BOOK LAUNCH OF THE CITY HE NEVER RETURNED TO By Ibekwe Paul Chukwuemeka

Keynote address delivered by Collins Nweke,
Global Affairs Analyst & Author, Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora

Ladies and Gentlemen

Distinguished Guests
Members of the Literary Community
Friends of Nigeria
Fellow Africans
And lovers of ideas

Good evening.

It is both an honour and a profound responsibility to stand before you today to launch what I consider one of the most important Nigerian novels of recent years particularly out here in Belgium and Europe.

The City He Never Returned To is not simply a novel.

It is a mirror. It is a ledger. It is a conversation.

And perhaps most importantly, it is an invitation.

An invitation to revisit a chapter of our collective history that remains unfinished.

An invitation to imagine what healing might look like if we summoned sufficient courage to pursue it.

An invitation to move beyond remembrance toward repair.

Before I speak about this book, permit me a brief personal reflection.

I come to this conversation not merely as a reader, analyst, or keynote speaker. In more ways than one, I am a war child. When the Nigerian Civil War broke out, I was still a toddler. Like many children of that generation, my memories are not arranged as historical facts or political arguments. They survive instead as fragments: the anxiety in adult voices, the sudden silences when certain subjects arose, the cautious way people spoke about the future, and the lingering awareness that something profound had happened to our country and to the people around us.

As I grew older, I came to understand that while some people experienced the war on the battlefield, many of us experienced it in memory, in inheritance, and in its long shadows. We inherited stories. We inherited grief. We inherited caution. We inherited questions that were never fully answered.

That is why this novel resonates with me so deeply. I am not a distant observer looking back at history through the comfort of archives. I am part of a generation shaped by the afterlife of that history. A generation that grew up among survivors. A generation that learned that wars do not always end when the guns fall silent. Sometimes they continue quietly, in memory, in institutions, in relationships, and in the stories nations tell themselves about who belongs and who does not.

Perhaps that is why I find the central proposition of this book so compelling. It is not content merely to remember. It dares to ask what comes after memory. It dares to ask how a nation heals. It dares to ask how survival can become repair, and how repair can become renewal.

The author, Ibekwe Paul Chukwuemeka, tells us in his Author’s Note that this novel began not with a plot, but with a question:

“How does a nation live with a past that refuses to become past?”

That question sits at the heart of this remarkable work.

For many Nigerians, particularly those whose families carry memories of the civil war, the past has never truly become past.

It survives in silences. It survives in inherited fears. It survives in caution, in suspicion, in stories told under the mango trees, at the ogwa in the village square, around dining tables and family gatherings. It survives in memories that official history often struggles to accommodate.

What makes this novel extraordinary is that it refuses to become trapped in grievance. Instead, it dares to ask a more difficult question:

What comes after survival?

The Emeka Ibekwe’s answer is both bold and original.

He calls it “speculative repair.”

In his own words and I quote:

“What if we treated this national healing not as a mysterious affair of the heart, but as the most complex—and most worthy—engineering project of our lifetime?” Unquote

That single sentence may well become one of the defining intellectual contributions of this book.

Because throughout history, societies have often spoken about reconciliation as an emotional process.

But this novel challenges us to think differently. It suggests that healing is also institutional. That memory requires archives. That justice requires documentation. That reconciliation requires accountability. And that nation-building requires deliberate design.

As someone whose professional and intellectual life has increasingly focused on economic diplomacy, governance, and institutional development, I find this idea deeply compelling.

Nations do not become stronger because they forget. They become stronger because they learn how to remember responsibly. That is why one of the central symbols in this novel is not a weapon. Not a politician. Not even a battlefield.

It is a ledger.

The ledger carried by Okechukwu Nwankwo, whose character or persona is recognisable in the Okey be anyi  of our different families.

A simple book of records. A record of assets. A record of losses. A record of names. A record of existence itself.

At one point in the novel, Okechukwu says:

“If we lose the record of what we have, we lose the proof of who we are.”

That statement speaks not only to one family. It speaks to nations. Because nations, too, require ledgers. Ledgers of truth. Ledgers of memory. Ledgers of accountability.

Without them, history becomes vulnerable to manipulation. And societies become vulnerable to repetition.

One of the most moving passages in the book appears in the dedication where the author writes:

“The opposite of war is not just peace, but the difficult, daily work of building something worthy of the survivors.”

Allow me to repeat that:

“The opposite of war is not just peace, but the difficult, daily work of building something worthy of the survivors.”

That is a profound political statement. And perhaps an even deeper moral one. Because too often we celebrate the end of conflict while neglecting the harder work that follows. The work of rebuilding trust. The work of rebuilding institutions. The work of rebuilding relationships. The work of rebuilding shared futures.

The Emeka (the author) reminds us that survival alone is not enough.

A nation owes its survivors something more. It owes them dignity. It owes them recognition. It owes them inclusion. And it owes future generations a better inheritance.

What particularly impressed me about this novel is that it refuses easy binaries.

It does not seek to inflame. It seeks to understand. It does not seek victory. It seeks healing.

It does not seek separation. It seeks a stronger basis for coexistence.

In the Introduction, the author writes:

“You cannot repair what you will not first acknowledge.”

This is true of families. It is true of institutions. And it is true of nations.

Across the world, societies that have successfully confronted difficult histories have not done so by pretending those histories never happened.

They have done so by acknowledging them honestly. Germany did not become stronger by forgetting. South Africa did not become stronger by denying. Rwanda did not become stronger by silence.

Every society that has healed has first found the courage to look directly at its wounds.

Nigeria is no exception.

Yet the beauty of this novel is that it does not stop at diagnosis. Many books tell us what is broken. Few attempt to imagine what repair might look like.

This one does.

And that is why I believe The City He Never Returned To belongs to an emerging tradition of literature that does more than remember history.

It seeks to shape the future.

As a first-generation Nigerian migrant who has spent decades living in Europe while remaining emotionally, intellectually, and professionally connected to Nigeria, I found another aspect of this book deeply resonant.

The author writes from Brussels. He writes from distance. Yet he writes with intimacy.

He demonstrates that distance need not diminish belonging. Indeed, sometimes distance sharpens perspective. Sometimes it allows us to see patterns that proximity obscures. Sometimes it allows us to imagine possibilities that entrenched positions dismiss.

The diaspora has often been described as a source of remittances. This novel reminds us that the diaspora is also a source of ideas. A source of memory. A source of imagination. And sometimes, a source of national self-reflection.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At its core, this book is an act of hope. Not naïve hope. Not sentimental hope. But disciplined hope. The kind of hope that understands pain. The kind of hope that acknowledges loss. The kind of hope that recognises injustice. Yet still chooses to believe in the possibility of a shared future.

The author closes his introduction with these words:

“The discussion begins not in the halls of power, but in the imagination.”

How true. Every institution was once an idea. Every policy was once a conversation. Every reform was once an act of imagination. And every better future begins with someone daring to imagine it.

Tonight, Ibekwe Paul Chukwuemeka (simply Emeka to us his friends) has done precisely that.

He has given us more than a novel. He has given us a framework for conversation. A vocabulary for healing. A language of repair. And a challenge. The challenge is whether we are prepared to engage honestly with the questions he raises.

Whether we are prepared to move from memory to understanding. From understanding to empathy. From empathy to repair. And from repair to renewal.

I congratulate the author for this remarkable achievement.

I commend Akajiofo Press for bringing this important work into the public domain. And I encourage every reader not merely to read this book, but to study it, and to  wrestle with it.

Discuss it. Debate it. Question it.

Because the future it imagines ultimately belongs not to the author alone, but to all of us.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is with great pleasure that I formally present and celebrate the launch of The City He Never Returned To.

May it travel widely. May it provoke thought. May it inspire dialogue.

And may it contribute, in its own important way, to building a Nigeria, and indeed an Africa, worthy of those who survived, and worthy of those yet to come.

Thank you.

God bless Nigeria. God bless Africa.

And God bless the power of literature to help us imagine a better future.

Brussels, Saturday 20 June 2026

A Trilogy on Why Governance and Economic Statecraft Matter

For decades, governance and economic diplomacy were treated as separate disciplines. Governments governed. Diplomats attracted investment. Development agencies pursued growth.

That distinction is rapidly disappearing.

In this three-part Proshare essay series, I explore why the future of economic development, particularly in Nigeria, will increasingly be shaped not only by national governments but by states and their leaders.

Part One: From Gateway to Factory Floor argues that investment competition has become fundamentally subnational. Increasingly, investors are asking not whether to invest in Nigeria, but where in Nigeria to invest.

Part Two: Why Sub-National Economic Diplomacy Will Define Nigeria’s Next Investment examines why states must become active participants in economic diplomacy, competing not merely with one another but with provinces and regions across Asia, Europe, and Latin America for capital, talent, technology, and partnerships.

Part Three: The Governor as Chief Economic Diplomat: A New Leadership Model for Nigerian States proposes a new leadership paradigm, one in which governors are measured not only by infrastructure commissioned, but by investment attracted, jobs created, exports expanded, and global partnerships secured.

Drawing on nearly three decades of experience in municipal governance and my work in international trade and investment promotion through the Nigeria Belgium Luxembourg Business Forum, the trilogy offers a practitioner’s perspective on a simple but increasingly important proposition.

Encouragingly, these ideas are already beginning to find institutional expression. Following the publication of the series, the Chartered Institute of Public Management of Nigeria has approved a pioneering Master Class in Economic Diplomacy for Public Managers, leading to the designation Certified Public Manager in Economic Diplomacy (CPMED). The initiative reflects a growing recognition that public managers must increasingly think beyond administration alone and embrace investment promotion, trade facilitation, partnership building, diaspora engagement, and global competitiveness as integral elements of modern governance.

Governance and economic statecraft are no longer separate disciplines. The most successful states of the future will be those whose leaders understand how to connect local opportunity with global possibility.

I am pleased to share the complete trilogy and look forward to the conversations and practical reforms it may inspire.

Zero-Tariff China Access can be a Strategic Opening for Nigeria if Matched with Domestic Reform

In a Worker’s Day 2026 interview, incidentally the same day that Zero-Tariff China Access for Africa took effect, South African Broadcasting Service radio, had me on to discuss the implications of the new trade regime for Nigeria.

Zero-Tariff China Access essentially means that a wide range of African exports can now enter China duty-free. For Nigeria, this is both an opportunity and a test of readiness.

On the opportunity side, it potentially opens up the world’s second-largest consumer market to Nigerian products like agricultural goods, solid minerals, leather, textiles, and even some manufactured items. If properly leveraged, Nigeria could diversify away from oil and earn more non-oil export revenue, which is critical for economic stability.

However, and this is the critical point, zero tariffs do not automatically translate into increased exports. Nigeria’s challenge has never really been market access. It has been production capacity, quality standards, and export logistics. China is a highly competitive market with strict phytosanitary and industrial standards. Many Nigerian producers are not yet positioned to meet those consistently.

There is also a structural concern: without a deliberate export strategy, Nigeria risks deepening its role as a raw material supplier, rather than moving up the value chain. So instead of exporting processed cocoa, for example, we may continue exporting raw cocoa while importing finished goods at a higher value.

So, in summary, Zero-Tariff China Access is a strategic opening, but it will only benefit Nigeria if it is matched with domestic reforms: improving infrastructure, supporting exporters, ensuring standards compliance, and aligning trade policy with industrial policy.

If Nigeria gets that alignment right, this could be transformative. If not, it risks becoming another missed opportunity, I told Innocent Samosa, Business Reporter at SABS Radio here

https://omny.fm/shows/business-africa/china-grants-africa-zero-tariff-access-to-all-africa-countries

The UK-Nigeria Migration Pact: Strategic Diplomacy or a Missed Opportunity for Human Capital?

The recent “strengthening” of the Migration, Justice, and Home Affairs (MJHA) partnership between the United Kingdom and Nigeria marks a pivotal, yet contentious, moment in Afro-British relations. Billed as a “landmark” in security cooperation, the deal introduces the “UK Letter”, dressed up as a mechanism allowing the UK Home Office to bypass traditional passport bottlenecks for removals, alongside a “Fusion Cell” to combat visa fraud.

While the optics suggest a robust defense of sovereign borders, a deeper policy analysis reveals a framework that is increasingly out of sync with the global shift toward Economic Migration Management. For a partnership that claims to be “forward-looking,” it remains stubbornly anchored in the mechanics of removal rather than the dynamics of human capital.

The Asymmetry of the “Security-First” Model

On the surface, the MJHA is presented as a reciprocal arrangement. However, the benefits are fundamentally asymmetrical. The UK gains a fast-track solution to a domestic political pressure point; the visibility of “failed” migration; while Nigeria receives vague assurances regarding business visa streamlining.

As a migration advocate, one must ask: is Nigeria merely serving as an enforcement arm for the UK Home Office? By facilitating the removal of thousands without addressing the structural drivers of their movement, we are treating the symptoms of a global economic disparity while ignoring the disease.

Shifting the Paradigm: Lessons from the ‘Arraigo’ and ‘Chancenkarte’

To move toward a more statesmanlike discourse, we must look to European neighbours who are pioneering more sophisticated, “rooting-based” models.

·      Spain’s Arraigo (Social Rooting): Spain has recognized that after two to three years of residency, an individual is no longer just a “migrant” but a community member. Their model allows for the regularisation of status through employment, turning a “legal liability” into a Social Security-contributing asset.

·      Germany’s Chancenkarte (Opportunity Card): Germany is moving toward a points-based flexibility that allows migrants to “switch lanes” (Spurwechsel) from irregular status to work permits if they possess the skills the German economy lacks.

These are not “soft” policies. They are economically literate ones. They prioritise the fiscal contribution of the individual over the prohibitive cost of deportation flights and diplomatic friction.

A Blueprint for “Migration for Development”

Nigeria should not be a passive “returning partner.” A truly strategic partnership would advocate for a Global Skill Partnership (GSP).

In this model, the UK would invest in Nigerian vocational training, creating a “dual-track” system. One group of trainees remains to strengthen the Nigerian domestic market, while the other is granted a legal, streamlined pathway to the UK. This transforms the “brain drain” into a “brain gain,” ensuring that Nigeria’s human capital is developed, not just depleted. The initiative, SkillUp Nigeria can be a credible partner in this model.

Furthermore, we must discuss Regularisation for Remittance. With remittances to Nigeria exceeding $20 billion annually, the economic stability of millions of Nigerian households depends on the diaspora. Instead of mass removals, the UK should offer “probationary status” to non-criminal overstayers. This keeps the wheels of the Nigerian economy turning and saves the UK taxpayer the immense cost of enforcement.

In the final analysis, Nigeria and the UK must move from enforcement to engagement. The 2026 UK-Nigeria pact is a functional tool for border security, but it is not a vision for a shared future. If the UK and Nigeria are to be true strategic partners, they must move beyond the “UK Letter.”

We must demand a transition from Security-led Migration to Investment-led Migration. Security is a prerequisite for order, but human capital is the prerequisite for prosperity. A modern, statesmanlike approach would value the Nigerian migrant not by the speed of their departure, but by the potential of their contribution.

 Collins Nweke is the author of Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora (2026) and Senior International Trade Consultant. He writes from Brussels, Belgium.

The Brussels Mission of Nigeria Must Become a Command Centre for Economic Diplomacy

by Collins Nweke

Belgium’s logistics power, Luxembourg’s financial strength, and the regulatory influence of the European Union make Brussels one of Nigeria’s most strategically important diplomatic postings. The challenge for Nigeria’s new envoy is to convert presence into economic and geopolitical influence. Because diplomacy today is no longer conducted only across negotiating tables, but across networks of trade, finance, technology, and people.

Diplomacy in the twenty-first century is no longer only about representation. It is increasingly about economic positioning. Nowhere illustrates this reality more clearly than Nigeria’s diplomatic mission to Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the European Union.

For many Nigerians, Brussels may appear as just another European capital where Nigeria maintains an embassy. In reality, it is one of the most strategically consequential diplomatic platforms Nigeria possesses anywhere in the world.

From trade logistics to financial capital and regulatory influence, the Brussels mission sits at the intersection of three powerful European systems that directly shape Nigeria’s economic future.

Brussels as Nigeria’s Triple Strategic Gateway

Nigeria’s envoy in Brussels operates within what may best be described as a triple gateway to Europe.

Belgium: Europe’s Logistics Platform

Belgium hosts one of the most important maritime trade hubs in the world. The Port of Antwerp-Bruges serves as a key entry point for goods moving into the European market.

For Nigeria, this port represents more than maritime infrastructure. It is a strategic corridor through which Nigerian exports, from agricultural products to petrochemicals, enter the broader European economy.

A proactive diplomatic strategy in Belgium can therefore directly influence Nigeria’s trade competitiveness in Europe.

Luxembourg: Global Capital Markets

Luxembourg, despite its small size, is one of the world’s most influential financial centres. It hosts one of the largest global investment fund industries and plays a leading role in sustainable finance.

As Nigeria seeks to diversify its economy and finance infrastructure development, Luxembourg offers access to sophisticated financial instruments including green bonds, blended finance structures, and climate investment platforms.

For Nigeria, the Luxembourg dimension of the Brussels mission represents an opportunity to connect diplomacy with global capital markets.

The European Union: Regulatory Powerhouse

The third pillar of the mission is the European Union itself.

EU policy decisions increasingly shape the rules governing global trade, digital markets, climate compliance, and supply-chain sustainability. Measures such as the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, for example, will have direct implications for African exporters.

Nigeria’s presence in Brussels must therefore go beyond ceremonial diplomacy. It must become an active platform for regulatory engagement and strategic dialogue with European institutions.

From Protocol Diplomacy to Economic Statecraft

If Nigeria is to maximise the strategic value of this mission, the embassy in Brussels must function less as a traditional diplomatic outpost and more as a hub of economic diplomacy.

Three areas deserve particular attention.

The Creative Economy Opportunity

Nigeria’s cultural industries, which include film, music, fashion, and digital media, have become global brands with strong commercial potential.

These sectors should be positioned within European markets not simply as cultural expressions but as high-growth investment ecosystems capable of attracting venture capital, distribution partnerships, and technology collaboration…

Economic diplomacy must learn to speak the language of culture as commerce.

Energy Transition and Climate Finance

Europe’s green transition is reshaping global energy markets. For Nigeria, the strategic challenge is to balance its role as a major natural gas supplier while also accelerating domestic renewable energy capacity.

Luxembourg’s financial ecosystem could provide a platform for structuring green financing instruments capable of supporting Nigeria’s long-term energy transition.

Handled strategically, diplomacy can help Nigeria convert climate pressure into investment opportunity.

Harnessing Diaspora Networks

Nigeria’s diaspora across Europe remains one of the country’s most underutilised strategic assets.

Highly skilled Nigerian professionals operate across European institutions, research centres, financial markets, and technology companies. Their networks represent a form of diplomatic capital that traditional embassies often fail to mobilise.

A forward-looking mission should treat the diaspora not merely as citizens abroad but as partners in economic diplomacy.

Five Strategic Priorities for Nigeria’s Brussels Mission

1. Trade Corridors

Deepen commercial engagement through the Port of Antwerp-Bruges as a gateway for Nigerian exports into European markets.

2. Financial Diplomacy

Leverage Luxembourg’s leadership in investment funds and green finance to support Nigeria’s infrastructure and renewable energy ambitions.

3. Regulatory Engagement

Strengthen Nigeria’s presence within EU policy conversations on trade, digital regulation, climate policy, and supply chains.

4. Creative Economy Promotion

Position Nigeria’s cultural industries—film, music, fashion, and digital media—as investment opportunities rather than cultural showcases.

5. Diaspora Economic Power

Treat the Nigerian diaspora in Europe as strategic partners capable of opening doors in business, academia, and policy networks.

The Narrative Challenge

Despite Nigeria’s economic scale and cultural influence, perceptions within Europe are often shaped by narratives centred on migration, governance challenges, and regional insecurity.

If Nigeria’s diplomatic engagement remains reactive, these narratives risk defining the entire relationship.

The more strategic approach is to reposition Nigeria as what it increasingly is: Africa’s largest economy, a major cultural exporter, and a critical geopolitical actor in West Africa.

This shift requires deliberate storytelling, sustained engagement with European policymakers, and strong partnerships with think tanks, business communities, and civil society networks.

A theme I explore in my recent book, Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora, is that diplomacy in the twenty-first century must expand beyond state institutions to include networks of entrepreneurs, professionals, and communities operating across borders. Brussels provides precisely such an environment, where formal diplomacy intersects with business, finance, and diaspora influence. For Nigeria, leveraging these networks may prove just as important as the traditional tools of statecraft.

A Strategic Opportunity

Nigeria’s mission in Brussels stands at the crossroads of trade, finance, regulation, and diplomacy.

In many ways, it is less a conventional embassy and more a strategic command centre for Nigeria’s engagement with Europe.

The challenge now is to ensure that Nigeria’s presence in Brussels reflects the scale of its ambitions. When Europe debates Africa’s economic future, Nigeria should not merely be represented in the room. Nigeria should help shape the conversation.

Because in the diplomacy of the twenty-first century, influence is not measured only by embassies and protocol, but by the ability to turn networks into opportunity.

And few places offer Nigeria more opportunity to do so than Brussels.

Diplomacy, Perception, and the Berlin Question

by Collins Nweke

Diplomacy, Perception, and the Berlin Question
by Collins Nweke

I have read with great interest the thoughtful intervention by my longtime friend and associate, Frank Ofili, concerning the reported appointment of Femi Fani-Kayode as Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany. His analysis rightly situates the issue within the broader intersection of diplomacy, history, and perception.

Many watchers will largely align with the thrust of Frank Ofili’s argument captioned FFK As Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany: Diplomacy or Contradiction?

This is not a question of personalities or partisan loyalties. It is a question of diplomatic calibration the essence of which is the careful alignment between a nation’s envoy and the political sensitivities of the host country. In modern diplomacy, perception can sometimes matter as much as policy.

Germany’s Historical Sensitivity

Germany’s foreign policy posture cannot be understood outside the shadow of the Holocaust. Since the end of the Second World War, successive German governments have framed their relationship with Israel as a moral responsibility. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel captured this sentiment when she told the Knesset that Israel’s security formed part of Germany’s raison d’état. Her successor, Olaf Scholz, has reiterated this doctrine repeatedly.

For Berlin, support for Israel is not merely an element of foreign policy; it is embedded within the country’s historical conscience. It follows that diplomats posted to Berlin must operate within that unique political atmosphere. Any envoy whose past public commentary appears sharply critical of Israel may therefore face unusually intense scrutiny from German political circles, the media, and civil society.

How Berlin Might React

If the appointment proceeds, three arenas in Germany are likely to react quickly:

1. The German Media

Germany’s press culture is robust and investigative. Major newspapers such as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, and Süddeutsche Zeitung routinely examine the public records of incoming ambassadors.

Past statements by the envoy would likely be revisited, contextualised, and debated. This will particularly be so with those touching on Israel or Middle Eastern conflicts. This could frame the diplomatic narrative before the ambassador even presents credentials to the German President.

2. Political Establishment

Within the Bundestag, parties across the ideological spectrum, from the Christian Democrats to the Greens, maintain strong pro-Israel positions. Parliamentary committees dealing with foreign affairs could interpret prior anti-Israel rhetoric as diplomatically awkward.

While Germany would not ordinarily block an ambassadorial appointment, the tone of official engagement might initially become cautious or guarded.

3. Public and Academic Discourse

Germany’s policy ecosystem includes influential think tanks, foundations, and universities deeply engaged in Middle East policy debates. These institutions often shape elite opinion. Questions about the suitability of an envoy could easily enter these circles and amplify reputational concerns.

Possible Negative Fallout

Several practical consequences could emerge if the diplomatic optics become contentious:

1. Distraction from Strategic Priorities

Nigeria’s relationship with Germany spans trade, renewable energy, migration cooperation, technical training, and industrial investment. Diplomatic energy could be diverted from these priorities toward managing reputational controversies.

2. Reduced Informal Access

Diplomacy often advances through informal networks: private dinners, policy forums, quiet consultations. If an envoy begins his tenure under a cloud of controversy, elite access may initially narrow.

3. Media Framing of Nigeria

Unfortunately, international audiences often conflate the persona of an ambassador with the posture of the sending country. The debate may shift from the individual to Nigeria’s diplomatic judgment.

A Four-Point Mitigation Strategy

Even where concerns arise, diplomacy always offers pathways to recalibration.

1. Early Diplomatic Reset

The envoy could proactively signal respect for Germany’s historical sensitivities. A carefully framed public statement acknowledging Germany’s post-war moral commitments could help reset perceptions.

2. Focus on Economic Diplomacy

If the ambassador quickly pivots toward economic cooperation, including investment, green energy partnerships, vocational training, attention may gradually shift from controversy to practical collaboration.

3. Strategic Engagement with Think Tanks

Active participation in policy forums hosted by German foundations such as Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and others could demonstrate intellectual seriousness and rebuild credibility.

4. Abuja’s Supporting Diplomacy

Nigeria’s foreign ministry could reinforce the relationship through high-level visits, trade missions, and bilateral initiatives that underline the strategic importance of the partnership.

The Abuja–Berlin Institutional Memory

It is also worth noting that the current Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, served previously as Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany for nearly eight years across two diplomatic postings. This is an unusually long tenure in ambassadorial practice. That experience means he is intimately familiar with the political culture of Berlin, its policy ecosystem, and the sensitivities that shape German foreign policy debates. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the reported appointment of Femi Fani-Kayode could not have emerged entirely outside the awareness of the Foreign Ministry. One may legitimately ask: if reservations existed within the ministry, were they overridden, or were they perhaps judged manageable? It is equally conceivable that Abuja believes any potential diplomatic friction can be mitigated through careful calibration, leveraging the institutional relationships and goodwill built during Ambassador Tuggar’s long tenure in Berlin. For all we know, the groundwork for managing the optics may already be quietly underway.

The Larger Lesson

Nigeria has long been regarded as one of Africa’s diplomatic heavyweights. From the anti-apartheid struggle to peacekeeping across West Africa, Nigerian diplomacy has historically carried considerable moral and strategic weight.

That tradition places a premium on careful ambassadorial selection.

Diplomacy is ultimately the art of building bridges. The strength of those bridges often depends not only on national policy but also on the temperament, reputation, and symbolic alignment of those entrusted to represent the nation abroad.

When the host country is Germany, such alignment becomes even more consequential. Watcher always remind themselves that when it is about Germany, you are dealing with an EU superpower whose foreign policy remains deeply shaped by historical memory. Frank Ofili’s intervention therefore raises a legitimate question: not about loyalty or patriotism, but about strategic fit.

And in diplomacy, strategic fit is rarely a trivial matter.

 Collins Nweke is the author of Economic Diplomacy of the Diaspora (2026) and a columnist with Proshare Nigeria and The Brussels Times. He writes from Brussels.

The Venezuela Crisis Through an African Non‑Interference Lens

“In reality, Africa has articulated one of the most sophisticated normative frameworks on sovereignty and intervention outside Europe. The Venezuelan invasion calls for the deployment AU Doctrine, Strategic Non-Alignment, and choosing diplomacy over coercion”  – Collins Nweke

The evolving crisis in Venezuela is often framed as a distant Latin American drama, but for Africa, that would be a profound misreading. What is unfolding in Caracas is far more than a contest over Nicolás Maduro or a reaction to United States policy choices. It is a stress test of global norms in an increasingly fragmented international order. Viewed through Africa’s long‑established doctrine of sovereignty, non‑interference, and non‑indifference, the crisis exposes the same dilemmas the continent has repeatedly confronted in Libya, the Sahel, and other externally shaped theatres of instability. 

Africa is not merely a bystander to these debates. It has articulated one of the world’s most sophisticated frameworks on intervention and state responsibility. It is seen as a framework born from hard lessons about the costs of both indifference and coercive external involvement. The Venezuelan crisis thus becomes a mirror, reflecting the stakes for African states as global powers stretch, reinterpret, or selectively apply international rules. Its implications reach far beyond Caracas. They speak directly to Africa’s strategic autonomy, its commitment to diplomacy over coercion, and its insistence that sovereignty must coexist with accountability.

Africa Is Not Normatively Silent

Africa is often caricatured as reactive in global affairs. In reality, the continent has articulated one of the most sophisticated normative frameworks on sovereignty and intervention outside Europe. The African Union is built on a carefully negotiated doctrine that seeks to reconcile state sovereignty, collective responsibility, and human security.

The AU Constitutive Act establishes, on the one hand, the principle of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. On the other, it introduces a distinctly African innovation: the right of the Union to intervene in grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This was not a rejection of sovereignty, but a refinement of it. This was born of Africa’s painful experience with indifference during mass atrocities.

The Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000) further clarified Africa’s red lines. It rejected coups, mercenary interventions, and externally engineered seizures of power, while insisting that political change must be constitutional, inclusive, and domestically anchored. Importantly, Lomé did not license regime change by foreign powers. It asserted African ownership over political legitimacy.

Together, these instruments amount to a coherent African doctrine: non-interference without non-indifference; sovereignty without impunity; and reform without coercion.

Diplomacy as First Resort, Not Last Option

Africa’s practical diplomacy has reinforced this doctrine. AU-led and AU-mandated mediation efforts have consistently prioritised dialogue, negotiated settlements, and regional legitimacy over punitive or militarised approaches. Examples abound from Sudan and South Sudan to Kenya, The Gambia, and parts of the Sahel. While outcomes have been uneven, the underlying lesson is clear: durable political settlements emerge from inclusive processes, not externally imposed outcomes.

This preference for diplomacy over coercion is not weakness. It is strategic realism. Coercive sanctions regimes and forced political outcomes often hollow out institutions, radicalise domestic actors, and internationalise internal conflicts. Venezuela’s protracted crisis illustrates this danger vividly.

For Africa, the Venezuela case reaffirms a long-held conviction: defending sovereignty does not mean defending misrule; rejecting regime change does not require silence on accountability; and supporting democracy does not justify abandoning international law.

Strategic Non-Alignment in a Multipolar Order

China’s stance on Venezuela is less about ideology than about signalling a multipolar world. For African states navigating relationships with the United States, China, the European Union, and emerging middle powers, this moment underscores the urgency of strategic non-alignment. This implies that cooperation can exist without subordination.

Non-alignment today is not Cold War nostalgia. It is about policy space. Africa’s interest lies not in choosing sides, but in strengthening its collective voice through the AU. Fragmented national positions dilute Africa’s leverage. Coordinated continental postures enhance it.

Acting through the AU, African states can:

  • Uphold respect for sovereignty and constitutional order
  • Demand consistency in the application of international law
  • Engage all partners including Washington, Beijing, Brussels, and beyond, on equal terms
  • Anchor external relations firmly in the principles of the United Nations Charter

Resources, Legitimacy, and the Venezuela Lesson

Venezuela’s vast oil reserves offer Africa another cautionary lesson. Natural resources are not power by default. They become leverage only when matched with institutional legitimacy, credible governance, and effective diplomacy. Absent these, resource wealth attracts external pressure rather than strategic respect.

Africa has learned this lesson repeatedly. The continent’s future resource diplomacy must therefore be anchored not only in extraction, but in governance, legitimacy, and multilateral engagement.

A Pro-African Call to Action

For Africa, the implications of Venezuela’s crisis are neither abstract nor distant. They are immediate and strategic:

  • Defend sovereignty without legitimising misrule
  • Reject externally imposed regime change while insisting on accountability
  • Champion AU-led diplomacy and mediation as first resort
  • Converge under the African Union to practice principled non-alignment
  • Insist on respect for international law and the UN Charter by all powers, without exception.

In an era where global rules are being selectively applied and routinely stress-tested, Africa must stand firm on multilateralism as the currency of legitimacy. Anything less risks a regression to a world where might defines right. Africa has lived through that era. It cannot afford its return, whether in Caracas, Tripoli, Abuja, or closer to anywhere called home on the continent.

EU Doctrine Must Become Action in Venezuela

The European Union has spent the better part of two decades building a foreign-policy identity around a simple promise: power should be constrained by law, and crises should be resolved through principled multilateralism. That promise is not an abstract slogan. It is embedded in the everyday doctrine of the EU External Action Service (EEAS): conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue “as a tool of first response.” This is an integrated approach across the conflict cycle, and a steadfast commitment to a rules-based international order with the UN Charter at its core. 

Venezuela now presents a moment of truth for that doctrine.

In the wake of the US operation that removed Nicolás Maduro, Europe’s public posture has been understandably cautious. It welcomes an opportunity for democratic transition while underscoring that restoring democracy must respect the Venezuelan people’s will and remain anchored in international law and the UN Charter.  That framing is not diplomatic fence-sitting; it is the EU’s most valuable asset: legitimacy.

But legitimacy is only leverage when it is organised into policy. It must happen quickly, coherently, and visibly.

The EU already has a Council mandate that it must use.

Recent Council positions on Venezuela are not ambiguous. The Council has repeatedly renewed restrictive measures and listings in response to democratic backsliding and human-rights concerns, and it has underlined the EU’s commitment to support democracy and a peaceful and inclusive transition.  This is not merely sanctions policy; it is a political line: the EU seeks democratic restoration, but through lawful and inclusive means.

The question is whether Europe will now pair that line with a diplomatic initiative commensurate with the stakes.

EEAS doctrine points to the answer: mediation, preventive diplomacy, and “principled pragmatism.” The EEAS is not starting from scratch. Its mediation doctrine recognises that conflict resolution demands principled pragmatism: defending human rights and the rule of law while engaging the messy realities that make negotiated outcomes possible. 

In practical terms, that should translate into five immediate moves:

1.      Activate an EEAS-led mediation track

The High Representative/VP should mandate the EEAS Mediation Support capacity to convene a structured dialogue framework focused on political freedoms, prisoner releases, electoral guarantees, and transitional governance arrangements. This should be done quietly at first, but with a clear roadmap.

2.      Anchor the process in the UN Charter and regional ownership

Europe should explicitly root its engagement in UN Charter principles, including sovereignty, political independence, self-determination. It should then push for a process that is Venezuelan-led, with meaningful roles for Latin American stakeholders (including Brazil) rather than a purely Washington–Beijing tug-of-war. This aligns with the European Council’s repeated insistence that effective multilateralism and the UN Charter remain the EU’s compass. 

3.      Coordinate “contact group” diplomacy with enforceable sequencing

The EU should help organise a renewed international contact mechanism that couples incentives and constraints in a sequenced way: concrete reforms trigger calibrated relief; reversals trigger targeted re-tightening. The Council’s existing sanctions architecture provides the technical toolset; what is missing is the political choreography. 

4.      Separate accountability from revenge

If Maduro’s detention becomes a geopolitical flashpoint, Europe should insist that accountability for crimes must be pursued through lawful processes, not triumphalism. This is irrespective of whether the crime is corruption, repression, or transnational organised crime. That distinction matters for EU unity and for persuading hesitant partners that this is about norms, not dominance. Europe’s own statements appear to already point in this direction.

5.      Protect EU unity by staying anchored to Council language

Divergences inside Europe are inevitable under pressure. The stabiliser is to keep returning to agreed Council/European Council phrasing: peaceful transition, human rights, verifiable democratic outcomes, and the UN Charter. The more Europe speaks with one legal voice, the harder it becomes for external actors to split the Union into “hawks” and “handwringers.” 

Why this matters beyond Venezuela

This matters because the precedent being set is larger than Caracas. If the world normalises political change through unilateral force, then the guardrails that protect smaller states weaken. This must be without prejudice to how satisfying it may feel in the short term. Europe understands this better than most. It was built to ensure that law restrains power, not the other way around.

That is why Venezuela is not only a Latin American drama. Venezuela is a test of whether the EU still believes in the doctrine it teaches. That doctrine is a gospel according to mediation first, multilateralism always, the UN Charter as the floor, not the ceiling. The doctrine has many converts including the United States and should not require much preaching now.

Europe should not choose between democracy and legality. The EU’s calling is to insist that democracy pursued unlawfully is fragile, and legality pursued without democracy is hollow. The EU has no better comparative advantage than this. The only sustainable outcome is a negotiated transition that is Venezuelan-led, internationally verified, and regionally owned. That is what EU doctrine demands. It is time to operationalise it.

A Fiscal Reset for Nigeria That Depends on Trust

Op-Ed by Collins Nweke

Nigeria’s tax overhaul is less a revenue exercise than a credibility test. It is one that will shape investor confidence, citizen buy-in, and the country’s reform reputation in the face of the world for years to come.

by Collins Nweke

Today, 1 January 2026, marks more than the start of a new year for Nigeria. It is the dawn of a new fiscal era, as the country’s ambitious tax law comes into force. The timing of this piece is deliberate: it coincides with a moment of profound national significance and symbolism. In the months since the law was announced, Nigeria has witnessed spirited debates, rigorous analyses including my op-ed on Proshare titled: Tax Ombud for Nigeria: Navigating a Promising Reform in a Distrustful Context on the role of the tax ombudsman, and passionate protests, all underscoring the gravity of the changes at hand. Yet, despite the turbulence, the government has pressed ahead, undeterred and unwavering in its resolve. Against this backdrop, my purpose is not to add to the noise, but to offer a sober reflection and an objective assessment of what will ultimately determine whether this reform succeeds or falters. For Nigeria, the true test is not simply about raising revenue, but about building credibility, at home and abroad, through the choices made from this day forward.

Operating in the intersection of international trade consultancy and Diaspora thoughts leadership for a couple of decades now, feels like a long-standing bridge between Nigeria and global capital. In such vantage position, I have learnt one enduring lesson: investors do not fear reform, they fear uncertainty. Nigeria’s new tax framework should therefore not be viewed as a risk by default, instead of the test that it is. A test of credibility, sequencing, and Nigeria’s capacity to translate reform intent into institutional reliability.

The Federal Government of Nigeria has framed the overhaul as a decisive pivot. It is a route away from oil dependency and toward domestic resource mobilisation; away from over-taxing a narrow formal sector and toward a broader, fairer base. For international investors, this narrative is familiar. What will distinguish Nigeria is not ambition, but execution.

What Investors Should Watch Most Closely

Speaking daily with investors who want to engage Nigeria but remain cautious, I can say this plainly: capital wants Nigeria to succeed. The market size, entrepreneurial energy, and strategic relevance are undeniable. But goodwill is not infinite. Nigeria has a duty, indeed an obligation, to make this reform work. Not only for revenue, but for reputation. If successful, it will reposition Nigeria as a serious reform economy, one that converts policy ambition into institutional trust. Not allowing it falter means paying attention to a few key factors:

Predictability over perfection: Tax rates can be modelled; volatility cannot. The clearest signal Nigeria can send to markets is that rules will not shift abruptly, retroactively, or selectively. Consistency in application matters more than marginal adjustments in rates. Credible reform is reform that businesses can plan around.

Balanced enforcement: A sound tax system expands compliance without penalising those already compliant. Investors will watch closely whether enforcement finally tackles elite non-compliance, leakages, and rent-seeking, rather than defaulting—yet again—to squeezing formal businesses because they are easiest to reach. Reform that punishes compliance undermines confidence.

Transparency in the use of revenues: Taxation is not merely a fiscal instrument; it is the backbone of the social contract. Investors, like citizens, want evidence that revenues translate into infrastructure, healthcare, education, and logistics that reduce the cost of doing business. Transparent reporting, independent audits, and visible outcomes are not political luxuries. These are investment fundamentals.

Sub-national readiness: Nigeria’s federal structure means national reform is only as strong as State level and local government implementation. Fragmented administration, multiple levies, and uneven capacity remain among the greatest deterrents to investment. Harmonisation, digital integration, and clarity across jurisdictions will therefore be critical tests of seriousness.

Sequencing and sensitivity: Reform during economic strain may be unavoidable, but its success depends on timing and tone. Phased implementation, clear thresholds, and protection for small enterprises would signal that Nigeria understands the difference between taxing productivity and suffocating survival.

Opposition, Dissent, and Democratic Legitimacy

It is important to recognise, and commend, the voices of trade unions, opposition parties, and civil society organisations that have raised concerns about the reform. They are not obstacles to progress, but essential actors in a functioning democracy, exercising a legitimate right to scrutinise state power and defend vulnerable groups. History shows that reforms imposed without consultation rarely endure. Government has a responsibility to engage dissent with respect, transparency, and good faith. From my position as an independent assessor, supporting investors to make informed decisions rather than defending any administration, robust opposition is not a weakness. Properly engaged, it strengthens legitimacy and improves policy outcomes.

Why This Reform Must Be a Win-Win

Engaging daily with investors eager to enter Nigeria yet wary of policy risk, one reality that shouts loud is that most investors want Nigeria to succeed. They realise that this, in the first instance is good for them. But it is also good for Nigeria. The reverse will reinforce a damaging narrative: that reform in Nigeria remains episodic rather than systemic. This moment therefore demands more than legislation. It calls for leadership that listens, institutions that deliver, and a country that treats citizens and investors not as extraction targets, but as partners in national renewal.

Tax reform is not the destination. Credibility is. And credibility, once earned, delivers the highest return of all.

From Rupture to Repair: Why Erasmus+ Signals a Smarter Brexit Reset

I was resolutely opposed to Brexit. I remain convinced that it diminished both the United Kingdom and the European Union. It did so economically, politically, and symbolically. Yet democracy does not end where disappointment begins. The British people voted, the decision was implemented, and history moved on. What remains is not whether Brexit should have happened, but how responsibly its consequences are managed. That is why the UK’s decision to rejoin Erasmus+ from 2027 matters far beyond the confines of student exchanges. It is a quiet, deliberate, and consequential signal that the long work of repair has begun.

Erasmus+ is not a concession extracted from a defeated party. It is also not a stealth reversal of the referendum. It is a confidence-building measure between two partners that have learned, painfully, that rupture carries costs for both sides. In an era of performative politics, this return to functional cooperation is refreshingly untheatrical. It says that after years of posturing, London and Brussels are rediscovering the value of pragmatism, of doing what works, even when grand reconciliations remain politically out of reach.

The choice of Erasmus+ is telling. Few programmes embody European soft power as clearly. It builds skills, broadens horizons, and weaves human networks that outlast election cycles. For young people in particular, Erasmus+ has been a rite of passage into a wider world. The UK’s withdrawal from it was one of the most tangible, everyday losses of Brexit. It was not felt in abstract trade statistics but in classrooms, campuses, and communities. Its restoration does not erase the past five years, but it acknowledges a simple truth: cooperation in education and skills strengthens competitiveness, social cohesion, and trust.

This is what a credible Brexit reset looks like. Not denial. Not revisionism. Not a rush to reopen the settlement. A reset that works with political realities while quietly improving outcomes. Rejoining Erasmus+ respects the UK’s red lines  while advancing mutual interests. Today, no free movement, no single market, no customs union are still in place. Rejoining Erasmus+ demonstrates that selective cooperation can coexist with institutional separation. In doing so, it offers a template for rebuilding ties incrementally, sector by sector, without relitigating the referendum.

Such humility is not weakness. Call it maturity. The most durable political arrangements are rarely rebuilt in a straight line. They are reconstructed through patient confidence-building, through policies that deliver visible benefits and rebuild habits of cooperation. On the question of the UK ultimately rejoining the EU, realism must prevail: it is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But politics is rarely static. If history teaches anything, it is that relationships heal when incentives align and trust is restored, often sooner than cynics expect. Fingers crossed, yes, but grounded in the hard work of repair.

Yet the significance of Erasmus+ extend beyond Europe’s internal architecture. Brexit did not only fracture UK–EU relations at home. It exported European disunity abroad, most visibly to Africa. In the years since the referendum, London and Brussels have too often pursued parallel strategies on the continent: duplicating instruments, competing narratives, and fragmenting impact. What should have been complementarity became rivalry. What should have been coordination became clutter.

Africa matters profoundly to both the UK and the EU, economically, demographically, geopolitically. Europe’s future growth, security, and climate resilience are entwined with Africa’s. And yet, post-Brexit, African partners have frequently encountered two Europes where one would have sufficed: overlapping trade initiatives, competing development finance, and unaligned regulatory approaches. The result has been inefficiency at best, confusion at worst, and missed opportunities for African agency to set the terms of engagement.

This is where the lesson of Erasmus+ becomes instructive. Cooperation does not require political reintegration. It requires political intelligence. Erasmus+ shows that shared programmes can be rebuilt on mutually agreed terms, delivering public value without reopening old wounds. Applied to Africa, this logic points to a necessary reframing: the UK and the EU do not need to compete for African trade; they need to cooperate for African transformation.

Such cooperation would not erase differences. Nor should it. The UK’s bilateral agility can complement the EU’s scale, regulatory depth, and convening power. Its ability to move quickly, tailor partnerships, and mobilise finance was instructive.  Together, they can support African priorities more coherently: skills and vocational training, digital connectivity, climate adaptation, and industrial value chains aligned with the African Continental Free Trade Area. Done well, this would replace zero-sum rivalry with outcome-driven alignment.

Diaspora networks are the connective tissue in this story. Across Europe and the UK, African diasporas possess market knowledge, cultural fluency, and investment capital that remain underutilised. They are bridges, not battlegrounds. A cooperative UK–EU posture in Africa would empower these communities as partners in development and trade, rather than forcing them to navigate competing bureaucracies. Trade is not a trophy to be won from Africa; it is a partnership to be built with Africans.

Critically, African agency must remain central. Cooperation between the UK and the EU should not recreate old hierarchies or proxy competitions. It should support African strategies, institutions, and ambitions, on terms defined by African governments, businesses, and civil society. The aim is not alignment for alignment’s sake, but coherence where it adds value and restraint where it does not.

Erasmus+ therefore deserves to be read as a template, not an exception. If Britain and Europe can relearn how to cooperate on students and skills, they can do the same on research, climate, health security, and Africa’s economic transformation. The recent re-association with research programmes, the resumption of structured dialogues, and now Erasmus+ together suggest a pattern: a mosaic of practical agreements that rebuild trust piece by piece.

For those of us who opposed Brexit but accept its democratic legitimacy, this approach is both principled and pragmatic. It neither denies the past nor surrenders the future. It recognises that politics is the art of the possible. And that what is possible expands when cooperation delivers results. A reset worthy of the name does not seek to relive the arguments of 2016. It seeks to govern responsibly in the world of 2026.

Brexit was a rupture. Erasmus+ is repair. And repair, when done patiently, often lasts longer than what was broken in haste. Europe’s future will not be shaped by who won Brexit, but by who learned from it within Europe and beyond.