment competition has become fundamentally subnational. Increasingly, investors are asking not whether to invest in Nigeria, but where in Nigeria to invest.

Part Two: Why Sub-National Economic Diplomacy Will Define Nigeria’s Next Investment examines why states must become active participants in economic diplomacy, competing not merely with one another but with provinces and regions across Asia, Europe, and Latin America for capital, talent, technology, and partnerships.

Part Three: The Governor as Chief Economic Diplomat: A New Leadership Model for Nigerian States proposes a new leadership paradigm, one in which governors are measured not only by infrastructure commissioned, but by investment attracted, jobs created, exports expanded, and global partnerships secured.

Drawing on nearly three decades of experience in municipal governance and my work in international trade and investment promotion through the Nigeria Belgium Luxembourg Business Forum, the trilogy offers a practitioner’s perspective on a simple but increasingly important proposition.

Encouragingly, these ideas are already beginning to find institutional expression. Following the publication of the series, the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria has approved a pioneering Master Class in Economic Diplomacy for Public Managers, leading to the designation Certified Public Manager in Economic Diplomacy (CPMED). The initiative reflects a growing recognition that public managers must increasingly think beyond administration alone and embrace investment promotion, trade facilitation, partnership building, diaspora engagement, and global competitiveness as integral elements of modern governance.

Governance and economic statecraft are no longer separate disciplines. The most successful states of the future will be those whose leaders understand how to connect local opportunity with global possibility.

I am pleased to share the complete trilogy and look forward to the conversations and practical reforms it may inspire.

Youth, Future, and the African Rebirth

Being a Speech Delivered by Collins Nweke as Guest of Honour and Founding Patron of The AfrikaFora, at Nzuko Africa 2026, Paris, France on 30 May 2026

Your Excellency, Founder & CEO The AfrikaFora, Madam Winifred Uloaku Gaillard 

Incoming Grand Patron The AfrikaFora, Chief Ben C. Etiaba

Distinguished guests

Members of the African Diaspora

Young leaders

Ladies and Gentlemen

It is both a privilege and a deeply personal honour to stand before you today at Nzuko Africa 2026.

When I was invited to speak on the theme “Youth, Future, and the African Rebirth,” I at once recognised that this is not merely a conference theme. It is perhaps the defining question of our generation. And true to character, The AfrikaFora has located it within the context of Nzuko Africa 2026 in celebration of Africa Day.

The future of Africa will not be decided in conference halls alone.

It will be decided by the quality of our youth.

It will be determined by the courage of our ideas.

And it will be shaped by whether we choose hope over cynicism, action over complaint, and vision over nostalgia.

Because every generation inherits an Africa. But only a few generations are called upon to reinvent Africa.

I believe ours is one of them. And in more ways than one, The AfrikaFora epitomises it.

Africa’s Greatest Resource Is Not Under the Ground

For decades, the world has described Africa through the language of resources.

They speak of our oil. Our gas. Our minerals. Our fertile land. Our strategic location.

But I have come to believe that Africa’s greatest resource is not beneath the soil.

It is above it. It is the African youth.

The young woman in Lagos building a technology startup.

The young researcher in Nairobi developing solutions to local challenges.

The young entrepreneur in Abidjan.

The young creative in Johannesburg.

The young engineer in Kigali.

The young diaspora professional in Paris, Brussels, London, New York, Toronto, or Dubai.

Africa’s future is not hidden in its mines.

It is walking on its streets, from Kinshasa to Kigali.

It is sitting in our universities.

It is logging onto digital platforms.

It is waiting for an opportunity.

The question before us is simple:

Will we invest in this generation enough to allow it to flourish?

The Rebirth We Seek

When we speak of African rebirth, we must be clear about what we mean.

A rebirth is not a return to the past.

It is the creation of something new.

Africa does not need romantic nostalgia.

Nor does it need imported identities.

Africa needs confidence.

Confidence to innovate.

Confidence to trade.

Confidence to compete.

Confidence to collaborate.

Confidence to lead.

The African rebirth must therefore be economic, intellectual, technological, cultural, and institutional.

It must be a rebirth built not merely on political slogans but on measurable opportunities.

Because no young person can eat rhetoric.

No graduate can build a future on promises alone.

And no continent can prosper without creating pathways for its youth to participatemeaningfully in the economy.

African Youth & Economic Diplomacy 

As many of you know, this year I begin a global tour around my recently published book, Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora.

In every city I visit, from Europe to Africa and beyond, one question inevitably emerges:

“What role should young Africans play in shaping Africa’s future?”

The answer lies at the very heart of the book.

The central argument of Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora is simple:

Diaspora communities are not merely remittance senders.

They are bridges.

Bridges of knowledge.

Bridges of capital.

Bridges of innovation.

Bridges of culture.

Bridges of opportunity.

And when those bridges are deliberately connected to Africa’s development aspirations, extraordinary things become possible.

But there is an important evolution of that idea.

The future of diaspora engagement is not my generation.

It is yours.

The next phase of Africa’s economic diplomacy will be led by digitally connected, globally educated, technologically fluent young Africans.

Young people who understand both Africa and the world.

Young people who can move comfortably between Lagos and London, Kigali and Brussels, Accra and Toronto, Nairobi and Silicon Valley.

Young people who can transform identity into influence and influence into development.

The African rebirth will not happen despite its youth.

It will happen because of its youth.

A New Social Contract

But let me speak frankly.

Young Africans cannot carry the burden of Africa’s future alone.

Governments have responsibilities.

Institutions have responsibilities.

The private sector has responsibilities.

The Diaspora has responsibilities.

And elders have responsibilities.

Every generation owes the next generation more than advice.

It owes them opportunity.

We cannot continue asking young people to believe in a future that we ourselves have failed to prepare.

The African rebirth requires a new social contract.

One that prioritises education.

Rewards innovation.

Encourages entrepreneurship.

Protects merit.

Strengthens institutions.

And creates an environment where talent can thrive regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender, social background, or geography.

The Power of Passing the Baton

Today is particularly emotional for me. As Founding Patron of The AfrikaFora, I have had the privilege of watching an idea become a movement.

I have seen commitment transform into community.

I have seen vision become impact. And today, I formally step aside from that role.

But let me be clear. Stepping aside is not stepping out.

It is renewal.

It is continuity.

It is faith in the future.

No institution survives if it depends on one individual.

Strong institutions endure because leadership is transferred with grace, trust, and purpose.

That is why I am delighted that the baton passes into the capable hands of our new Grand Patron, Chief Ben C. Etiaba.

Chief Etiaba has demonstrated repeatedly, in different spheres of service and leadership, an exceptional ability to receive a baton and carry it forward with dignity, wisdom, and results.

I have every confidence that under his stewardship, The AfrikaFora will not merely continue.

It will grow.

It will flourish.

And it will reach heights beyond what we originally imagined.

That is how progress works.

Each generation builds a bridge and invites the next generation to extend it.

A Message to Young Africans

To the young people listening today:

Do not wait for permission to dream.

Do not wait for perfect conditions.

Do not wait for governments to solve every problem.

Africa’s future belongs to those willing to build it.

Be ambitious enough to compete globally.

Be proud enough to remain connected to Africa.

Be innovative enough to create solutions.

And be courageous enough to challenge systems that no longer serve the common good.

The future is not something that happens to you.

The future is something you create.

Conclusion: Africa’s Finest Century

Ladies and Gentlemen,

remain optimistic.

Not because Africa’s challenges are small.

But because Africa’s possibilities are enormous.

I have travelled widely.

I have worked across diplomacy, governance, business, media, and civil society.

And everywhere I go, I encounter evidence that Africa’s moment is not behind us.

It is ahead of us.

The rebirth of Africa will not be delivered by destiny.

People will deliver it.

By visionaries.

By innovators.

By entrepreneurs.

By scholars.

By patriots.

By diaspora communities.

And above all, by young Africans who refuse to accept that the future must resemble the past.

Let us therefore leave this gathering committed to one shared mission:

To build an Africa where talent matters more than circumstance.

Where opportunity matters more than privilege.

Where institutions outlive personalities.

Where leadership creates successors.

And where every young African can confidently say:

“The future is not somewhere else. The future is here. And I am part of building it.”

That is the Africa worth believing in.

That is the Africa worth building.

And that is the Africa whose rebirth has already begun.

Thank you.

God bless Africa.
God bless the African Diaspora.
And God bless the generation that will complete Africa’s rebirth.

Collins Nweke is Founding Patron, The AfrikaFora and Author, Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora

The Brussels Mission of Nigeria Must Become a Command Centre for Economic Diplomacy

by Collins Nweke

Belgium’s logistics power, Luxembourg’s financial strength, and the regulatory influence of the European Union make Brussels one of Nigeria’s most strategically important diplomatic postings. The challenge for Nigeria’s new envoy is to convert presence into economic and geopolitical influence. Because diplomacy today is no longer conducted only across negotiating tables, but across networks of trade, finance, technology, and people.

Diplomacy in the twenty-first century is no longer only about representation. It is increasingly about economic positioning. Nowhere illustrates this reality more clearly than Nigeria’s diplomatic mission to Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the European Union.

For many Nigerians, Brussels may appear as just another European capital where Nigeria maintains an embassy. In reality, it is one of the most strategically consequential diplomatic platforms Nigeria possesses anywhere in the world.

From trade logistics to financial capital and regulatory influence, the Brussels mission sits at the intersection of three powerful European systems that directly shape Nigeria’s economic future.

Brussels as Nigeria’s Triple Strategic Gateway

Nigeria’s envoy in Brussels operates within what may best be described as a triple gateway to Europe.

Belgium: Europe’s Logistics Platform

Belgium hosts one of the most important maritime trade hubs in the world. The Port of Antwerp-Bruges serves as a key entry point for goods moving into the European market.

For Nigeria, this port represents more than maritime infrastructure. It is a strategic corridor through which Nigerian exports, from agricultural products to petrochemicals, enter the broader European economy.

A proactive diplomatic strategy in Belgium can therefore directly influence Nigeria’s trade competitiveness in Europe.

Luxembourg: Global Capital Markets

Luxembourg, despite its small size, is one of the world’s most influential financial centres. It hosts one of the largest global investment fund industries and plays a leading role in sustainable finance.

As Nigeria seeks to diversify its economy and finance infrastructure development, Luxembourg offers access to sophisticated financial instruments including green bonds, blended finance structures, and climate investment platforms.

For Nigeria, the Luxembourg dimension of the Brussels mission represents an opportunity to connect diplomacy with global capital markets.

The European Union: Regulatory Powerhouse

The third pillar of the mission is the European Union itself.

EU policy decisions increasingly shape the rules governing global trade, digital markets, climate compliance, and supply-chain sustainability. Measures such as the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, for example, will have direct implications for African exporters.

Nigeria’s presence in Brussels must therefore go beyond ceremonial diplomacy. It must become an active platform for regulatory engagement and strategic dialogue with European institutions.

From Protocol Diplomacy to Economic Statecraft

If Nigeria is to maximise the strategic value of this mission, the embassy in Brussels must function less as a traditional diplomatic outpost and more as a hub of economic diplomacy.

Three areas deserve particular attention.

The Creative Economy Opportunity

Nigeria’s cultural industries, which include film, music, fashion, and digital media, have become global brands with strong commercial potential.

These sectors should be positioned within European markets not simply as cultural expressions but as high-growth investment ecosystems capable of attracting venture capital, distribution partnerships, and technology collaboration…

Economic diplomacy must learn to speak the language of culture as commerce.

Energy Transition and Climate Finance

Europe’s green transition is reshaping global energy markets. For Nigeria, the strategic challenge is to balance its role as a major natural gas supplier while also accelerating domestic renewable energy capacity.

Luxembourg’s financial ecosystem could provide a platform for structuring green financing instruments capable of supporting Nigeria’s long-term energy transition.

Handled strategically, diplomacy can help Nigeria convert climate pressure into investment opportunity.

Harnessing Diaspora Networks

Nigeria’s diaspora across Europe remains one of the country’s most underutilised strategic assets.

Highly skilled Nigerian professionals operate across European institutions, research centres, financial markets, and technology companies. Their networks represent a form of diplomatic capital that traditional embassies often fail to mobilise.

A forward-looking mission should treat the diaspora not merely as citizens abroad but as partners in economic diplomacy.

Five Strategic Priorities for Nigeria’s Brussels Mission

1. Trade Corridors

Deepen commercial engagement through the Port of Antwerp-Bruges as a gateway for Nigerian exports into European markets.

2. Financial Diplomacy

Leverage Luxembourg’s leadership in investment funds and green finance to support Nigeria’s infrastructure and renewable energy ambitions.

3. Regulatory Engagement

Strengthen Nigeria’s presence within EU policy conversations on trade, digital regulation, climate policy, and supply chains.

4. Creative Economy Promotion

Position Nigeria’s cultural industries—film, music, fashion, and digital media—as investment opportunities rather than cultural showcases.

5. Diaspora Economic Power

Treat the Nigerian diaspora in Europe as strategic partners capable of opening doors in business, academia, and policy networks.

The Narrative Challenge

Despite Nigeria’s economic scale and cultural influence, perceptions within Europe are often shaped by narratives centred on migration, governance challenges, and regional insecurity.

If Nigeria’s diplomatic engagement remains reactive, these narratives risk defining the entire relationship.

The more strategic approach is to reposition Nigeria as what it increasingly is: Africa’s largest economy, a major cultural exporter, and a critical geopolitical actor in West Africa.

This shift requires deliberate storytelling, sustained engagement with European policymakers, and strong partnerships with think tanks, business communities, and civil society networks.

A theme I explore in my recent book, Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora, is that diplomacy in the twenty-first century must expand beyond state institutions to include networks of entrepreneurs, professionals, and communities operating across borders. Brussels provides precisely such an environment, where formal diplomacy intersects with business, finance, and diaspora influence. For Nigeria, leveraging these networks may prove just as important as the traditional tools of statecraft.

A Strategic Opportunity

Nigeria’s mission in Brussels stands at the crossroads of trade, finance, regulation, and diplomacy.

In many ways, it is less a conventional embassy and more a strategic command centre for Nigeria’s engagement with Europe.

The challenge now is to ensure that Nigeria’s presence in Brussels reflects the scale of its ambitions. When Europe debates Africa’s economic future, Nigeria should not merely be represented in the room. Nigeria should help shape the conversation.

Because in the diplomacy of the twenty-first century, influence is not measured only by embassies and protocol, but by the ability to turn networks into opportunity.

And few places offer Nigeria more opportunity to do so than Brussels.

Diplomacy, Perception, and the Berlin Question

by Collins Nweke

Diplomacy, Perception, and the Berlin Question
by Collins Nweke

I have read with great interest the thoughtful intervention by my longtime friend and associate, Frank Ofili, concerning the reported appointment of Femi Fani-Kayode as Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany. His analysis rightly situates the issue within the broader intersection of diplomacy, history, and perception.

Many watchers will largely align with the thrust of Frank Ofili’s argument captioned FFK As Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany: Diplomacy or Contradiction?

This is not a question of personalities or partisan loyalties. It is a question of diplomatic calibration the essence of which is the careful alignment between a nation’s envoy and the political sensitivities of the host country. In modern diplomacy, perception can sometimes matter as much as policy.

Germany’s Historical Sensitivity

Germany’s foreign policy posture cannot be understood outside the shadow of the Holocaust. Since the end of the Second World War, successive German governments have framed their relationship with Israel as a moral responsibility. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel captured this sentiment when she told the Knesset that Israel’s security formed part of Germany’s raison d’état. Her successor, Olaf Scholz, has reiterated this doctrine repeatedly.

For Berlin, support for Israel is not merely an element of foreign policy; it is embedded within the country’s historical conscience. It follows that diplomats posted to Berlin must operate within that unique political atmosphere. Any envoy whose past public commentary appears sharply critical of Israel may therefore face unusually intense scrutiny from German political circles, the media, and civil society.

How Berlin Might React

If the appointment proceeds, three arenas in Germany are likely to react quickly:

1. The German Media

Germany’s press culture is robust and investigative. Major newspapers such as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, and Süddeutsche Zeitung routinely examine the public records of incoming ambassadors.

Past statements by the envoy would likely be revisited, contextualised, and debated. This will particularly be so with those touching on Israel or Middle Eastern conflicts. This could frame the diplomatic narrative before the ambassador even presents credentials to the German President.

2. Political Establishment

Within the Bundestag, parties across the ideological spectrum, from the Christian Democrats to the Greens, maintain strong pro-Israel positions. Parliamentary committees dealing with foreign affairs could interpret prior anti-Israel rhetoric as diplomatically awkward.

While Germany would not ordinarily block an ambassadorial appointment, the tone of official engagement might initially become cautious or guarded.

3. Public and Academic Discourse

Germany’s policy ecosystem includes influential think tanks, foundations, and universities deeply engaged in Middle East policy debates. These institutions often shape elite opinion. Questions about the suitability of an envoy could easily enter these circles and amplify reputational concerns.

Possible Negative Fallout

Several practical consequences could emerge if the diplomatic optics become contentious:

1. Distraction from Strategic Priorities

Nigeria’s relationship with Germany spans trade, renewable energy, migration cooperation, technical training, and industrial investment. Diplomatic energy could be diverted from these priorities toward managing reputational controversies.

2. Reduced Informal Access

Diplomacy often advances through informal networks: private dinners, policy forums, quiet consultations. If an envoy begins his tenure under a cloud of controversy, elite access may initially narrow.

3. Media Framing of Nigeria

Unfortunately, international audiences often conflate the persona of an ambassador with the posture of the sending country. The debate may shift from the individual to Nigeria’s diplomatic judgment.

A Four-Point Mitigation Strategy

Even where concerns arise, diplomacy always offers pathways to recalibration.

1. Early Diplomatic Reset

The envoy could proactively signal respect for Germany’s historical sensitivities. A carefully framed public statement acknowledging Germany’s post-war moral commitments could help reset perceptions.

2. Focus on Economic Diplomacy

If the ambassador quickly pivots toward economic cooperation, including investment, green energy partnerships, vocational training, attention may gradually shift from controversy to practical collaboration.

3. Strategic Engagement with Think Tanks

Active participation in policy forums hosted by German foundations such as Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and others could demonstrate intellectual seriousness and rebuild credibility.

4. Abuja’s Supporting Diplomacy

Nigeria’s foreign ministry could reinforce the relationship through high-level visits, trade missions, and bilateral initiatives that underline the strategic importance of the partnership.

The Abuja–Berlin Institutional Memory

It is also worth noting that the current Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, served previously as Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany for nearly eight years across two diplomatic postings. This is an unusually long tenure in ambassadorial practice. That experience means he is intimately familiar with the political culture of Berlin, its policy ecosystem, and the sensitivities that shape German foreign policy debates. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the reported appointment of Femi Fani-Kayode could not have emerged entirely outside the awareness of the Foreign Ministry. One may legitimately ask: if reservations existed within the ministry, were they overridden, or were they perhaps judged manageable? It is equally conceivable that Abuja believes any potential diplomatic friction can be mitigated through careful calibration, leveraging the institutional relationships and goodwill built during Ambassador Tuggar’s long tenure in Berlin. For all we know, the groundwork for managing the optics may already be quietly underway.

The Larger Lesson

Nigeria has long been regarded as one of Africa’s diplomatic heavyweights. From the anti-apartheid struggle to peacekeeping across West Africa, Nigerian diplomacy has historically carried considerable moral and strategic weight.

That tradition places a premium on careful ambassadorial selection.

Diplomacy is ultimately the art of building bridges. The strength of those bridges often depends not only on national policy but also on the temperament, reputation, and symbolic alignment of those entrusted to represent the nation abroad.

When the host country is Germany, such alignment becomes even more consequential. Watcher always remind themselves that when it is about Germany, you are dealing with an EU superpower whose foreign policy remains deeply shaped by historical memory. Frank Ofili’s intervention therefore raises a legitimate question: not about loyalty or patriotism, but about strategic fit.

And in diplomacy, strategic fit is rarely a trivial matter.

 Collins Nweke is the author of Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora (2026) and a columnist with Proshare Nigeria and The Brussels Times. He writes from Brussels.

Renewal of AGOA Is a Pause, Not a Reset

Following my discussion on TRT World on the renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), one thing is clear: this decision restores trade flows, but it does not restore certainty.

The Trump administration’s late-night move reopens duty-free access for over 1,800 African products, ending months of uncertainty for exporters and manufacturers. Yet the renewal is best understood as a pragmatic holding action rather than a return to stable, long-term partnership.

A key point raised during the interview was whether Washington set aside political tensions, particularly with South Africa, which accounts for nearly half of AGOA trade volumes, in order to protect supply chains. The answer is largely yes, but not out of generosity. After more than two decades, AGOA supply chains are deeply embedded in US industries. Letting them collapse would have imposed real costs on American consumers and businesses. Trade pragmatism, in this case, prevailed over political signalling.

However, the extension only runs to year-end. While this prevents immediate disruption, it is insufficient to rebuild full business confidence. Companies invest on multi-year horizons. Short extensions stabilise existing operations but rarely unlock new capital or expansion. For African economies, this narrow window must be used strategically to strengthen compliance, diversify exports, and move further up value chains.

The most consequential signal accompanying the renewal is the insistence on “America First” reciprocity. As discussed in the interview, African markets are not opposed to reciprocity, but they are structurally constrained. Agriculture remains a major source of employment and social stability, and sudden exposure to heavily subsidised US farm products could be destabilising.

What is realistic is calibrated reciprocity: selective and phased market opening, paired with support for African agricultural productivity and value addition. This approach aligns development needs with US commercial interests.

Watch the interview on TRT World here

AGOA’s renewal is therefore neither a breakthrough nor a setback. It is a pause in a rapidly evolving global trade order, one that underscores how trade policy is increasingly transactional, conditional, and shaped by geopolitics. The real test is whether this temporary reprieve leads to a modernised, balanced partnership or simply postpones a deeper reckoning.

EU Doctrine Must Become Action in Venezuela

The European Union has spent the better part of two decades building a foreign-policy identity around a simple promise: power should be constrained by law, and crises should be resolved through principled multilateralism. That promise is not an abstract slogan. It is embedded in the everyday doctrine of the EU External Action Service (EEAS): conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue “as a tool of first response.” This is an integrated approach across the conflict cycle, and a steadfast commitment to a rules-based international order with the UN Charter at its core. 

Venezuela now presents a moment of truth for that doctrine.

In the wake of the US operation that removed Nicolás Maduro, Europe’s public posture has been understandably cautious. It welcomes an opportunity for democratic transition while underscoring that restoring democracy must respect the Venezuelan people’s will and remain anchored in international law and the UN Charter.  That framing is not diplomatic fence-sitting; it is the EU’s most valuable asset: legitimacy.

But legitimacy is only leverage when it is organised into policy. It must happen quickly, coherently, and visibly.

The EU already has a Council mandate that it must use.

Recent Council positions on Venezuela are not ambiguous. The Council has repeatedly renewed restrictive measures and listings in response to democratic backsliding and human-rights concerns, and it has underlined the EU’s commitment to support democracy and a peaceful and inclusive transition.  This is not merely sanctions policy; it is a political line: the EU seeks democratic restoration, but through lawful and inclusive means.

The question is whether Europe will now pair that line with a diplomatic initiative commensurate with the stakes.

EEAS doctrine points to the answer: mediation, preventive diplomacy, and “principled pragmatism.” The EEAS is not starting from scratch. Its mediation doctrine recognises that conflict resolution demands principled pragmatism: defending human rights and the rule of law while engaging the messy realities that make negotiated outcomes possible. 

In practical terms, that should translate into five immediate moves:

1.      Activate an EEAS-led mediation track

The High Representative/VP should mandate the EEAS Mediation Support capacity to convene a structured dialogue framework focused on political freedoms, prisoner releases, electoral guarantees, and transitional governance arrangements. This should be done quietly at first, but with a clear roadmap.

2.      Anchor the process in the UN Charter and regional ownership

Europe should explicitly root its engagement in UN Charter principles, including sovereignty, political independence, self-determination. It should then push for a process that is Venezuelan-led, with meaningful roles for Latin American stakeholders (including Brazil) rather than a purely Washington–Beijing tug-of-war. This aligns with the European Council’s repeated insistence that effective multilateralism and the UN Charter remain the EU’s compass. 

3.      Coordinate “contact group” diplomacy with enforceable sequencing

The EU should help organise a renewed international contact mechanism that couples incentives and constraints in a sequenced way: concrete reforms trigger calibrated relief; reversals trigger targeted re-tightening. The Council’s existing sanctions architecture provides the technical toolset; what is missing is the political choreography. 

4.      Separate accountability from revenge

If Maduro’s detention becomes a geopolitical flashpoint, Europe should insist that accountability for crimes must be pursued through lawful processes, not triumphalism. This is irrespective of whether the crime is corruption, repression, or transnational organised crime. That distinction matters for EU unity and for persuading hesitant partners that this is about norms, not dominance. Europe’s own statements appear to already point in this direction.

5.      Protect EU unity by staying anchored to Council language

Divergences inside Europe are inevitable under pressure. The stabiliser is to keep returning to agreed Council/European Council phrasing: peaceful transition, human rights, verifiable democratic outcomes, and the UN Charter. The more Europe speaks with one legal voice, the harder it becomes for external actors to split the Union into “hawks” and “handwringers.” 

Why this matters beyond Venezuela

This matters because the precedent being set is larger than Caracas. If the world normalises political change through unilateral force, then the guardrails that protect smaller states weaken. This must be without prejudice to how satisfying it may feel in the short term. Europe understands this better than most. It was built to ensure that law restrains power, not the other way around.

That is why Venezuela is not only a Latin American drama. Venezuela is a test of whether the EU still believes in the doctrine it teaches. That doctrine is a gospel according to mediation first, multilateralism always, the UN Charter as the floor, not the ceiling. The doctrine has many converts including the United States and should not require much preaching now.

Europe should not choose between democracy and legality. The EU’s calling is to insist that democracy pursued unlawfully is fragile, and legality pursued without democracy is hollow. The EU has no better comparative advantage than this. The only sustainable outcome is a negotiated transition that is Venezuelan-led, internationally verified, and regionally owned. That is what EU doctrine demands. It is time to operationalise it.

A Fiscal Reset for Nigeria That Depends on Trust

Op-Ed by Collins Nweke

Nigeria’s tax overhaul is less a revenue exercise than a credibility test. It is one that will shape investor confidence, citizen buy-in, and the country’s reform reputation in the face of the world for years to come.

by Collins Nweke

Today, 1 January 2026, marks more than the start of a new year for Nigeria. It is the dawn of a new fiscal era, as the country’s ambitious tax law comes into force. The timing of this piece is deliberate: it coincides with a moment of profound national significance and symbolism. In the months since the law was announced, Nigeria has witnessed spirited debates, rigorous analyses including my op-ed on Proshare titled: Tax Ombud for Nigeria: Navigating a Promising Reform in a Distrustful Context on the role of the tax ombudsman, and passionate protests, all underscoring the gravity of the changes at hand. Yet, despite the turbulence, the government has pressed ahead, undeterred and unwavering in its resolve. Against this backdrop, my purpose is not to add to the noise, but to offer a sober reflection and an objective assessment of what will ultimately determine whether this reform succeeds or falters. For Nigeria, the true test is not simply about raising revenue, but about building credibility, at home and abroad, through the choices made from this day forward.

Operating in the intersection of international trade consultancy and Diaspora thoughts leadership for a couple of decades now, feels like a long-standing bridge between Nigeria and global capital. In such vantage position, I have learnt one enduring lesson: investors do not fear reform, they fear uncertainty. Nigeria’s new tax framework should therefore not be viewed as a risk by default, instead of the test that it is. A test of credibility, sequencing, and Nigeria’s capacity to translate reform intent into institutional reliability.

The Federal Government of Nigeria has framed the overhaul as a decisive pivot. It is a route away from oil dependency and toward domestic resource mobilisation; away from over-taxing a narrow formal sector and toward a broader, fairer base. For international investors, this narrative is familiar. What will distinguish Nigeria is not ambition, but execution.

What Investors Should Watch Most Closely

Speaking daily with investors who want to engage Nigeria but remain cautious, I can say this plainly: capital wants Nigeria to succeed. The market size, entrepreneurial energy, and strategic relevance are undeniable. But goodwill is not infinite. Nigeria has a duty, indeed an obligation, to make this reform work. Not only for revenue, but for reputation. If successful, it will reposition Nigeria as a serious reform economy, one that converts policy ambition into institutional trust. Not allowing it falter means paying attention to a few key factors:

Predictability over perfection: Tax rates can be modelled; volatility cannot. The clearest signal Nigeria can send to markets is that rules will not shift abruptly, retroactively, or selectively. Consistency in application matters more than marginal adjustments in rates. Credible reform is reform that businesses can plan around.

Balanced enforcement: A sound tax system expands compliance without penalising those already compliant. Investors will watch closely whether enforcement finally tackles elite non-compliance, leakages, and rent-seeking, rather than defaulting—yet again—to squeezing formal businesses because they are easiest to reach. Reform that punishes compliance undermines confidence.

Transparency in the use of revenues: Taxation is not merely a fiscal instrument; it is the backbone of the social contract. Investors, like citizens, want evidence that revenues translate into infrastructure, healthcare, education, and logistics that reduce the cost of doing business. Transparent reporting, independent audits, and visible outcomes are not political luxuries. These are investment fundamentals.

Sub-national readiness: Nigeria’s federal structure means national reform is only as strong as State level and local government implementation. Fragmented administration, multiple levies, and uneven capacity remain among the greatest deterrents to investment. Harmonisation, digital integration, and clarity across jurisdictions will therefore be critical tests of seriousness.

Sequencing and sensitivity: Reform during economic strain may be unavoidable, but its success depends on timing and tone. Phased implementation, clear thresholds, and protection for small enterprises would signal that Nigeria understands the difference between taxing productivity and suffocating survival.

Opposition, Dissent, and Democratic Legitimacy

It is important to recognise, and commend, the voices of trade unions, opposition parties, and civil society organisations that have raised concerns about the reform. They are not obstacles to progress, but essential actors in a functioning democracy, exercising a legitimate right to scrutinise state power and defend vulnerable groups. History shows that reforms imposed without consultation rarely endure. Government has a responsibility to engage dissent with respect, transparency, and good faith. From my position as an independent assessor, supporting investors to make informed decisions rather than defending any administration, robust opposition is not a weakness. Properly engaged, it strengthens legitimacy and improves policy outcomes.

Why This Reform Must Be a Win-Win

Engaging daily with investors eager to enter Nigeria yet wary of policy risk, one reality that shouts loud is that most investors want Nigeria to succeed. They realise that this, in the first instance is good for them. But it is also good for Nigeria. The reverse will reinforce a damaging narrative: that reform in Nigeria remains episodic rather than systemic. This moment therefore demands more than legislation. It calls for leadership that listens, institutions that deliver, and a country that treats citizens and investors not as extraction targets, but as partners in national renewal.

Tax reform is not the destination. Credibility is. And credibility, once earned, delivers the highest return of all.

From Rupture to Repair: Why Erasmus+ Signals a Smarter Brexit Reset

I was resolutely opposed to Brexit. I remain convinced that it diminished both the United Kingdom and the European Union. It did so economically, politically, and symbolically. Yet democracy does not end where disappointment begins. The British people voted, the decision was implemented, and history moved on. What remains is not whether Brexit should have happened, but how responsibly its consequences are managed. That is why the UK’s decision to rejoin Erasmus+ from 2027 matters far beyond the confines of student exchanges. It is a quiet, deliberate, and consequential signal that the long work of repair has begun.

Erasmus+ is not a concession extracted from a defeated party. It is also not a stealth reversal of the referendum. It is a confidence-building measure between two partners that have learned, painfully, that rupture carries costs for both sides. In an era of performative politics, this return to functional cooperation is refreshingly untheatrical. It says that after years of posturing, London and Brussels are rediscovering the value of pragmatism, of doing what works, even when grand reconciliations remain politically out of reach.

The choice of Erasmus+ is telling. Few programmes embody European soft power as clearly. It builds skills, broadens horizons, and weaves human networks that outlast election cycles. For young people in particular, Erasmus+ has been a rite of passage into a wider world. The UK’s withdrawal from it was one of the most tangible, everyday losses of Brexit. It was not felt in abstract trade statistics but in classrooms, campuses, and communities. Its restoration does not erase the past five years, but it acknowledges a simple truth: cooperation in education and skills strengthens competitiveness, social cohesion, and trust.

This is what a credible Brexit reset looks like. Not denial. Not revisionism. Not a rush to reopen the settlement. A reset that works with political realities while quietly improving outcomes. Rejoining Erasmus+ respects the UK’s red lines  while advancing mutual interests. Today, no free movement, no single market, no customs union are still in place. Rejoining Erasmus+ demonstrates that selective cooperation can coexist with institutional separation. In doing so, it offers a template for rebuilding ties incrementally, sector by sector, without relitigating the referendum.

Such humility is not weakness. Call it maturity. The most durable political arrangements are rarely rebuilt in a straight line. They are reconstructed through patient confidence-building, through policies that deliver visible benefits and rebuild habits of cooperation. On the question of the UK ultimately rejoining the EU, realism must prevail: it is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But politics is rarely static. If history teaches anything, it is that relationships heal when incentives align and trust is restored, often sooner than cynics expect. Fingers crossed, yes, but grounded in the hard work of repair.

Yet the significance of Erasmus+ extend beyond Europe’s internal architecture. Brexit did not only fracture UK–EU relations at home. It exported European disunity abroad, most visibly to Africa. In the years since the referendum, London and Brussels have too often pursued parallel strategies on the continent: duplicating instruments, competing narratives, and fragmenting impact. What should have been complementarity became rivalry. What should have been coordination became clutter.

Africa matters profoundly to both the UK and the EU, economically, demographically, geopolitically. Europe’s future growth, security, and climate resilience are entwined with Africa’s. And yet, post-Brexit, African partners have frequently encountered two Europes where one would have sufficed: overlapping trade initiatives, competing development finance, and unaligned regulatory approaches. The result has been inefficiency at best, confusion at worst, and missed opportunities for African agency to set the terms of engagement.

This is where the lesson of Erasmus+ becomes instructive. Cooperation does not require political reintegration. It requires political intelligence. Erasmus+ shows that shared programmes can be rebuilt on mutually agreed terms, delivering public value without reopening old wounds. Applied to Africa, this logic points to a necessary reframing: the UK and the EU do not need to compete for African trade; they need to cooperate for African transformation.

Such cooperation would not erase differences. Nor should it. The UK’s bilateral agility can complement the EU’s scale, regulatory depth, and convening power. Its ability to move quickly, tailor partnerships, and mobilise finance was instructive.  Together, they can support African priorities more coherently: skills and vocational training, digital connectivity, climate adaptation, and industrial value chains aligned with the African Continental Free Trade Area. Done well, this would replace zero-sum rivalry with outcome-driven alignment.

Diaspora networks are the connective tissue in this story. Across Europe and the UK, African diasporas possess market knowledge, cultural fluency, and investment capital that remain underutilised. They are bridges, not battlegrounds. A cooperative UK–EU posture in Africa would empower these communities as partners in development and trade, rather than forcing them to navigate competing bureaucracies. Trade is not a trophy to be won from Africa; it is a partnership to be built with Africans.

Critically, African agency must remain central. Cooperation between the UK and the EU should not recreate old hierarchies or proxy competitions. It should support African strategies, institutions, and ambitions, on terms defined by African governments, businesses, and civil society. The aim is not alignment for alignment’s sake, but coherence where it adds value and restraint where it does not.

Erasmus+ therefore deserves to be read as a template, not an exception. If Britain and Europe can relearn how to cooperate on students and skills, they can do the same on research, climate, health security, and Africa’s economic transformation. The recent re-association with research programmes, the resumption of structured dialogues, and now Erasmus+ together suggest a pattern: a mosaic of practical agreements that rebuild trust piece by piece.

For those of us who opposed Brexit but accept its democratic legitimacy, this approach is both principled and pragmatic. It neither denies the past nor surrenders the future. It recognises that politics is the art of the possible. And that what is possible expands when cooperation delivers results. A reset worthy of the name does not seek to relive the arguments of 2016. It seeks to govern responsibly in the world of 2026.

Brexit was a rupture. Erasmus+ is repair. And repair, when done patiently, often lasts longer than what was broken in haste. Europe’s future will not be shaped by who won Brexit, but by who learned from it within Europe and beyond.

Reforming Unemployment Without Cutting Too Close to the Bones

Belgium has decided. And in a democracy, decisions once debated, voted, and translated into policy, do not remain theoretical. They become lived reality. From 1 January 2026, a first group of jobseekers will begin to lose unemployment benefits, with a phased rollout that continues until 1 July 2027. The first wave affects roughly 21,500 people, many of them in Wallonia. And by summer 2027, the reform is expected to impact nearly 103,000 residents. 

I opposed this direction when it was still a plan. In my earlier piece, I warned against a welfare debate that risks shifting from fighting poverty to fighting the poor.  I still believe that warning was valid. But the point of democratic politics is not to continue campaigning after the ballots are counted. It is to help society govern itself wisely, cautiously, and humanely, especially when reform touches the lives of those with the least margin for error. My colleagues on the political Left who are still in active service might read this and say to me: how convenient! They may be right because, since retiring from active party politics, I no longer must be part of that hard decision of cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens. When it is the law, you are duty bound to comply, irrespective of political persuasion.

So I write now not to relitigate yesterday, but to prevent tomorrow’s avoidable harm.

Activation is not cruelty unless we make it so

Even as critics think otherwise, most liberals understand that Belgium’s welfare state was not built to romanticise dependency. We simply argue that it was built to protect dignity while enabling participation. Support and responsibility were always meant to travel in tandem.

In principle, governments are right to ask: how do we encourage labour-market participation, reduce long-term joblessness, and protect public finances? Those are legitimate policy aims. But legitimacy of intent does not guarantee legitimacy of outcome.

A hard truth sits at the centre of this reform: if you withdraw income support without simultaneously removing the barriers that keep people unemployed, you don’t “activate” people. You destabilise them. You push them from unemployment insurance into deeper poverty, precarious housing, debt traps, family stress, and sometimes untreated mental health conditions. The social cost does not disappear. It merely relocates often to OCMW/CPAS, to charities, to food aid networks, and to already overstretched local services.

Brussels authorities have already publicly prepared for that pressure, warning that thousands may turn to social welfare services as benefit limits bite.  This is the pivot Belgium must get right: reform must be paired with protection.

A humane implementation: six guardrails Belgium should adopt now

If the reform is to proceed, and the sad reality is that it is proceeding, then federal and regional governments should adopt a do no avoidable harm framework. Concretely:

1. No one should fall off a cliff: build a guaranteed “bridge” to support

The moment unemployment benefits stop, the transition to alternative support must be automatic, guided, and time-bound; not an obstacle course of appointments, paperwork, missed letters, and administrative confusion.

A person losing benefits should receive one coordinated pathway: employment guidance + social support + income stabilisation where eligible. If activation is the goal, then administrative chaos is policy sabotage.

2. Fund the shock where it lands: municipalities need real money, not moral lectures

If the policy shifts people from federal unemployment protection toward local welfare assistance, then the federal level must co-finance the increased load. Otherwise, the reform becomes a fiscal shell game: savings for one level of government, pressure and political backlash for another.

Belgium should create a transparent mechanism that tracks how many people transfer to CPAS/OCMW support and funds municipalities accordingly: predictably, not through ad hoc crisis measures.

3. Replace “one-size-fits-all” with case-based activation

Some jobseekers are unemployed because they lack skills. Others because they are older, sick, caring for relatives, facing language barriers, or living with invisible disabilities. A uniform time cap treats these realities as excuses. They are not excuses; they are contexts.

Belgium must implement individualised, case-based activation that distinguishes:

  • those who need skills and placement,
  • those who need health and psychosocial support,
  • those who need care infrastructure (childcare, eldercare),
  • those who are effectively unemployable under current labour-market conditions and need protected pathways.

A mature welfare state doesn’t pretend all unemployment is identical.

4. Expand training exceptions into a real ladder, not a loophole

The current framework includes an exception for people enrolled by 31 December 2025 in training for shortage occupations, allowing benefits to be extended until training ends (under conditions). 

That is sensible—but too narrow if Belgium wants genuine activation.

Training must be:

  • accessible (cost, transport, childcare),
  • realistic (matching labour-market demand),
  • and supportive (coaching, internships, employer linkages).

If training is truly the “on-ramp” to work, then government should widen, simplify, and properly resource it, especially for those closest to the labour-market margins.

5. Protect dignity in assessment and communication

When people receive letters informing them that their benefits end, the message must not be punitive. The tone matters because it signals whether society still recognises the recipient as a citizen or treats them as a burden.

Public discourse should also be policed for scapegoating. Belgium must reject narratives that imply poverty is a character flaw or that long-term unemployment is best solved through humiliation. Policy can be firm without being dehumanising.

6. Monitor outcomes like lives depend on it, because they do

Belgium should publish a quarterly Reform Impact Dashboard that tracks:

  • transitions to work (quality, not just any job),
  • transitions to CPAS/OCMW,
  • poverty and housing insecurity indicators,
  • debt and arrears,
  • health and mental health service demand.

And there must be a willingness to adjust. If evidence shows rising hardship without commensurate employment gains, democratic responsibility requires correction, not stubbornness.

A word to Europe: do not misread Belgium

Across Europe, many governments have long looked to Belgium as proof that a generous, humane social protection system can coexist with fiscal responsibility and labour-market participation. That reputation now places a burden not only on Belgium, but on Europe itself. This reform will be read, rightly or wrongly, as a signal. If Belgium; the careful compromiser, the laboratory of social dialogue; normalises time-limited protection without equally visible investment in activation, care, and dignity, others will feel licensed to go further and cut deeper. Europe must therefore resist the temptation to treat this moment as validation of a harsher continental turn. The lesson to draw is not that social protection has failed, but that reform divorced from social investment corrodes trust, cohesion, and legitimacy. If Europe still claims a distinct social model, one that tempers markets with solidarity, then Belgium’s experience should be a warning light, not a green one. The benchmark must not slide from humane protection to managed abandonment.

The moral test of governance

There is a phrase I used before that I repeat now with even greater urgency: we are cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens—fellow humans.

It is precisely when the political system has “decided” that the responsibility of leadership becomes most demanding. Because implementation is where policy stops being ideology and starts being ethics.

Belgium can still make this reform worthy of its social model, if it treats activation as a supported pathway, not a punishment clock; if it funds the consequences honestly; and if it refuses to confuse fiscal discipline with moral superiority.

In the coming weeks, the first wave will feel the reform not as a concept but as an empty line in a bank account.  The question is whether Belgium will meet that moment with bureaucratic indifference or with the quiet competence and compassion that once made its welfare model a benchmark.

Democracy brought us here. Now decency must guide what we do next.

The author, Collins Nweke is a Senior Consultant on international trade and economic diplomacy. A three-term councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium till December 2024, his portfolio included social welfare and economy. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.