Europe’s debates over free speech, regulation, and democratic trust often unfold with an air of exceptionalism. Yet Nigeria’s experience offers a timely and uncomfortable mirror. Witnessing the visit of Honourable Jesse Okey-Joe Onuakalusi to the European Parliament, I was reminded how deeply the crises of democracy now transcend geography.
Having stepped back from Belgian active party politics a little over a year ago, I’ve found myself inhabiting an unexpected role: a quiet translator between African and European democratic experiences. It’s a vantage point shaped not by theory but by lived proximity, moving between systems where institutions feel predictable and others where democracy is negotiated daily amid mistrust, misinformation, and civic fatigue.
That perspective framed my role in Brussels as Honourable Onuakalusi prepared to address Parliament on truth in public debate and the collapse of dialogue. What lingered most was not the applause but the irony of the moment: a Nigerian lawmaker, representing a country often portrayed as needing democratic guidance, was speaking to Europe at a time when Europe itself is wrestling with polarisation, mistrust, and regulatory anxiety.
The quiet scene before the speech captured this reversal even more vividly. As officials settled into their seats, a Nigerian parliamentarian stood ready to speak on democratic trust in an institution long considered a symbol of democratic certainty. Attending the VII Transatlantic Summit themed “Free Speech vs. Regulated Speech: Strengthening the Pillars of Democracy,” he had not been summoned for instruction but invited for insight. The roles had not changed by design, but by reality.
Europe often treats Nigeria’s democratic challenges as distant or exceptional. But listening closely that day made something undeniable: Nigeria is not an outlier. It is a mirror. The pressures shaping Nigerian democracy echo, in sharper form, the same dynamics now emerging across Europe.
Consider voter turnout. Fewer than one in three registered Nigerians participated in the most recent general elections. This is frequently read as apathy, but that misses the mark. It is alienation, citizens withdrawing not because they are indifferent, but because they doubt that public debate rests on truth or that participation yields accountability. Europe should recognize these early signals: rising youth disengagement, the normalisation of protest voting, and increasing dependence on regulation to compensate for eroding legitimacy.
Nigeria also illustrates what happens when misinformation becomes ambient rather than episodic. Toxic rhetoric, identity-driven narratives, and persistent falsehoods have not simply distorted debate, they have hollowed it out. Europe remains focused on regulating digital platforms. Nigeria shows what emerges when the shared reality that gives regulation meaning begins to fracture.
A central insight offered in Brussels rejected a false binary dominating Europe’s discourse: free speech versus regulation. Regulation is not the enemy of democracy. Regulation without legitimacy is. Nigeria’s laws to curb misinformation and protect public order often falter not because the laws are absent, but because citizens suspect they serve power rather than people and truth. Europe, expanding its regulatory reach, should take note.
Beneath all of this lies the deeper warning: the collapse of dialogue. When dialogue falters, democracy becomes procedural rather than participatory. Institutions may function, elections may be held, but legitimacy drains quietly. Nigeria’s recent crises show how quickly silence, opacity, and competing narratives can exhaust public trust.
Africa–Europe relations are often framed through the familiar lenses of aid, trade, or the export of values. But moments like the Brussels exchange suggest a different, more equal footing, one rooted in shared democratic vulnerability. Nigeria does not bring ready-made solutions. It brings hard-earned lessons. And if Nigeria is Europe’s mirror, the real question is not whether the reflection applies, but whether Europe is willing to recognise it in time.
Full text of aPresentation by Hon. Jesse Okey-Joe Onuakalusi, Member House of Representatives, Federal Republic of Nigeria at the European Parliament
Protocols President of the Political Network for Values, Honourable Chair: Margarita de la Pisa Distinguished Members of the European Parliament, PfE Group, Spain Lucy Akelo Member of Parliament, Uganda Distinguished parliamentarians, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,
1. Introduction
I am deeply honoured to address this VII Transatlantic Summit convened by the Political Network for Values – a global platform courageously defending human dignity and fundamental freedoms at a time when these ideals face unprecedented pressure.
Let me begin by thanking the organizers for the opportunity to participate and for inviting me to speak on this topic. Defending Truth in Public Debate: Building Spaces for Dialogue is not merely professional; it is deeply personal. It touches the very bedrock of democracy and our shared humanity.
The recent tragic murders of Charlie Kirk and Miguel Uribe painfully remind us of the dangers confronting those who defend fundamental values in the public arena. Across continents, promoting life, family, freedom, and truth is increasingly treated as a position to be silenced – often through censorship disguised as regulation, rather than through dialogue aimed at consensus.
Yet truth in public debate remains sine qua non for democratic growth. It is the glue of the social contract between leaders and citizens.
2. On the Complexity of Truth
Firstly, we must acknowledge that speaking about truth is extremely challenging. It is challenging because every one of us seated here has a “safe haven” we call or perceive as truth.
For us to have a meaningful conversation, it is imperative that we open our minds to the reality that truth is often place- and time-determinant.
Truth can only be absolute where people share similar culture, orientation, and background. The primary essence of truth is to actualize peace. But seeking truth in isolation – without dialogue – often produces rancour and disunity.
That is why I was particularly pleased that dialogue appears in today’s theme. Dialogue is the major instrument for achieving the peace that truth seeks to bring.
Allow me a simple illustration. Imagine you were raised in the United States and travelled to Nigeria. You asked Tony to buy you a “pair of pants.” Tony returned with underwear. Truthfully, Tony was right – but practically, he was wrong. That was not what you meant.
Even a witness who heard your request would testify that you asked for pants. Yet misunderstanding arose. This is where dialogue becomes indispensable.
As minor and humorous as this example sounds, it reflects why we have so much disagreement in today’s world.
Growing up, my grandmother often said in Igbo: onye si ka mmadu nile mebe kaya, mara nani ya ga ebi – meaning, if you insist everyone must see things exactly your way, be prepared to live alone.
3. Democracy in an Age of Noise
We live in an era of social media with unfettered loud voices but shrinking understanding.
It is an age where opinions travel faster than facts, outrage often replaces reason, and disagreement is too easily mistaken for hostility.
International IDEA confirms what many of us feel: the world is in democratic recession. More countries are declining than improving in democratic performance.
The Washington Post reminds us: “Democracy dies in darkness.”
Former U.S. President John Adams warned that democracy can exhaust itself unless defended. Sir Winston Churchill observed that democracy is the worst form of government – except for all others.
These words compel us to act.
Truth is not a luxury. It is the foundation of legitimacy, the basis of social justice, and the compass of democratic leadership.
4. Nigeria and Africa: A Case Study in Fragile Trust
Let me situate this discussion in Africa, using Nigeria as a case study.
In Nigeria’s 2023 general elections, over 93 million citizens were registered to vote, yet only about 26.7% participated in the presidential election. Similar patterns have persisted since 2003. This is not voter apathy alone – it is voter distrust.
Blatant misinformation, toxic rhetoric, identity politics, and broken promises have driven many citizens away from democratic participation. Where truth disappears from public debate, extremism finds fertile ground.
5. Legal Frameworks for Truth and Dialogue in Nigeria
Nigeria’s Constitution (as amended) guarantees freedom of expression under Section 39, while recognizing reasonable limits in the interest of public order and morality.
Other relevant frameworks include:
1. The Electoral Act 2022 – criminalizing misinformation and hate speech capable of undermining elections.
2. The Cybercrimes Act 2015 – addressing online falsehoods and harmful digital conduct.
3. The Freedom of Information Act 2011 – empowering citizens to demand transparency.
4. Broadcasting and media regulations – balancing free speech with responsibility.
These laws show that regulation itself is not the enemy of democracy – misuse of regulation is. The goal must always be to protect truth, not power.
6. Rivers State: When Dialogue Collapses
A recent example from Rivers State illustrates this danger.
Political tensions between branches of government escalated into legislative paralysis, contested legitimacy, public protests, and media warfare. Rather than structured dialogue, citizens were subjected to competing narratives and institutional silence.
This breakdown occurs when:
1. Political actors weaponise information
2. Institutions fail to communicate transparently
3. Dialogue is replaced by confrontation
The result is erosion of trust and democratic fatigue among ordinary people.
7. Public Debate and Its Democratic Purpose
Public debate enables:
1. Diverse perspectives
2. Democratic engagement
3. Accessible information
4. Respectful structure and tone
5. Persuasion through reason, not intimidation
Its purpose is not to win arguments, but to build understanding and shape policy through consensus.
Dialogue is the ingredient of consensus – and consensus is democracy’s enduring armour.
8. Practical Strategies in:
Defending Truth
i. Verify facts before speaking
ii. Use credible sources
iii. Correct misinformation respectfully
iv. Promote critical thinking and media literacy
Building Spaces for Dialogue
i. Create safe civic spaces
ii. Listen actively to opposing views
iii. Focus on issues, not personalities
iv. Seek common ground
Standing on truth does not show weakness – it cultivates statesmanship.
9. Recommendations to Parliamentarians
I respectfully propose five guiding principles:
1. Lead by Example – Commit to fact-based discourse.
3. Institutionalize Dialogue – Build bipartisan and community platforms.
4. Invest in Civic Education – Equip young people with democratic values.
5. Protect Journalists and whistleblowers – Democracy needs light to survive.
10. Condemning Killings and Reaffirming State Responsibility
At this point, I must also speak to the painful reality unfolding in parts of Nigeria. The persistent killings of innocent citizens across several states are barbaric and wholly unacceptable in any civilised society. Every life matters, and the continued loss of lives through violence, banditry, and communal conflict represents a grave assault on our shared humanity and democratic values. Government exists first and foremost to protect lives and property, and I therefore call on all tiers of government in Nigeria to rise urgently to this responsibility. Beyond military responses, there must be justice for victims, accountability for perpetrators, and sustained dialogue with affected communities. Peace cannot be imposed by force alone; it must be built through trust, inclusion, and responsive governance.
11. Choosing Dialogue Over Darkness
Distinguished colleagues,
Disagreement is not strange in politics. But dialogue is the only credible path to lasting consensus.
Truth in public debate is not optional. It is the heartbeat of democracy.
If we fail to defend it, we risk louder politicians but fewer statesmen; more regulations but less legitimacy; more platforms but fewer conversations.
Moving forward, I suggest that the world, under the United Nations, should champion dialogue as a primary instrument for world peace, not merely fronting truth in isolation.
12. Conclusion
In conclusion, from Africa to Europe, from national assemblies to this very Parliament, may we have the courage to focus on dialogue rather than truth.
Permit me to add that Nigeria, after 26 years of constitutional democracy, continues to make steady progress despite challenges. We invite global partners to invest in Nigeria. With a vibrant youth population, resilient economy, and improving regulatory frameworks, Nigeria is positioned as Africa’s next major economic destination.
Our tax laws are being clarified, opportunities span every sector, and innovation is rising.
Each January, Davos becomes a mirror reflecting the anxieties of the global economy. The 2026 edition of the World Economic Forum is no different. While headlines have been dominated by U.S. President Donald Trump’s disruptive rhetoric, particularly his renewed talk of “purchasing” Greenland, the more consequential story lies elsewhere: a world economy struggling to maintain confidence amid geopolitical strain, fragmented trade relations, and heightened investment risk.
It is within this unsettled global context that Nigeria’s decision to inaugurate its first-ever sovereign pavilion at Davos; popularly branded Nigeria House; must be understood. For Africa’s largest economy, this is more than symbolic visibility. It is a strategic attempt to reposition Nigeria in the global marketplace for capital, partnerships, and influence.
Davos 2026: Why Dialogue Matters to Markets
The theme of Davos 2026, “A Spirit of Dialogue,” may sound diplomatic, but it carries a hard economic message. Dialogue today is not idealism; it is risk control. Markets price uncertainty quickly, and geopolitical tensions now translate directly into higher borrowing costs, disrupted supply chains, and delayed investment decisions.
For businesses and investors, the real question emanating from Davos is whether global leaders can prevent political rivalry from degenerating into economic fragmentation. In that sense, Davos 2026 is less about speeches and more about restoring a minimum level of predictability necessary for trade and investment to function.
Nigeria House: A Strategic Signal, Not a Ceremony
Nigeria’s sovereign pavilion represents a deliberate shift in posture. For years, Nigeria has been discussed at Davos. Sometimes admiringly, often cautiously. But rarely on its own terms. A pavilion changes that equation. It signals readiness to engage directly with global capital, articulate priorities clearly, and present Nigeria as an investment destination rather than merely a development narrative.
For media consumers in Nigeria reading this, the implication is straightforward: reputation increasingly shapes access to capital. A sovereign pavilion is reputational infrastructure. It allows Nigeria to demonstrate reform intent, highlight private-sector opportunities, and counter long-standing risk perceptions with concrete propositions.
Importantly, this move aligns Nigeria’s representation with its economic weight. Africa’s largest economy cannot afford underrepresentation in the very forums where global capital allocation decisions are influenced.
From Visibility to Value Creation
However, visibility is not value. Nigeria’s success at Davos should not be measured by footfall or media mentions, but by outcomes. Investors do not invest in atmospherics; they invest in clarity and execution.
Concrete deliverables should include:
Investment conversations that mature into term sheets, not just expressions of interest
Sector-specific partnerships in energy, agribusiness, digital infrastructure, logistics, and manufacturing
Blended finance arrangements that crowd in private capital alongside development finance institutions
Export-oriented partnerships that support diversification beyond oil
These sectors are not abstract priorities. They align with Nigeria’s growth constraints: energy supply, food security, industrial productivity, and foreign exchange stability.
The Execution Gap Nigeria Must Close
Nigeria’s recurring challenge has not been the absence of interest, but the weakness of follow-through. Davos offers access, not automatic capital. To convert engagement into investment, Nigeria must demonstrate three things consistently:
Second, policy predictability. Capital is patient where rules are stable. Exchange-rate transparency, contract sanctity, and regulatory consistency matter more than promotional rhetoric.
Third, institutional follow-up. A structured post-Davos mechanism that tracks engagements from initial meetings to financial close would signal seriousness. In today’s risk-averse environment, that discipline can be decisive.
Global Politics and Nigeria’s Opportunity
The Greenland episode is not just theatre. It reflects a broader trend of geopolitics intruding into economic decision-making. Trade policy, investment screening, and industrial strategy are increasingly politicised.
For emerging economies, this creates mixed outcomes. On one hand, uncertainty raises risk premiums. On the other, investors seeking diversification are actively scanning for large markets with reform momentum and regional reach. Nigeria fits that profile, if it reduces policy volatility and deepens market credibility.
In this environment, Nigeria’s engagement at Davos should be pragmatic: less about grand positioning statements, more about transaction-ready opportunities that appeal to private capital under tight global conditions.
From Conference Participation to Economic Positioning
Will Davos 2026 matter for Nigeria? Only if it produces consequences beyond the event itself. A sovereign pavilion opens doors, but it does not close deals. That responsibility lies in execution, at home and after Davos.
If Nigeria uses Nigeria House as a launchpad for disciplined engagement, credible reforms, and structured investment pipelines, this Davos moment could mark a turning point. If not, it risks becoming another episode of high-level presence without economic positioning.
History does not remember conferences. It remembers outcomes. And markets are no different.
“In reality, Africa has articulated one of the most sophisticated normative frameworks on sovereignty and intervention outside Europe. The Venezuelan invasion calls for the deployment AU Doctrine, Strategic Non-Alignment, and choosing diplomacy over coercion” – Collins Nweke
The evolving crisis in Venezuela is often framed as a distant Latin American drama, but for Africa, that would be a profound misreading. What is unfolding in Caracas is far more than a contest over Nicolás Maduro or a reaction to United States policy choices. It is a stress test of global norms in an increasingly fragmented international order. Viewed through Africa’s long‑established doctrine of sovereignty, non‑interference, and non‑indifference, the crisis exposes the same dilemmas the continent has repeatedly confronted in Libya, the Sahel, and other externally shaped theatres of instability.
Africa is not merely a bystander to these debates. It has articulated one of the world’s most sophisticated frameworks on intervention and state responsibility. It is seen as a framework born from hard lessons about the costs of both indifference and coercive external involvement. The Venezuelan crisis thus becomes a mirror, reflecting the stakes for African states as global powers stretch, reinterpret, or selectively apply international rules. Its implications reach far beyond Caracas. They speak directly to Africa’s strategic autonomy, its commitment to diplomacy over coercion, and its insistence that sovereignty must coexist with accountability.
Africa Is Not Normatively Silent
Africa is often caricatured as reactive in global affairs. In reality, the continent has articulated one of the most sophisticated normative frameworks on sovereignty and intervention outside Europe. The African Union is built on a carefully negotiated doctrine that seeks to reconcile state sovereignty, collective responsibility, and human security.
The AU Constitutive Act establishes, on the one hand, the principle of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. On the other, it introduces a distinctly African innovation: the right of the Union to intervene in grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This was not a rejection of sovereignty, but a refinement of it. This was born of Africa’s painful experience with indifference during mass atrocities.
The Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000) further clarified Africa’s red lines. It rejected coups, mercenary interventions, and externally engineered seizures of power, while insisting that political change must be constitutional, inclusive, and domestically anchored. Importantly, Lomé did not license regime change by foreign powers. It asserted African ownership over political legitimacy.
Together, these instruments amount to a coherent African doctrine: non-interference without non-indifference; sovereignty without impunity; and reform without coercion.
Diplomacy as First Resort, Not Last Option
Africa’s practical diplomacy has reinforced this doctrine. AU-led and AU-mandated mediation efforts have consistently prioritised dialogue, negotiated settlements, and regional legitimacy over punitive or militarised approaches. Examples abound from Sudan and South Sudan to Kenya, The Gambia, and parts of the Sahel. While outcomes have been uneven, the underlying lesson is clear: durable political settlements emerge from inclusive processes, not externally imposed outcomes.
This preference for diplomacy over coercion is not weakness. It is strategic realism. Coercive sanctions regimes and forced political outcomes often hollow out institutions, radicalise domestic actors, and internationalise internal conflicts. Venezuela’s protracted crisis illustrates this danger vividly.
For Africa, the Venezuela case reaffirms a long-held conviction: defending sovereignty does not mean defending misrule; rejecting regime change does not require silence on accountability; and supporting democracy does not justify abandoning international law.
Strategic Non-Alignment in a Multipolar Order
China’s stance on Venezuela is less about ideology than about signalling a multipolar world. For African states navigating relationships with the United States, China, the European Union, and emerging middle powers, this moment underscores the urgency of strategic non-alignment. This implies that cooperation can exist without subordination.
Non-alignment today is not Cold War nostalgia. It is about policy space. Africa’s interest lies not in choosing sides, but in strengthening its collective voice through the AU. Fragmented national positions dilute Africa’s leverage. Coordinated continental postures enhance it.
Acting through the AU, African states can:
Uphold respect for sovereignty and constitutional order
Demand consistency in the application of international law
Engage all partners including Washington, Beijing, Brussels, and beyond, on equal terms
Anchor external relations firmly in the principles of the United Nations Charter
Resources, Legitimacy, and the Venezuela Lesson
Venezuela’s vast oil reserves offer Africa another cautionary lesson. Natural resources are not power by default. They become leverage only when matched with institutional legitimacy, credible governance, and effective diplomacy. Absent these, resource wealth attracts external pressure rather than strategic respect.
Africa has learned this lesson repeatedly. The continent’s future resource diplomacy must therefore be anchored not only in extraction, but in governance, legitimacy, and multilateral engagement.
A Pro-African Call to Action
For Africa, the implications of Venezuela’s crisis are neither abstract nor distant. They are immediate and strategic:
Defend sovereignty without legitimising misrule
Reject externally imposed regime change while insisting on accountability
Champion AU-led diplomacy and mediation as first resort
Converge under the African Union to practice principled non-alignment
Insist on respect for international law and the UN Charter by all powers, without exception.
In an era where global rules are being selectively applied and routinely stress-tested, Africa must stand firm on multilateralism as the currency of legitimacy. Anything less risks a regression to a world where might defines right. Africa has lived through that era. It cannot afford its return, whether in Caracas, Tripoli, Abuja, or closer to anywhere called home on the continent.
The European Union has spent the better part of two decades building a foreign-policy identity around a simple promise: power should be constrained by law, and crises should be resolved through principled multilateralism. That promise is not an abstract slogan. It is embedded in the everyday doctrine of the EU External Action Service (EEAS): conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue “as a tool of first response.” This is an integrated approach across the conflict cycle, and a steadfast commitment to a rules-based international order with the UN Charter at its core.
Venezuela now presents a moment of truth for that doctrine.
In the wake of the US operation that removed Nicolás Maduro, Europe’s public posture has been understandably cautious. It welcomes an opportunity for democratic transition while underscoring that restoring democracy must respect the Venezuelan people’s will and remain anchored in international law and the UN Charter. That framing is not diplomatic fence-sitting; it is the EU’s most valuable asset: legitimacy.
But legitimacy is only leverage when it is organised into policy. It must happen quickly, coherently, and visibly.
The EU already has a Council mandate that it must use.
Recent Council positions on Venezuela are not ambiguous. The Council has repeatedly renewed restrictive measures and listings in response to democratic backsliding and human-rights concerns, and it has underlined the EU’s commitment to support democracy and a peaceful and inclusive transition. This is not merely sanctions policy; it is a political line: the EU seeks democratic restoration, but through lawful and inclusive means.
The question is whether Europe will now pair that line with a diplomatic initiative commensurate with the stakes.
EEAS doctrine points to the answer: mediation, preventive diplomacy, and “principled pragmatism.” The EEAS is not starting from scratch. Its mediation doctrine recognises that conflict resolution demands principled pragmatism: defending human rights and the rule of law while engaging the messy realities that make negotiated outcomes possible.
In practical terms, that should translate into five immediate moves:
1.Activate an EEAS-led mediation track
The High Representative/VP should mandate the EEAS Mediation Support capacity to convene a structured dialogue framework focused on political freedoms, prisoner releases, electoral guarantees, and transitional governance arrangements. This should be done quietly at first, but with a clear roadmap.
2.Anchor the process in the UN Charter and regional ownership
Europe should explicitly root its engagement in UN Charter principles, including sovereignty, political independence, self-determination. It should then push for a process that is Venezuelan-led, with meaningful roles for Latin American stakeholders (including Brazil) rather than a purely Washington–Beijing tug-of-war. This aligns with the European Council’s repeated insistence that effective multilateralism and the UN Charter remain the EU’s compass.
3.Coordinate “contact group” diplomacy with enforceable sequencing
The EU should help organise a renewed international contact mechanism that couples incentives and constraints in a sequenced way: concrete reforms trigger calibrated relief; reversals trigger targeted re-tightening. The Council’s existing sanctions architecture provides the technical toolset; what is missing is the political choreography.
4.Separate accountability from revenge
If Maduro’s detention becomes a geopolitical flashpoint, Europe should insist that accountability for crimes must be pursued through lawful processes, not triumphalism. This is irrespective of whether the crime is corruption, repression, or transnational organised crime. That distinction matters for EU unity and for persuading hesitant partners that this is about norms, not dominance. Europe’s own statements appear to already point in this direction.
5.Protect EU unity by staying anchored to Council language
Divergences inside Europe are inevitable under pressure. The stabiliser is to keep returning to agreed Council/European Council phrasing: peaceful transition, human rights, verifiable democratic outcomes, and the UN Charter. The more Europe speaks with one legal voice, the harder it becomes for external actors to split the Union into “hawks” and “handwringers.”
Why this matters beyond Venezuela
This matters because the precedent being set is larger than Caracas. If the world normalises political change through unilateral force, then the guardrails that protect smaller states weaken. This must be without prejudice to how satisfying it may feel in the short term. Europe understands this better than most. It was built to ensure that law restrains power, not the other way around.
That is why Venezuela is not only a Latin American drama. Venezuela is a test of whether the EU still believes in the doctrine it teaches. That doctrine is a gospel according to mediation first, multilateralism always, the UN Charter as the floor, not the ceiling. The doctrine has many converts including the United States and should not require much preaching now.
Europe should not choose between democracy and legality. The EU’s calling is to insist that democracy pursued unlawfully is fragile, and legality pursued without democracy is hollow. The EU has no better comparative advantage than this. The only sustainable outcome is a negotiated transition that is Venezuelan-led, internationally verified, and regionally owned. That is what EU doctrine demands. It is time to operationalise it.
Nigeria’s tax overhaul is less a revenue exercise than a credibility test. It is one that will shape investor confidence, citizen buy-in, and the country’s reform reputation in the face of the world for years to come.
by Collins Nweke
Today, 1 January 2026, marks more than the start of a new year for Nigeria. It is the dawn of a new fiscal era, as the country’s ambitious tax law comes into force. The timing of this piece is deliberate: it coincides with a moment of profound national significance and symbolism. In the months since the law was announced, Nigeria has witnessed spirited debates, rigorous analyses including my op-ed on Proshare titled: Tax Ombud for Nigeria: Navigating a Promising Reform in a Distrustful Context on the role of the tax ombudsman, and passionate protests, all underscoring the gravity of the changes at hand. Yet, despite the turbulence, the government has pressed ahead, undeterred and unwavering in its resolve. Against this backdrop, my purpose is not to add to the noise, but to offer a sober reflection and an objective assessment of what will ultimately determine whether this reform succeeds or falters. For Nigeria, the true test is not simply about raising revenue, but about building credibility, at home and abroad, through the choices made from this day forward.
Operating in the intersection of international trade consultancy and Diaspora thoughts leadership for a couple of decades now, feels like a long-standing bridge between Nigeria and global capital. In such vantage position, I have learnt one enduring lesson: investors do not fear reform, they fear uncertainty. Nigeria’s new tax framework should therefore not be viewed as a risk by default, instead of the test that it is. A test of credibility, sequencing, and Nigeria’s capacity to translate reform intent into institutional reliability.
The Federal Government of Nigeria has framed the overhaul as a decisive pivot. It is a route away from oil dependency and toward domestic resource mobilisation; away from over-taxing a narrow formal sector and toward a broader, fairer base. For international investors, this narrative is familiar. What will distinguish Nigeria is not ambition, but execution.
What Investors Should Watch Most Closely
Speaking daily with investors who want to engage Nigeria but remain cautious, I can say this plainly: capital wants Nigeria to succeed. The market size, entrepreneurial energy, and strategic relevance are undeniable. But goodwill is not infinite. Nigeria has a duty, indeed an obligation, to make this reform work. Not only for revenue, but for reputation. If successful, it will reposition Nigeria as a serious reform economy, one that converts policy ambition into institutional trust. Not allowing it falter means paying attention to a few key factors:
Predictability over perfection: Tax rates can be modelled; volatility cannot. The clearest signal Nigeria can send to markets is that rules will not shift abruptly, retroactively, or selectively. Consistency in application matters more than marginal adjustments in rates. Credible reform is reform that businesses can plan around.
Balanced enforcement: A sound tax system expands compliance without penalising those already compliant. Investors will watch closely whether enforcement finally tackles elite non-compliance, leakages, and rent-seeking, rather than defaulting—yet again—to squeezing formal businesses because they are easiest to reach. Reform that punishes compliance undermines confidence.
Transparency in the use of revenues: Taxation is not merely a fiscal instrument; it is the backbone of the social contract. Investors, like citizens, want evidence that revenues translate into infrastructure, healthcare, education, and logistics that reduce the cost of doing business. Transparent reporting, independent audits, and visible outcomes are not political luxuries. These are investment fundamentals.
Sub-national readiness: Nigeria’s federal structure means national reform is only as strong as State level and local government implementation. Fragmented administration, multiple levies, and uneven capacity remain among the greatest deterrents to investment. Harmonisation, digital integration, and clarity across jurisdictions will therefore be critical tests of seriousness.
Sequencing and sensitivity: Reform during economic strain may be unavoidable, but its success depends on timing and tone. Phased implementation, clear thresholds, and protection for small enterprises would signal that Nigeria understands the difference between taxing productivity and suffocating survival.
Opposition, Dissent, and Democratic Legitimacy
It is important to recognise, and commend, the voices of trade unions, opposition parties, and civil society organisations that have raised concerns about the reform. They are not obstacles to progress, but essential actors in a functioning democracy, exercising a legitimate right to scrutinise state power and defend vulnerable groups. History shows that reforms imposed without consultation rarely endure. Government has a responsibility to engage dissent with respect, transparency, and good faith. From my position as an independent assessor, supporting investors to make informed decisions rather than defending any administration, robust opposition is not a weakness. Properly engaged, it strengthens legitimacy and improves policy outcomes.
Why This Reform Must Be a Win-Win
Engaging daily with investors eager to enter Nigeria yet wary of policy risk, one reality that shouts loud is that most investors want Nigeria to succeed. They realise that this, in the first instance is good for them. But it is also good for Nigeria. The reverse will reinforce a damaging narrative: that reform in Nigeria remains episodic rather than systemic. This moment therefore demands more than legislation. It calls for leadership that listens, institutions that deliver, and a country that treats citizens and investors not as extraction targets, but as partners in national renewal.
Tax reform is not the destination. Credibility is. And credibility, once earned, delivers the highest return of all.
I was resolutely opposed to Brexit. I remain convinced that it diminished both the United Kingdom and the European Union. It did so economically, politically, and symbolically. Yet democracy does not end where disappointment begins. The British people voted, the decision was implemented, and history moved on. What remains is not whether Brexit should have happened, but how responsibly its consequences are managed. That is why the UK’s decision to rejoin Erasmus+ from 2027 matters far beyond the confines of student exchanges. It is a quiet, deliberate, and consequential signal that the long work of repair has begun.
Erasmus+ is not a concession extracted from a defeated party. It is also not a stealth reversal of the referendum. It is a confidence-building measure between two partners that have learned, painfully, that rupture carries costs for both sides. In an era of performative politics, this return to functional cooperation is refreshingly untheatrical. It says that after years of posturing, London and Brussels are rediscovering the value of pragmatism, of doing what works, even when grand reconciliations remain politically out of reach.
The choice of Erasmus+ is telling. Few programmes embody European soft power as clearly. It builds skills, broadens horizons, and weaves human networks that outlast election cycles. For young people in particular, Erasmus+ has been a rite of passage into a wider world. The UK’s withdrawal from it was one of the most tangible, everyday losses of Brexit. It was not felt in abstract trade statistics but in classrooms, campuses, and communities. Its restoration does not erase the past five years, but it acknowledges a simple truth: cooperation in education and skills strengthens competitiveness, social cohesion, and trust.
This is what a credible Brexit reset looks like. Not denial. Not revisionism. Not a rush to reopen the settlement. A reset that works with political realities while quietly improving outcomes. Rejoining Erasmus+ respects the UK’s red lines while advancing mutual interests. Today, no free movement, no single market, no customs union are still in place. Rejoining Erasmus+ demonstrates that selective cooperation can coexist with institutional separation. In doing so, it offers a template for rebuilding ties incrementally, sector by sector, without relitigating the referendum.
Such humility is not weakness. Call it maturity. The most durable political arrangements are rarely rebuilt in a straight line. They are reconstructed through patient confidence-building, through policies that deliver visible benefits and rebuild habits of cooperation. On the question of the UK ultimately rejoining the EU, realism must prevail: it is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But politics is rarely static. If history teaches anything, it is that relationships heal when incentives align and trust is restored, often sooner than cynics expect. Fingers crossed, yes, but grounded in the hard work of repair.
Yet the significance of Erasmus+ extend beyond Europe’s internal architecture. Brexit did not only fracture UK–EU relations at home. It exported European disunity abroad, most visibly to Africa. In the years since the referendum, London and Brussels have too often pursued parallel strategies on the continent: duplicating instruments, competing narratives, and fragmenting impact. What should have been complementarity became rivalry. What should have been coordination became clutter.
Africa matters profoundly to both the UK and the EU, economically, demographically, geopolitically. Europe’s future growth, security, and climate resilience are entwined with Africa’s. And yet, post-Brexit, African partners have frequently encountered two Europes where one would have sufficed: overlapping trade initiatives, competing development finance, and unaligned regulatory approaches. The result has been inefficiency at best, confusion at worst, and missed opportunities for African agency to set the terms of engagement.
This is where the lesson of Erasmus+ becomes instructive. Cooperation does not require political reintegration. It requires political intelligence. Erasmus+ shows that shared programmes can be rebuilt on mutually agreed terms, delivering public value without reopening old wounds. Applied to Africa, this logic points to a necessary reframing: the UK and the EU do not need to compete for African trade; they need to cooperate for African transformation.
Such cooperation would not erase differences. Nor should it. The UK’s bilateral agility can complement the EU’s scale, regulatory depth, and convening power. Its ability to move quickly, tailor partnerships, and mobilise finance was instructive. Together, they can support African priorities more coherently: skills and vocational training, digital connectivity, climate adaptation, and industrial value chains aligned with the African Continental Free Trade Area. Done well, this would replace zero-sum rivalry with outcome-driven alignment.
Diaspora networks are the connective tissue in this story. Across Europe and the UK, African diasporas possess market knowledge, cultural fluency, and investment capital that remain underutilised. They are bridges, not battlegrounds. A cooperative UK–EU posture in Africa would empower these communities as partners in development and trade, rather than forcing them to navigate competing bureaucracies. Trade is not a trophy to be won from Africa; it is a partnership to be built with Africans.
Critically, African agency must remain central. Cooperation between the UK and the EU should not recreate old hierarchies or proxy competitions. It should support African strategies, institutions, and ambitions, on terms defined by African governments, businesses, and civil society. The aim is not alignment for alignment’s sake, but coherence where it adds value and restraint where it does not.
Erasmus+ therefore deserves to be read as a template, not an exception. If Britain and Europe can relearn how to cooperate on students and skills, they can do the same on research, climate, health security, and Africa’s economic transformation. The recent re-association with research programmes, the resumption of structured dialogues, and now Erasmus+ together suggest a pattern: a mosaic of practical agreements that rebuild trust piece by piece.
For those of us who opposed Brexit but accept its democratic legitimacy, this approach is both principled and pragmatic. It neither denies the past nor surrenders the future. It recognises that politics is the art of the possible. And that what is possible expands when cooperation delivers results. A reset worthy of the name does not seek to relive the arguments of 2016. It seeks to govern responsibly in the world of 2026.
Brexit was a rupture. Erasmus+ is repair. And repair, when done patiently, often lasts longer than what was broken in haste. Europe’s future will not be shaped by who won Brexit, but by who learned from it within Europe and beyond.
Belgium has decided. And in a democracy, decisions once debated, voted, and translated into policy, do not remain theoretical. They become lived reality. From 1 January 2026, a first group of jobseekers will begin to lose unemployment benefits, with a phased rollout that continues until 1 July 2027. The first wave affects roughly 21,500 people, many of them in Wallonia. And by summer 2027, the reform is expected to impact nearly 103,000 residents.
I opposed this direction when it was still a plan. In my earlier piece, I warned against a welfare debate that risks shifting from fighting poverty to fighting the poor. I still believe that warning was valid. But the point of democratic politics is not to continue campaigning after the ballots are counted. It is to help society govern itself wisely, cautiously, and humanely, especially when reform touches the lives of those with the least margin for error. My colleagues on the political Left who are still in active service might read this and say to me: how convenient! They may be right because, since retiring from active party politics, I no longer must be part of that hard decision of cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens. When it is the law, you are duty bound to comply, irrespective of political persuasion.
So I write now not to relitigate yesterday, but to prevent tomorrow’s avoidable harm.
Activation is not crueltyunless we make it so
Even as critics think otherwise, most liberals understand that Belgium’s welfare state was not built to romanticise dependency. We simply argue that it was built to protect dignity while enabling participation. Support and responsibility were always meant to travel in tandem.
In principle, governments are right to ask: how do we encourage labour-market participation, reduce long-term joblessness, and protect public finances? Those are legitimate policy aims. But legitimacy of intent does not guarantee legitimacy of outcome.
A hard truth sits at the centre of this reform: if you withdraw income support without simultaneously removing the barriers that keep people unemployed, you don’t “activate” people. You destabilise them. You push them from unemployment insurance into deeper poverty, precarious housing, debt traps, family stress, and sometimes untreated mental health conditions. The social cost does not disappear. It merely relocates often to OCMW/CPAS, to charities, to food aid networks, and to already overstretched local services.
Brussels authorities have already publicly prepared for that pressure, warning that thousands may turn to social welfare services as benefit limits bite. This is the pivot Belgium must get right: reform must be paired with protection.
A humane implementation: six guardrails Belgium should adopt now
If the reform is to proceed, and the sad reality is that it is proceeding, then federal and regional governments should adopt a do no avoidable harm framework. Concretely:
1. No one should fall off a cliff: build a guaranteed “bridge” to support
The moment unemployment benefits stop, the transition to alternative support must be automatic, guided, and time-bound; not an obstacle course of appointments, paperwork, missed letters, and administrative confusion.
A person losing benefits should receive one coordinated pathway: employment guidance + social support + income stabilisation where eligible. If activation is the goal, then administrative chaos is policy sabotage.
2.Fund the shock where it lands: municipalities need real money, not moral lectures
If the policy shifts people from federal unemployment protection toward local welfare assistance, then the federal level must co-finance the increased load. Otherwise, the reform becomes a fiscal shell game: savings for one level of government, pressure and political backlash for another.
Belgium should create a transparent mechanism that tracks how many people transfer to CPAS/OCMW support and funds municipalities accordingly: predictably, not through ad hoc crisis measures.
3. Replace “one-size-fits-all” with case-based activation
Some jobseekers are unemployed because they lack skills. Others because they are older, sick, caring for relatives, facing language barriers, or living with invisible disabilities. A uniform time cap treats these realities as excuses. They are not excuses; they are contexts.
Belgium must implement individualised, case-based activation that distinguishes:
those who need skills and placement,
those who need health and psychosocial support,
those who need care infrastructure (childcare, eldercare),
those who are effectively unemployable under current labour-market conditions and need protected pathways.
A mature welfare state doesn’t pretend all unemployment is identical.
4. Expand training exceptions into a real ladder, not a loophole
The current framework includes an exception for people enrolled by 31 December 2025 in training for shortage occupations, allowing benefits to be extended until training ends (under conditions).
That is sensible—but too narrow if Belgium wants genuine activation.
Training must be:
accessible (cost, transport, childcare),
realistic (matching labour-market demand),
and supportive (coaching, internships, employer linkages).
If training is truly the “on-ramp” to work, then government should widen, simplify, and properly resource it, especially for those closest to the labour-market margins.
5. Protect dignity in assessment and communication
When people receive letters informing them that their benefits end, the message must not be punitive. The tone matters because it signals whether society still recognises the recipient as a citizen or treats them as a burden.
Public discourse should also be policed for scapegoating. Belgium must reject narratives that imply poverty is a character flaw or that long-term unemployment is best solved through humiliation. Policy can be firm without being dehumanising.
6. Monitor outcomes like lives depend on it, because they do
Belgium should publish a quarterly Reform Impact Dashboard that tracks:
transitions to work (quality, not just any job),
transitions to CPAS/OCMW,
poverty and housing insecurity indicators,
debt and arrears,
health and mental health service demand.
And there must be a willingness to adjust. If evidence shows rising hardship without commensurate employment gains, democratic responsibility requires correction, not stubbornness.
A word to Europe: do not misread Belgium
Across Europe, many governments have long looked to Belgium as proof that a generous, humane social protection system can coexist with fiscal responsibility and labour-market participation. That reputation now places a burden not only on Belgium, but on Europe itself. This reform will be read, rightly or wrongly, as a signal. If Belgium; the careful compromiser, the laboratory of social dialogue; normalises time-limited protection without equally visible investment in activation, care, and dignity, others will feel licensed to go further and cut deeper. Europe must therefore resist the temptation to treat this moment as validation of a harsher continental turn. The lesson to draw is not that social protection has failed, but that reform divorced from social investment corrodes trust, cohesion, and legitimacy. If Europe still claims a distinct social model, one that tempers markets with solidarity, then Belgium’s experience should be a warning light, not a green one. The benchmark must not slide from humane protection to managed abandonment.
The moral test of governance
There is a phrase I used before that I repeat now with even greater urgency: we are cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens—fellow humans.
It is precisely when the political system has “decided” that the responsibility of leadership becomes most demanding. Because implementation is where policy stops being ideology and starts being ethics.
Belgium can still make this reform worthy of its social model, if it treats activation as a supported pathway, not a punishment clock; if it funds the consequences honestly; and if it refuses to confuse fiscal discipline with moral superiority.
In the coming weeks, the first wave will feel the reform not as a concept but as an empty line in a bank account. The question is whether Belgium will meet that moment with bureaucratic indifference or with the quiet competence and compassion that once made its welfare model a benchmark.
Democracy brought us here. Now decency must guide what we do next.
The author, Collins Nweke is a Senior Consultant on international trade and economic diplomacy. A three-term councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium till December 2024, his portfolio included social welfare and economy. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.
At the 3rd Nigeria Belgium Luxembourg Business Forum on Wednesday 22 October 2025 in Brussels, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and Development Cooperation, Mr. Maxime Prévot, delivered a GOODWILL MESSAGE to the delegates. Speaking on his behalf was His Excellency Ambassador Marc Pecsteen, Africa Director, Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region. In his message, he singled out an opinion editorial titled From Dependency to Partnership: Belgium’s Geopolitical Recalibration and Africa’s Moment by Senior International Trade Consultant for the Business Forum, Collins Nweke. The minister’s words:
“Ambassador Leenknegt drew my attention on a recent article by Mr. Collins Nweke – who is here in the room with us, as he is a trusted expert of Belgo-Nigerian trade promotion. In his article Mr. Nweke reflects on the current reshuffle of global supply chains. How can Belgium (Europe) navigate this transition? And what does Nigeria (Africa) have to offer? Well, Nigeria’s emergence as a regional economic hub positions it to anchor Belgian and European value chain diversification efforts. If Europe wants to avoid its current strategic dependency and move towards strategic autonomy – Mr. Nweke argues – then it should develop partnerships in the form of joint investment structures, knowledge transfer and transparent governance.”
[Full text of the Goodwill Message]
Esteemed Governor,
Excellencies,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Welcome to Brussels!
This is the third edition of this Business Forum and so we may now start calling it a tradition, one that we should maintain and build upon!
I commend the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Belgium Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce for this opportunity to meet each other. Meeting one other is the necessary first step for any fruitful relationship built on trust and fostered by mutual interest. Politics and trade have precisely that in common: at the heart of it, it is about investing in human relationships.
Allow me to congratulate also our ambassador in Abuja, H.E. Pieter Leenknegt, for the tremendous efforts he and his team are making to develop and facilitate bilateral trade relations between our countries, for his active involvement in trade promotion activities alongside with Flanders Investment and Trade (FIT) based in Lagos, with the Nigerian commercial authorities at Federal, State and local levels, with sector organizations and locally and internationally oriented chambers of commerce, and with the Belgian business community.
Ambassador Leenknegt drew my attention on a recent article by Mr. Collins Nweke – who is here in the room with us, as he is a trusted expert of Belgo-Nigerian trade promotion. In his article Mr. Nweke reflects on the current reshuffle of global supply chains. How can Belgium (Europe) navigate this transition? And what does Nigeria (Africa) have to offer? Well, Nigeria’s emergence as a regional economic hub positions it to anchor Belgian and European value chain diversification efforts. If Europe wants to avoid its current strategic dependency and move towards strategic autonomy – Mr. Nweke argues – then it should develop partnerships in the form of joint investment structures, knowledge transfer and transparent governance. Because that is where Europe’s technological expertise and its rules- and value-based procedures can offer a solid base for enduring partnerships. Such partnerships are indeed empowering ! Creating mutually beneficial partnerships between Nigeria and Belgium, between Africa and Europe, has the potential and the capacity to redefine the ethics of globalization. I like Mr. Nweke’s vision very much. This new paradigm can reshape trade relationships between Europe and Africa into truly healthy ones!
I suggest you read Mr. Collins Nweke’s article yourself. I highly recommend it. But it is time to wrap up for me. Let me conclude.
In a few weeks from now, Flanders Investment and Trade (FIT) and VOKA, the Flemish Business Network, will accompany a substantial trade mission composed of dozens of business leaders to Abuja and Lagos. This occasion will be a catalyst for future bilateral trade relations.
In the week thereafter (16-21 November) the Walloon Export and Investment Agency (AWEX) will host a Nigerian trade delegation in Wallonia.
Do not hesitate to call upon representatives of our trade agencies present here in the room to find out more about these upcoming trade missions.
As you can see, exchanges between Belgium and Nigeria are intense and growing. This is due to the will and initiative of people like yourselves who commit themselves to making that happen.
At moments of historic pressure, nations are judged not only by the positions they take, but by the solutions they propose. The current European debate over frozen Russian assets, crystallised at a crucial EU summit, is one such moment. Belgium now finds itself at the intersection of legality and leadership, national prudence and European purpose.
The question confronting Europe is deceptively simple: should frozen Russian state assets be mobilised to support Ukraine? The answer, morally and politically, is already clear across much of the continent. Ukraine’s survival is inseparable from Europe’s security. What is contested is how Europe should act. More than that is who bears the risk.
Belgium’s caution has been widely interpreted, in some quarters, as hesitation. That reading is incomplete. My reading is that Belgium is not resisting European solidarity. It is warning against a model of solidarity that concentrates systemic risk in one member state simply because history and infrastructure placed the assets there. This is not obstructionism as some would like to simplistically label it. It is institutional realism.
As home to Euroclear, Belgium is custodian to a significant share of the frozen Russian assets. That custodianship carries legal exposure, financial vulnerability, and geopolitical risk. Any unilateral move that leaves Belgium or Euroclear bearing the brunt of litigation, retaliation, or reputational damage would be neither fair nor European. In a Union built on shared sovereignty, shared risk must follow shared ambition.
This is where Belgium’s political tradition offers Europe a way forward. Consensus-building is not weakness; it is statecraft. Belgian politics has long thrived on crafting outcomes that allow divergent interests to converge without humiliation or coercion. Europe would do well to draw from that tradition now. But Belgium would have to create the enabling environment for that to happen.
A credible European solution must rest on one foundational principle: Europeanise the risk, not merely the decision. If Europe chooses to act collectively, then the legal and financial consequences must also be collectively borne. A binding EU-level indemnity mechanism would ensure that no single member state becomes the fall guy for a European geopolitical choice. This must be anchored in a Council decision or regulation. It should not be seen as special pleading by Belgium. It is a test of European maturity.
Second, Europe must separate urgency from recklessness. There is already a lawful pathway that commands broad support: the use of windfall profits generated by frozen assets. Expanding this channel allows Europe to continue supporting Ukraine decisively while the more complex legal architecture around principal assets is clarified. Acting responsibly need not mean acting slowly.
Third, this debate exposes a structural weakness the EU can no longer ignore. Ad-hoc improvisation is no substitute for institutional readiness. Europe should seize this moment to establish a permanent EU-level sovereign assets mechanism. This is a framework that governs frozen state assets under strict political and legal thresholds. Such an instrument would remove hostage risk from individual member states and ensure that future crises are met with preparation, not panic.
For Belgium’s Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, the path forward lies not in retreat, but in reframing. Belgium should say, clearly and publicly, that it supports the objective of mobilising Russian-linked resources for Ukraine, provided Europe acts as Europe. That means unity not only in rhetoric, but in liability, governance, and protection of strategic infrastructure.
This is the win-win Europe needs. Belgium retains its legal and financial integrity. Europe gains a sustainable, credible mechanism to back its geopolitical commitments. Ukraine receives continued support without undermining the legal order Europe claims to defend.
In the end, the choice is not between Belgian national interest and European common interest. Properly understood, they converge. A Europe that asks one member state to carry disproportionate risk is not a stronger Europe; it is a fragile one. Conversely, a Europe that mutualises responsibility is a Europe capable of leadership.
Consensus, after all, is not the art of delaying decisions. It is the discipline of ensuring that when decisions are taken, they endure. Belgium should help Europe rise to that standard. It should rise to this occasion not by saying no, but by showing how to say yes, together.
