Tag: policy

The Venezuela Crisis Through an African Non‑Interference Lens

“In reality, Africa has articulated one of the most sophisticated normative frameworks on sovereignty and intervention outside Europe. The Venezuelan invasion calls for the deployment AU Doctrine, Strategic Non-Alignment, and choosing diplomacy over coercion”  – Collins Nweke

The evolving crisis in Venezuela is often framed as a distant Latin American drama, but for Africa, that would be a profound misreading. What is unfolding in Caracas is far more than a contest over Nicolás Maduro or a reaction to United States policy choices. It is a stress test of global norms in an increasingly fragmented international order. Viewed through Africa’s long‑established doctrine of sovereignty, non‑interference, and non‑indifference, the crisis exposes the same dilemmas the continent has repeatedly confronted in Libya, the Sahel, and other externally shaped theatres of instability. 

Africa is not merely a bystander to these debates. It has articulated one of the world’s most sophisticated frameworks on intervention and state responsibility. It is seen as a framework born from hard lessons about the costs of both indifference and coercive external involvement. The Venezuelan crisis thus becomes a mirror, reflecting the stakes for African states as global powers stretch, reinterpret, or selectively apply international rules. Its implications reach far beyond Caracas. They speak directly to Africa’s strategic autonomy, its commitment to diplomacy over coercion, and its insistence that sovereignty must coexist with accountability.

Africa Is Not Normatively Silent

Africa is often caricatured as reactive in global affairs. In reality, the continent has articulated one of the most sophisticated normative frameworks on sovereignty and intervention outside Europe. The African Union is built on a carefully negotiated doctrine that seeks to reconcile state sovereignty, collective responsibility, and human security.

The AU Constitutive Act establishes, on the one hand, the principle of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. On the other, it introduces a distinctly African innovation: the right of the Union to intervene in grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This was not a rejection of sovereignty, but a refinement of it. This was born of Africa’s painful experience with indifference during mass atrocities.

The Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000) further clarified Africa’s red lines. It rejected coups, mercenary interventions, and externally engineered seizures of power, while insisting that political change must be constitutional, inclusive, and domestically anchored. Importantly, Lomé did not license regime change by foreign powers. It asserted African ownership over political legitimacy.

Together, these instruments amount to a coherent African doctrine: non-interference without non-indifference; sovereignty without impunity; and reform without coercion.

Diplomacy as First Resort, Not Last Option

Africa’s practical diplomacy has reinforced this doctrine. AU-led and AU-mandated mediation efforts have consistently prioritised dialogue, negotiated settlements, and regional legitimacy over punitive or militarised approaches. Examples abound from Sudan and South Sudan to Kenya, The Gambia, and parts of the Sahel. While outcomes have been uneven, the underlying lesson is clear: durable political settlements emerge from inclusive processes, not externally imposed outcomes.

This preference for diplomacy over coercion is not weakness. It is strategic realism. Coercive sanctions regimes and forced political outcomes often hollow out institutions, radicalise domestic actors, and internationalise internal conflicts. Venezuela’s protracted crisis illustrates this danger vividly.

For Africa, the Venezuela case reaffirms a long-held conviction: defending sovereignty does not mean defending misrule; rejecting regime change does not require silence on accountability; and supporting democracy does not justify abandoning international law.

Strategic Non-Alignment in a Multipolar Order

China’s stance on Venezuela is less about ideology than about signalling a multipolar world. For African states navigating relationships with the United States, China, the European Union, and emerging middle powers, this moment underscores the urgency of strategic non-alignment. This implies that cooperation can exist without subordination.

Non-alignment today is not Cold War nostalgia. It is about policy space. Africa’s interest lies not in choosing sides, but in strengthening its collective voice through the AU. Fragmented national positions dilute Africa’s leverage. Coordinated continental postures enhance it.

Acting through the AU, African states can:

  • Uphold respect for sovereignty and constitutional order
  • Demand consistency in the application of international law
  • Engage all partners including Washington, Beijing, Brussels, and beyond, on equal terms
  • Anchor external relations firmly in the principles of the United Nations Charter

Resources, Legitimacy, and the Venezuela Lesson

Venezuela’s vast oil reserves offer Africa another cautionary lesson. Natural resources are not power by default. They become leverage only when matched with institutional legitimacy, credible governance, and effective diplomacy. Absent these, resource wealth attracts external pressure rather than strategic respect.

Africa has learned this lesson repeatedly. The continent’s future resource diplomacy must therefore be anchored not only in extraction, but in governance, legitimacy, and multilateral engagement.

A Pro-African Call to Action

For Africa, the implications of Venezuela’s crisis are neither abstract nor distant. They are immediate and strategic:

  • Defend sovereignty without legitimising misrule
  • Reject externally imposed regime change while insisting on accountability
  • Champion AU-led diplomacy and mediation as first resort
  • Converge under the African Union to practice principled non-alignment
  • Insist on respect for international law and the UN Charter by all powers, without exception.

In an era where global rules are being selectively applied and routinely stress-tested, Africa must stand firm on multilateralism as the currency of legitimacy. Anything less risks a regression to a world where might defines right. Africa has lived through that era. It cannot afford its return, whether in Caracas, Tripoli, Abuja, or closer to anywhere called home on the continent.

EU Doctrine Must Become Action in Venezuela

The European Union has spent the better part of two decades building a foreign-policy identity around a simple promise: power should be constrained by law, and crises should be resolved through principled multilateralism. That promise is not an abstract slogan. It is embedded in the everyday doctrine of the EU External Action Service (EEAS): conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue “as a tool of first response.” This is an integrated approach across the conflict cycle, and a steadfast commitment to a rules-based international order with the UN Charter at its core. 

Venezuela now presents a moment of truth for that doctrine.

In the wake of the US operation that removed Nicolás Maduro, Europe’s public posture has been understandably cautious. It welcomes an opportunity for democratic transition while underscoring that restoring democracy must respect the Venezuelan people’s will and remain anchored in international law and the UN Charter.  That framing is not diplomatic fence-sitting; it is the EU’s most valuable asset: legitimacy.

But legitimacy is only leverage when it is organised into policy. It must happen quickly, coherently, and visibly.

The EU already has a Council mandate that it must use.

Recent Council positions on Venezuela are not ambiguous. The Council has repeatedly renewed restrictive measures and listings in response to democratic backsliding and human-rights concerns, and it has underlined the EU’s commitment to support democracy and a peaceful and inclusive transition.  This is not merely sanctions policy; it is a political line: the EU seeks democratic restoration, but through lawful and inclusive means.

The question is whether Europe will now pair that line with a diplomatic initiative commensurate with the stakes.

EEAS doctrine points to the answer: mediation, preventive diplomacy, and “principled pragmatism.” The EEAS is not starting from scratch. Its mediation doctrine recognises that conflict resolution demands principled pragmatism: defending human rights and the rule of law while engaging the messy realities that make negotiated outcomes possible. 

In practical terms, that should translate into five immediate moves:

1.      Activate an EEAS-led mediation track

The High Representative/VP should mandate the EEAS Mediation Support capacity to convene a structured dialogue framework focused on political freedoms, prisoner releases, electoral guarantees, and transitional governance arrangements. This should be done quietly at first, but with a clear roadmap.

2.      Anchor the process in the UN Charter and regional ownership

Europe should explicitly root its engagement in UN Charter principles, including sovereignty, political independence, self-determination. It should then push for a process that is Venezuelan-led, with meaningful roles for Latin American stakeholders (including Brazil) rather than a purely Washington–Beijing tug-of-war. This aligns with the European Council’s repeated insistence that effective multilateralism and the UN Charter remain the EU’s compass. 

3.      Coordinate “contact group” diplomacy with enforceable sequencing

The EU should help organise a renewed international contact mechanism that couples incentives and constraints in a sequenced way: concrete reforms trigger calibrated relief; reversals trigger targeted re-tightening. The Council’s existing sanctions architecture provides the technical toolset; what is missing is the political choreography. 

4.      Separate accountability from revenge

If Maduro’s detention becomes a geopolitical flashpoint, Europe should insist that accountability for crimes must be pursued through lawful processes, not triumphalism. This is irrespective of whether the crime is corruption, repression, or transnational organised crime. That distinction matters for EU unity and for persuading hesitant partners that this is about norms, not dominance. Europe’s own statements appear to already point in this direction.

5.      Protect EU unity by staying anchored to Council language

Divergences inside Europe are inevitable under pressure. The stabiliser is to keep returning to agreed Council/European Council phrasing: peaceful transition, human rights, verifiable democratic outcomes, and the UN Charter. The more Europe speaks with one legal voice, the harder it becomes for external actors to split the Union into “hawks” and “handwringers.” 

Why this matters beyond Venezuela

This matters because the precedent being set is larger than Caracas. If the world normalises political change through unilateral force, then the guardrails that protect smaller states weaken. This must be without prejudice to how satisfying it may feel in the short term. Europe understands this better than most. It was built to ensure that law restrains power, not the other way around.

That is why Venezuela is not only a Latin American drama. Venezuela is a test of whether the EU still believes in the doctrine it teaches. That doctrine is a gospel according to mediation first, multilateralism always, the UN Charter as the floor, not the ceiling. The doctrine has many converts including the United States and should not require much preaching now.

Europe should not choose between democracy and legality. The EU’s calling is to insist that democracy pursued unlawfully is fragile, and legality pursued without democracy is hollow. The EU has no better comparative advantage than this. The only sustainable outcome is a negotiated transition that is Venezuelan-led, internationally verified, and regionally owned. That is what EU doctrine demands. It is time to operationalise it.

A Fiscal Reset for Nigeria That Depends on Trust

Op-Ed by Collins Nweke

Nigeria’s tax overhaul is less a revenue exercise than a credibility test. It is one that will shape investor confidence, citizen buy-in, and the country’s reform reputation in the face of the world for years to come.

by Collins Nweke

Today, 1 January 2026, marks more than the start of a new year for Nigeria. It is the dawn of a new fiscal era, as the country’s ambitious tax law comes into force. The timing of this piece is deliberate: it coincides with a moment of profound national significance and symbolism. In the months since the law was announced, Nigeria has witnessed spirited debates, rigorous analyses including my op-ed on Proshare titled: Tax Ombud for Nigeria: Navigating a Promising Reform in a Distrustful Context on the role of the tax ombudsman, and passionate protests, all underscoring the gravity of the changes at hand. Yet, despite the turbulence, the government has pressed ahead, undeterred and unwavering in its resolve. Against this backdrop, my purpose is not to add to the noise, but to offer a sober reflection and an objective assessment of what will ultimately determine whether this reform succeeds or falters. For Nigeria, the true test is not simply about raising revenue, but about building credibility, at home and abroad, through the choices made from this day forward.

Operating in the intersection of international trade consultancy and Diaspora thoughts leadership for a couple of decades now, feels like a long-standing bridge between Nigeria and global capital. In such vantage position, I have learnt one enduring lesson: investors do not fear reform, they fear uncertainty. Nigeria’s new tax framework should therefore not be viewed as a risk by default, instead of the test that it is. A test of credibility, sequencing, and Nigeria’s capacity to translate reform intent into institutional reliability.

The Federal Government of Nigeria has framed the overhaul as a decisive pivot. It is a route away from oil dependency and toward domestic resource mobilisation; away from over-taxing a narrow formal sector and toward a broader, fairer base. For international investors, this narrative is familiar. What will distinguish Nigeria is not ambition, but execution.

What Investors Should Watch Most Closely

Speaking daily with investors who want to engage Nigeria but remain cautious, I can say this plainly: capital wants Nigeria to succeed. The market size, entrepreneurial energy, and strategic relevance are undeniable. But goodwill is not infinite. Nigeria has a duty, indeed an obligation, to make this reform work. Not only for revenue, but for reputation. If successful, it will reposition Nigeria as a serious reform economy, one that converts policy ambition into institutional trust. Not allowing it falter means paying attention to a few key factors:

Predictability over perfection: Tax rates can be modelled; volatility cannot. The clearest signal Nigeria can send to markets is that rules will not shift abruptly, retroactively, or selectively. Consistency in application matters more than marginal adjustments in rates. Credible reform is reform that businesses can plan around.

Balanced enforcement: A sound tax system expands compliance without penalising those already compliant. Investors will watch closely whether enforcement finally tackles elite non-compliance, leakages, and rent-seeking, rather than defaulting—yet again—to squeezing formal businesses because they are easiest to reach. Reform that punishes compliance undermines confidence.

Transparency in the use of revenues: Taxation is not merely a fiscal instrument; it is the backbone of the social contract. Investors, like citizens, want evidence that revenues translate into infrastructure, healthcare, education, and logistics that reduce the cost of doing business. Transparent reporting, independent audits, and visible outcomes are not political luxuries. These are investment fundamentals.

Sub-national readiness: Nigeria’s federal structure means national reform is only as strong as State level and local government implementation. Fragmented administration, multiple levies, and uneven capacity remain among the greatest deterrents to investment. Harmonisation, digital integration, and clarity across jurisdictions will therefore be critical tests of seriousness.

Sequencing and sensitivity: Reform during economic strain may be unavoidable, but its success depends on timing and tone. Phased implementation, clear thresholds, and protection for small enterprises would signal that Nigeria understands the difference between taxing productivity and suffocating survival.

Opposition, Dissent, and Democratic Legitimacy

It is important to recognise, and commend, the voices of trade unions, opposition parties, and civil society organisations that have raised concerns about the reform. They are not obstacles to progress, but essential actors in a functioning democracy, exercising a legitimate right to scrutinise state power and defend vulnerable groups. History shows that reforms imposed without consultation rarely endure. Government has a responsibility to engage dissent with respect, transparency, and good faith. From my position as an independent assessor, supporting investors to make informed decisions rather than defending any administration, robust opposition is not a weakness. Properly engaged, it strengthens legitimacy and improves policy outcomes.

Why This Reform Must Be a Win-Win

Engaging daily with investors eager to enter Nigeria yet wary of policy risk, one reality that shouts loud is that most investors want Nigeria to succeed. They realise that this, in the first instance is good for them. But it is also good for Nigeria. The reverse will reinforce a damaging narrative: that reform in Nigeria remains episodic rather than systemic. This moment therefore demands more than legislation. It calls for leadership that listens, institutions that deliver, and a country that treats citizens and investors not as extraction targets, but as partners in national renewal.

Tax reform is not the destination. Credibility is. And credibility, once earned, delivers the highest return of all.

From Rupture to Repair: Why Erasmus+ Signals a Smarter Brexit Reset

I was resolutely opposed to Brexit. I remain convinced that it diminished both the United Kingdom and the European Union. It did so economically, politically, and symbolically. Yet democracy does not end where disappointment begins. The British people voted, the decision was implemented, and history moved on. What remains is not whether Brexit should have happened, but how responsibly its consequences are managed. That is why the UK’s decision to rejoin Erasmus+ from 2027 matters far beyond the confines of student exchanges. It is a quiet, deliberate, and consequential signal that the long work of repair has begun.

Erasmus+ is not a concession extracted from a defeated party. It is also not a stealth reversal of the referendum. It is a confidence-building measure between two partners that have learned, painfully, that rupture carries costs for both sides. In an era of performative politics, this return to functional cooperation is refreshingly untheatrical. It says that after years of posturing, London and Brussels are rediscovering the value of pragmatism, of doing what works, even when grand reconciliations remain politically out of reach.

The choice of Erasmus+ is telling. Few programmes embody European soft power as clearly. It builds skills, broadens horizons, and weaves human networks that outlast election cycles. For young people in particular, Erasmus+ has been a rite of passage into a wider world. The UK’s withdrawal from it was one of the most tangible, everyday losses of Brexit. It was not felt in abstract trade statistics but in classrooms, campuses, and communities. Its restoration does not erase the past five years, but it acknowledges a simple truth: cooperation in education and skills strengthens competitiveness, social cohesion, and trust.

This is what a credible Brexit reset looks like. Not denial. Not revisionism. Not a rush to reopen the settlement. A reset that works with political realities while quietly improving outcomes. Rejoining Erasmus+ respects the UK’s red lines  while advancing mutual interests. Today, no free movement, no single market, no customs union are still in place. Rejoining Erasmus+ demonstrates that selective cooperation can coexist with institutional separation. In doing so, it offers a template for rebuilding ties incrementally, sector by sector, without relitigating the referendum.

Such humility is not weakness. Call it maturity. The most durable political arrangements are rarely rebuilt in a straight line. They are reconstructed through patient confidence-building, through policies that deliver visible benefits and rebuild habits of cooperation. On the question of the UK ultimately rejoining the EU, realism must prevail: it is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But politics is rarely static. If history teaches anything, it is that relationships heal when incentives align and trust is restored, often sooner than cynics expect. Fingers crossed, yes, but grounded in the hard work of repair.

Yet the significance of Erasmus+ extend beyond Europe’s internal architecture. Brexit did not only fracture UK–EU relations at home. It exported European disunity abroad, most visibly to Africa. In the years since the referendum, London and Brussels have too often pursued parallel strategies on the continent: duplicating instruments, competing narratives, and fragmenting impact. What should have been complementarity became rivalry. What should have been coordination became clutter.

Africa matters profoundly to both the UK and the EU, economically, demographically, geopolitically. Europe’s future growth, security, and climate resilience are entwined with Africa’s. And yet, post-Brexit, African partners have frequently encountered two Europes where one would have sufficed: overlapping trade initiatives, competing development finance, and unaligned regulatory approaches. The result has been inefficiency at best, confusion at worst, and missed opportunities for African agency to set the terms of engagement.

This is where the lesson of Erasmus+ becomes instructive. Cooperation does not require political reintegration. It requires political intelligence. Erasmus+ shows that shared programmes can be rebuilt on mutually agreed terms, delivering public value without reopening old wounds. Applied to Africa, this logic points to a necessary reframing: the UK and the EU do not need to compete for African trade; they need to cooperate for African transformation.

Such cooperation would not erase differences. Nor should it. The UK’s bilateral agility can complement the EU’s scale, regulatory depth, and convening power. Its ability to move quickly, tailor partnerships, and mobilise finance was instructive.  Together, they can support African priorities more coherently: skills and vocational training, digital connectivity, climate adaptation, and industrial value chains aligned with the African Continental Free Trade Area. Done well, this would replace zero-sum rivalry with outcome-driven alignment.

Diaspora networks are the connective tissue in this story. Across Europe and the UK, African diasporas possess market knowledge, cultural fluency, and investment capital that remain underutilised. They are bridges, not battlegrounds. A cooperative UK–EU posture in Africa would empower these communities as partners in development and trade, rather than forcing them to navigate competing bureaucracies. Trade is not a trophy to be won from Africa; it is a partnership to be built with Africans.

Critically, African agency must remain central. Cooperation between the UK and the EU should not recreate old hierarchies or proxy competitions. It should support African strategies, institutions, and ambitions, on terms defined by African governments, businesses, and civil society. The aim is not alignment for alignment’s sake, but coherence where it adds value and restraint where it does not.

Erasmus+ therefore deserves to be read as a template, not an exception. If Britain and Europe can relearn how to cooperate on students and skills, they can do the same on research, climate, health security, and Africa’s economic transformation. The recent re-association with research programmes, the resumption of structured dialogues, and now Erasmus+ together suggest a pattern: a mosaic of practical agreements that rebuild trust piece by piece.

For those of us who opposed Brexit but accept its democratic legitimacy, this approach is both principled and pragmatic. It neither denies the past nor surrenders the future. It recognises that politics is the art of the possible. And that what is possible expands when cooperation delivers results. A reset worthy of the name does not seek to relive the arguments of 2016. It seeks to govern responsibly in the world of 2026.

Brexit was a rupture. Erasmus+ is repair. And repair, when done patiently, often lasts longer than what was broken in haste. Europe’s future will not be shaped by who won Brexit, but by who learned from it within Europe and beyond.

Reforming Unemployment Without Cutting Too Close to the Bones

Belgium has decided. And in a democracy, decisions once debated, voted, and translated into policy, do not remain theoretical. They become lived reality. From 1 January 2026, a first group of jobseekers will begin to lose unemployment benefits, with a phased rollout that continues until 1 July 2027. The first wave affects roughly 21,500 people, many of them in Wallonia. And by summer 2027, the reform is expected to impact nearly 103,000 residents. 

I opposed this direction when it was still a plan. In my earlier piece, I warned against a welfare debate that risks shifting from fighting poverty to fighting the poor.  I still believe that warning was valid. But the point of democratic politics is not to continue campaigning after the ballots are counted. It is to help society govern itself wisely, cautiously, and humanely, especially when reform touches the lives of those with the least margin for error. My colleagues on the political Left who are still in active service might read this and say to me: how convenient! They may be right because, since retiring from active party politics, I no longer must be part of that hard decision of cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens. When it is the law, you are duty bound to comply, irrespective of political persuasion.

So I write now not to relitigate yesterday, but to prevent tomorrow’s avoidable harm.

Activation is not cruelty unless we make it so

Even as critics think otherwise, most liberals understand that Belgium’s welfare state was not built to romanticise dependency. We simply argue that it was built to protect dignity while enabling participation. Support and responsibility were always meant to travel in tandem.

In principle, governments are right to ask: how do we encourage labour-market participation, reduce long-term joblessness, and protect public finances? Those are legitimate policy aims. But legitimacy of intent does not guarantee legitimacy of outcome.

A hard truth sits at the centre of this reform: if you withdraw income support without simultaneously removing the barriers that keep people unemployed, you don’t “activate” people. You destabilise them. You push them from unemployment insurance into deeper poverty, precarious housing, debt traps, family stress, and sometimes untreated mental health conditions. The social cost does not disappear. It merely relocates often to OCMW/CPAS, to charities, to food aid networks, and to already overstretched local services.

Brussels authorities have already publicly prepared for that pressure, warning that thousands may turn to social welfare services as benefit limits bite.  This is the pivot Belgium must get right: reform must be paired with protection.

A humane implementation: six guardrails Belgium should adopt now

If the reform is to proceed, and the sad reality is that it is proceeding, then federal and regional governments should adopt a do no avoidable harm framework. Concretely:

1. No one should fall off a cliff: build a guaranteed “bridge” to support

The moment unemployment benefits stop, the transition to alternative support must be automatic, guided, and time-bound; not an obstacle course of appointments, paperwork, missed letters, and administrative confusion.

A person losing benefits should receive one coordinated pathway: employment guidance + social support + income stabilisation where eligible. If activation is the goal, then administrative chaos is policy sabotage.

2. Fund the shock where it lands: municipalities need real money, not moral lectures

If the policy shifts people from federal unemployment protection toward local welfare assistance, then the federal level must co-finance the increased load. Otherwise, the reform becomes a fiscal shell game: savings for one level of government, pressure and political backlash for another.

Belgium should create a transparent mechanism that tracks how many people transfer to CPAS/OCMW support and funds municipalities accordingly: predictably, not through ad hoc crisis measures.

3. Replace “one-size-fits-all” with case-based activation

Some jobseekers are unemployed because they lack skills. Others because they are older, sick, caring for relatives, facing language barriers, or living with invisible disabilities. A uniform time cap treats these realities as excuses. They are not excuses; they are contexts.

Belgium must implement individualised, case-based activation that distinguishes:

  • those who need skills and placement,
  • those who need health and psychosocial support,
  • those who need care infrastructure (childcare, eldercare),
  • those who are effectively unemployable under current labour-market conditions and need protected pathways.

A mature welfare state doesn’t pretend all unemployment is identical.

4. Expand training exceptions into a real ladder, not a loophole

The current framework includes an exception for people enrolled by 31 December 2025 in training for shortage occupations, allowing benefits to be extended until training ends (under conditions). 

That is sensible—but too narrow if Belgium wants genuine activation.

Training must be:

  • accessible (cost, transport, childcare),
  • realistic (matching labour-market demand),
  • and supportive (coaching, internships, employer linkages).

If training is truly the “on-ramp” to work, then government should widen, simplify, and properly resource it, especially for those closest to the labour-market margins.

5. Protect dignity in assessment and communication

When people receive letters informing them that their benefits end, the message must not be punitive. The tone matters because it signals whether society still recognises the recipient as a citizen or treats them as a burden.

Public discourse should also be policed for scapegoating. Belgium must reject narratives that imply poverty is a character flaw or that long-term unemployment is best solved through humiliation. Policy can be firm without being dehumanising.

6. Monitor outcomes like lives depend on it, because they do

Belgium should publish a quarterly Reform Impact Dashboard that tracks:

  • transitions to work (quality, not just any job),
  • transitions to CPAS/OCMW,
  • poverty and housing insecurity indicators,
  • debt and arrears,
  • health and mental health service demand.

And there must be a willingness to adjust. If evidence shows rising hardship without commensurate employment gains, democratic responsibility requires correction, not stubbornness.

A word to Europe: do not misread Belgium

Across Europe, many governments have long looked to Belgium as proof that a generous, humane social protection system can coexist with fiscal responsibility and labour-market participation. That reputation now places a burden not only on Belgium, but on Europe itself. This reform will be read, rightly or wrongly, as a signal. If Belgium; the careful compromiser, the laboratory of social dialogue; normalises time-limited protection without equally visible investment in activation, care, and dignity, others will feel licensed to go further and cut deeper. Europe must therefore resist the temptation to treat this moment as validation of a harsher continental turn. The lesson to draw is not that social protection has failed, but that reform divorced from social investment corrodes trust, cohesion, and legitimacy. If Europe still claims a distinct social model, one that tempers markets with solidarity, then Belgium’s experience should be a warning light, not a green one. The benchmark must not slide from humane protection to managed abandonment.

The moral test of governance

There is a phrase I used before that I repeat now with even greater urgency: we are cutting too close to the bones of vulnerable fellow citizens—fellow humans.

It is precisely when the political system has “decided” that the responsibility of leadership becomes most demanding. Because implementation is where policy stops being ideology and starts being ethics.

Belgium can still make this reform worthy of its social model, if it treats activation as a supported pathway, not a punishment clock; if it funds the consequences honestly; and if it refuses to confuse fiscal discipline with moral superiority.

In the coming weeks, the first wave will feel the reform not as a concept but as an empty line in a bank account.  The question is whether Belgium will meet that moment with bureaucratic indifference or with the quiet competence and compassion that once made its welfare model a benchmark.

Democracy brought us here. Now decency must guide what we do next.

The author, Collins Nweke is a Senior Consultant on international trade and economic diplomacy. A three-term councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium till December 2024, his portfolio included social welfare and economy. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.

Deploying the Belgian Art of Consensus in the European Debacle over Frozen Russian Asset

by Collins Nweke

At moments of historic pressure, nations are judged not only by the positions they take, but by the solutions they propose. The current European debate over frozen Russian assets, crystallised at a crucial EU summit, is one such moment. Belgium now finds itself at the intersection of legality and leadership, national prudence and European purpose.

The question confronting Europe is deceptively simple: should frozen Russian state assets be mobilised to support Ukraine? The answer, morally and politically, is already clear across much of the continent. Ukraine’s survival is inseparable from Europe’s security. What is contested is how Europe should act. More than that is who bears the risk.

Belgium’s caution has been widely interpreted, in some quarters, as hesitation. That reading is incomplete. My reading is that Belgium is not resisting European solidarity. It is warning against a model of solidarity that concentrates systemic risk in one member state simply because history and infrastructure placed the assets there. This is not obstructionism as some would like to simplistically label it. It is institutional realism.

As home to Euroclear, Belgium is custodian to a significant share of the frozen Russian assets. That custodianship carries legal exposure, financial vulnerability, and geopolitical risk. Any unilateral move that leaves Belgium or Euroclear bearing the brunt of litigation, retaliation, or reputational damage would be neither fair nor European. In a Union built on shared sovereignty, shared risk must follow shared ambition.

This is where Belgium’s political tradition offers Europe a way forward. Consensus-building is not weakness; it is statecraft. Belgian politics has long thrived on crafting outcomes that allow divergent interests to converge without humiliation or coercion. Europe would do well to draw from that tradition now. But Belgium would have to create the enabling environment for that to happen.

A credible European solution must rest on one foundational principle: Europeanise the risk, not merely the decision. If Europe chooses to act collectively, then the legal and financial consequences must also be collectively borne. A binding EU-level indemnity mechanism  would ensure that no single member state becomes the fall guy for a European geopolitical choice. This must be anchored in a Council decision or regulation. It should not be seen as special pleading by Belgium. It is a test of European maturity.

Second, Europe must separate urgency from recklessness. There is already a lawful pathway that commands broad support: the use of windfall profits generated by frozen assets. Expanding this channel allows Europe to continue supporting Ukraine decisively while the more complex legal architecture around principal assets is clarified. Acting responsibly need not mean acting slowly.

Third, this debate exposes a structural weakness the EU can no longer ignore. Ad-hoc improvisation is no substitute for institutional readiness. Europe should seize this moment to establish a permanent EU-level sovereign assets mechanism. This is a framework that governs frozen state assets under strict political and legal thresholds. Such an instrument would remove hostage risk from individual member states and ensure that future crises are met with preparation, not panic.

For Belgium’s Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, the path forward lies not in retreat, but in reframing. Belgium should say, clearly and publicly,  that it supports the objective of mobilising Russian-linked resources for Ukraine, provided Europe acts as Europe. That means unity not only in rhetoric, but in liability, governance, and protection of strategic infrastructure.

This is the win-win Europe needs. Belgium retains its legal and financial integrity. Europe gains a sustainable, credible mechanism to back its geopolitical commitments. Ukraine receives continued support without undermining the legal order Europe claims to defend.

In the end, the choice is not between Belgian national interest and European common interest. Properly understood, they converge. A Europe that asks one member state to carry disproportionate risk is not a stronger Europe; it is a fragile one. Conversely, a Europe that mutualises responsibility is a Europe capable of leadership.

Consensus, after all, is not the art of delaying decisions. It is the discipline of ensuring that when decisions are taken, they endure. Belgium should help Europe rise to that standard. It should rise to this occasion not by saying no, but by showing how to say yes, together.

Understanding the U.S. Visa Restrictions on Nigerians Linked to Anti-Christian Violence

Collins Nweke commends the US shift from “Christian genocide” to “anti-Christian violence” framing, calls visa restrictions a targeted accountability tool addressing Nigeria’s impunity culture, not a national sanction.

In his Proshare Op-Ed, Nweke argues language correction reflects diplomatic maturity, recognising Nigeria’s complex security reality, communal clashes, banditry, and extremism affecting all groups. He urges Nigeria to prosecute perpetrators of violence, strengthen security accountability, build a conflict-prevention architecture, protect witnesses, and communicate transparently to avoid future sanctions.

Nweke also spoke to the topic on RadioNow FM, providing some nuanced arguments.

Upgrading Nigeria’s Economic Reforms for Shared Gains

When President Bola Tinubu announced Nigeria’s ambitious economic reforms in 2023, he framed them as bold steps to rescue the nation from fiscal collapse and stagnation. Two years later, his administration points to some verifiable gains: revenue mobilisation is up, FX market turbulence has eased, inflation is moderating, and GDP growth is stabilising.

It is only fair to admit that these are not trivial developments. Meeting the 2025 revenue target ahead of schedule signals improved fiscal mobilisation. Clearing a long-standing foreign exchange backlog has restored some investor confidence and narrowed currency spreads. Oil output is recovering towards 1.5 million barrels per day. Services are also driving GDP growth as bank recapitalisation is strengthening financial stability.

And yet, for millions of Nigerians, these numbers tell a story their wallets do not recognise.

The Reform–Reality Gap

Despite these “gains,” everyday Nigerians face the harshest cost-of-living pressures in a generation. Inflation, though easing statistically, still sits above 21%. Prices of food and essentials remain painfully high. The removal of the petrol subsidy, electricity tariff hikes, and a weaker naira have combined to squeeze household incomes and overwhelm small businesses.

This isn’t just about economic indicators. It is about lived experiences of everyday Nigerians. For them the bread and butter issues they faced under President Buhari have gotten worse, not better, under President Tinubu. What some of us tell our colleagues in government or those that politically lean towards the ruling party is: save your saliva; Nigerians feel prices, not your percentages.

Reforms are often front-loaded with pain while benefits arrive on a lag. I’m not one, but my economist friends call it “J-curve” in their trade. Let us tell ourselves the truth about Nigeria: weak social safety nets mean there’s little cushion to soften the knock-out blows citizen receive daily. I’m not sure government genuinely agrees with this but without  targeted, transparent interventions, reform fatigue risks eroding public trust and stalling the entire recovery agenda.

The Right Direction Maybe, But…

This isn’t a call for a U-turn. Nigeria’s policy shifts on FX unification, revenue reforms, and financial sector recapitalisation are directionally correct. The problem lies in sequencing, communication, and cushioning.

Take fuel subsidy removal: economically rational, but socially destabilising without simultaneous investments in mass transit, targeted and honest cash transfers, and energy alternatives. Or electricity tariffs: cost-reflective pricing is unavoidable for investor confidence, but Nigerians should never pay more for darkness.

Reforms succeed when policy discipline meets citizen empathy. Nigeria must not pursue stability at the expense of social cohesion.

Lessons From Abroad — A Wider Lens

Nigeria is not alone in navigating the pain-versus-gain cycle of ambitious economic reforms. Around the world, other economies have grappled with similar dilemmas, some successfully, others less so.

1. Ghana (2022–2025) — The Discipline Dividend

  • Implemented an IMF-backed stabilisation plan, cutting subsidies and increasing taxes.
  • Faced severe short-term hardship: food and fuel prices soared, public sector strikes intensified.
  • Outcome: By 2025, inflation has fallen, FX has stabilised, and investor confidence has begun returning.
  • Lesson for Nigeria: Pain upfront can deliver gains later. But only if reforms are sustained and supported by credible institutions.

2. Kenya (2024) — Reform Without Buy-In

  • Rolled out aggressive tax reforms to boost revenue but underestimated citizen fatigue.
  • Lack of social dialogue and safeguards triggered mass protests (“#RejectFinanceBill2024”), forcing partial reversals.
  • Lesson for Nigeria: Sequencing and fairness matter; reforms fail when citizens don’t trust the process or feel excluded.

3. Indonesia (1998–2025) — Gradual, Inclusive Transformation

  • After the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia faced soaring inflation, mass layoffs, and currency collapse.
  • Leaders adopted a sequenced reform path:
    • Fiscal discipline paired with targeted subsidies
    • Massive investments in infrastructure and SMEs
    • Progressive liberalisation of FX and trade regimes
  • Outcome: Today, Indonesia is an emerging powerhouse, combining macroeconomic stability with inclusive growth.
  • Lesson for Nigeria: Reforms succeed when sequencing is matched with social buffers and long-term investment.

4. Vietnam (1986–Present) — The Power of Export-Led Strategy

  • Through the Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam shifted from a closed economy to one of the world’s fastest-growing export-driven economies.
  • Prioritised:
    • Investment in manufacturing clusters
    • Integration into global value chains
    • Gradual FX liberalisation backed by trade surpluses
  • Outcome: Sustained GDP growth above 6% for decades, drastic poverty reduction, and rising FDI inflows.
  • Lesson for Nigeria: Nigeria must pair fiscal reforms with an export strategy to truly stabilise the naira and diversify earnings.

5. India (1991–Present) — Reform + Communication = Buy-In

  • Faced with a balance-of-payments crisis, India liberalised FX markets, cut subsidies, and opened up to global trade.
  • Key to success was political storytelling: reforms were communicated clearly, framed as national revival, and backed by bipartisan consensus.
  • Outcome: From a fragile, closed economy to a top-five global economy, driven by services exports, tech, and manufacturing.
  • Lesson for Nigeria: Economic reforms thrive when communication, credibility, and consistency align.

Nigeria can learn from these transition economies: reforms succeed only when people believe the sacrifices will pay off. And please do not start bullying Nigerians when they do not understand the right things that you are trying to do. Or call citizens daft moaners when it is your responsibility to calmly and proactively make them get the gist.

Upgrading the Reform Agenda: a five-point recommendation

These recommendations are not about abandoning reforms. It is about upgrading them:

1. Make Revenue Fair and Transparent

  • Widen the tax net instead of overburdening compliant taxpayers.
  • Publish verifiable quarterly revenue and expenditure dashboards to build trust.

2. Protect the Most Vulnerable

  • Expand and digitise targeted cash transfers to shield low-income households.
  • Reduce “one-size-fits-all” tariffs and create relief bands for SMEs and rural consumers.

3. Fix the Power Sector, Predictably

  • Tie tariff hikes to enforceable service benchmarks: if tariffs rise, service must rise too. Remember that Nigerians have adapted to darkness. But please do not make them pay for the same darkness that you created.
  • Invest in decentralised renewables to reduce dependency on the national grid. Belgium offers huge opportunities on renewables and entrepreneurs there and in Nigeria are ready to engage. Organise the table for them with business forum, trade mission, et cetera.

4. Unlock Food Security

  • Secure agricultural belts and provide affordable storage and logistics.
  • Support mechanisation and smallholder financing to bend food inflation downward.

5. Communicate With Candour

  • Nigerians are resilient, but not if kept in the dark. Citizens deserve clear, frequent, and honest communication about the economic roadmap and trade-offs.

Turning Stability Into Shared Prosperity

Nigeria stands at an economic crossroads. The stabilisation drive is working in parts. But citizenship legitimacy, which is the sense that reforms serve people, not just numbers, remains fragile.

As I often remind policymakers both in Europe and in Africa:

“Stability isn’t the destination. Prosperity is. Reforms must move from policy papers to people’s pockets.”

This requires patience, yes, but also precision. Nigeria doesn’t need to turn back. It needs to upgrade. It must upgrade with empathy, sequencing, and execution. If we get that right, this moment of pain can become the platform for shared prosperity.

The author, Collins Nweke is senior consultant international trade and researcher on economic diplomacy. A former three-term Green Councillor at Ostend City Council, Belgium, Collins is a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria and the Institute of Management Consultant. He is also a distinguished fellow of the International Association of Research Scholars & Administrators, where he serves on its Governing Council. Collins writes from Brussels, Belgium.

The Use of Strategic Maturity to Contain Trump Without Confrontation

At the just-concluded 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, The Netherlands, history did not just unfold. History was carefully steered. At a time when the Western alliance faces internal fractures, there is transatlantic fatigue. There are also mounting global threats. Yet, the European Union did not emerge as a disjointed bloc of bureaucracies. The EU came out as a strategic actor with resolve, restraint, and refined diplomatic dexterity. The summit revealed so much that need not be repeated here. Nonetheless, the most notable revelation is the laying bare of the EU’s quiet containment of President Donald Trump’s destabilising impulses. This was done through the characteristic European purposeful politics and calibrated diplomacy.

The summit’s defining headline may be the unprecedented agreement to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. This is a leap that silences years of criticism from Washington, especially from Trump, about European freeloading. But buried beneath the numbers lies a more compelling story. It is about how Europe managed to uphold NATO’s cohesion and project unity. At the same time, Europe subtly neutralised the toxic unpredictability of the Trump doctrine.

Unlike previous NATO gatherings marked by President Trump’s incendiary outbursts, this year’s summit was different. There were no threats to abandon Article 5. It was notable for what didn’t happen. There was no explosive press conference, no ridicule of allies, and no disruption of summit communiqués. Instead, EU leaders adopted a mature, layered response strategy. First, they embraced a pragmatic posture, meeting Trump’s demands halfway by bolstering military expenditure. But in tandem, the EU was shaping the narrative to suit European realities. Second, they invested in soft containment. They reaffirmed NATO’s core values and buttressed Ukraine. They also advanced strategic autonomy in case America once again wavers.

At the centre of this diplomatic choreography was NATO’s new Secretary-General, Mark Rutte. The former Prime Minister of The Netherlands is seen as a steady hand whose transatlantic credibility proved invaluable. His presence, familiar to Trump yet anchored in European consensus-building, was key to managing the optics of loyalty without subservience. In many ways, Rutte symbolised Europe’s pivot from a reactive to a proactive actor in global affairs.

Nowhere was this clearer than in the calibrated support for Ukraine. While the summit formally limited Ukraine’s presence, it deepened military and financial backing. It also includes air-defense systems and fast-tracked integration. Rather than provoke Trump with overt expansionist rhetoric, Europe delivered substance over symbolism. In that symbolism lies another hallmark of seasoned European diplomacy.

The EU smartly redefined what defense means in the contemporary world. They embedded the 5% defense commitment within a framework that includes infrastructure. This framework also covers cyber-resilience and civil protection. This framing not only broadened the coalition of contributors but also softened the brute militarism Trump typically champions. It is, in effect, a Europeanisation of deterrence: multidimensional, layered, and sustainable.

Critics may argue that Europe still operates in America’s shadow. Yet, what transpired in The Hague shows that shadow is now cast by two actors, not one. Europe’s investments in strategic autonomy, through joint procurement, shared stockpiles, and integrated infrastructure, signal that the U.S. remains indispensable. It is at the same time, no longer irreplaceable.

For Africa and the Global South, Europe’s diplomatic balancing act offers lessons. It is possible to engage powerful partners without capitulating. It is possible to play the long game even in an era of transactional geopolitics. And it is certainly possible to lead without bombast.

As the dust settles on the summit, the EU must now match diplomatic gains with delivery. Defense spending must be realised, not just promised. Ukraine must see results, not just reassurance. And Europe must internalise this moment. It is not a victory lap, but a turning point toward becoming a geopolitical actor in its own right.

In The Hague, NATO’s future was safeguarded. There was no shouting across the table. There was instead strategic whispering across aisles. If that’s not purposeful politics, I do not know what is.

The BRICS and G7 Politics for Nigeria: Not One or the Other

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by Collins Nweke

In the dynamic arena of global geopolitics, Nigerians must shed the illusion that their country has to pick sides between BRICS and the G7. Rather than viewing these blocs as mutually exclusive, Nigeria should boldly pursue a dual-engagement strategy that taps into the opportunities offered by both. It is not a matter of ‘either-or’ but ‘both-and’. This is a strategic move that reflects Nigeria’s aspirations as a global player.

BRICS vs G7 is a false dichotomy

It is true that China, a key BRICS member, has invested heavily in Nigeria’s industrial sector. This is particularly visible in the Ogun, Ota, Lagos, and Badagry axis, among other locations. These visible investments often overshadow Western contributions, which tend to be more subtle and regulatory-focused. But raw investment volumes do not tell the whole story. Many Chinese investments come with challenges. Take debt sustainability as example. Limited local job creation remains an issue. We cannot ignore environmental concerns either. Meanwhile, G7-linked initiatives often support democratic institutions, capacity building, and regulatory reforms that are less visible but equally essential for long-term development.

Currency Policy and the Sovereignty Debate

Yes, Bretton Woods institutions influenced by G7 powers often push currency devaluation policies in emerging economies, including Nigeria. But it would be simplistic to attribute Nigeria’s economic struggles solely to G7 influence. Macroeconomic mismanagement at home plays a major role. It is also worth noting that BRICS institutions like the New Development Bank have not exactly rushed to fill Nigeria’s financing gaps. Neither bloc is altruistic. Both run based on interest. Those rooting for Nigeria should assume the responsibility of strategically aligning their interests with those of Nigeria.

Non-Alignment 2.0: Nigeria’s Diplomatic Playbook

Nigeria must take a cue from fellow emerging powers like India and South Africa who engage both BRICS and G7 with calculated pragmatism. This is not fence-sitting. It is strategic positioning in a multipolar world. Nigeria’s influence must be exercised in multiple fora. The country must use BRICS to assert African agency while using G7 platforms to strengthen ties with traditional powers and access advanced technology, finance, and markets. And this brings me to the issue of strategic engagement as opposed to selective alignment.

Frustration with the G7 is understandable. However, disengagement is not a strategy. Nor is blind faith in BRICS a silver bullet. Nigeria must evolve from being a passive recipient of foreign policy to becoming a confident global actor. The future lies not in choosing sides, but in choosing strategy.

That is why I stand by my position: Nigeria needs BRICS and G7. This is not naivety; it is geopolitical maturity. Let us play the global game with clarity, courage, and conviction.

Watch my related interview with Amarachi Ubani of Channels TV: https://youtu.be/Esp8JpRHCV8?feature=shared